نوع مقاله : مقاله پژوهشی
نویسندگان
1 استادیار بخش حقوق خصوصی و اسلامی، دانشکده حقوق و علوم سیاسی، دانشگاه شیراز ، شیراز، ایران
2 دانشجوی کارشناسی ارشد حقوق تجارت بینالملل، دانشکده حقوق و علوم سیاسی، دانشگاه شیراز ، شیراز، ایران
چکیده
کلیدواژهها
موضوعات
عنوان مقاله [English]
نویسندگان [English]
Introduction
Smart contracts, as one of the most significant applications of blockchain technology, have transformed contractual relations through features such as self-execution, immutability, and the elimination of intermediaries. Nevertheless, disputes arising from such contracts remain inevitable. These disputes may stem from coding errors, disagreements concerning contractual interpretation, issues related to the parties’ legal capacity, or the legal validity of smart contracts themselves. In response to this need, blockchain-based dispute resolution and arbitration mechanisms have emerged, among which the decentralized arbitration mechanism of Kleros is one of the most prominent examples. Kleros resolves disputes within a decentralized environment through collective voting, anonymous jurors, and token-based economic incentives. Despite the innovative nature of this mechanism, a fundamental question arises as to whether decisions rendered through such platforms can be recognized as "arbitral awards" in the legal sense and consequently be recognized and enforced before national courts, particularly under the 1958 New York Convention. This article aims to examine the structural and legal challenges of blockchain-based arbitration, especially within the Kleros mechanism, and to analyze the enforceability of awards rendered through this system in light of the New York Convention and Iranian law.
Methods
This research adopts a descriptive-analytical method with a comparative approach, relying on library resources, scholarly articles, and legal instruments. The study first examines the arbitration mechanism employed by Kleros and subsequently analyzes the fundamental principles of international arbitration, the Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards (New York Convention 1958), the UNCITRAL Model Law, and the Iranian International Commercial Arbitration Act. Practical examples of Kleros arbitration, including the Mexican lease dispute case, are also examined as case studies.
Findings
The findings demonstrate that blockchain-based arbitration faces multiple substantive and procedural challenges. The first challenge concerns the independence and impartiality of arbitrators. Kleros jurors operate under financial incentives based on game theory and Schelling point mechanisms, whereby jurors whose decisions fall within the minority lose their staked tokens. Furthermore, the anonymity of arbitrators makes it difficult to verify their identity, qualifications, and potential conflicts of interest. Another major issue is the absence of a seat of arbitration, which causes blockchain awards to be regarded as seatless, floating, or non-national awards. This creates tension with the territorial criterion emphasized by the New York Convention and Iran’s reciprocity reservation to the Convention. In addition, the encrypted form of both the arbitration agreement and the arbitral award raises questions concerning the fulfillment of the Convention’s writing requirement. Moreover, Kleros decisions are generally not accompanied by detailed legal reasoning and are rendered based on equity and fairness, which in many legal systems is permissible only upon explicit consent of the parties.
On the other hand, the principle of party autonomy and the parties’ agreement to submit disputes to such platforms constitute the primary justification for the legitimacy of this form of arbitration. The parties’ voluntary and informed selection of blockchain arbitration may be interpreted as implicit acceptance of its unique characteristics, including anonymous jurors, equity-based decision-making, and limitations on judicial review.
Conclusions
The study concludes that although blockchain-based arbitration, particularly the Kleros mechanism, is founded upon party autonomy and offers advantages such as speed, efficiency, and decentralization, the recognition and enforcement of awards rendered through such mechanisms still face significant legal obstacles in many jurisdictions. The principal challenges include doubts concerning arbitrator independence and impartiality, the absence of a seat of arbitration, uncertainty regarding the legal nature of the award, and difficulties in satisfying the formal requirements of the New York Convention. Nevertheless, hybrid arbitration models, the explicit designation of the seat of arbitration and governing law, and the transformation of Kleros decisions into traditional written arbitral awards—as illustrated by the Mexican lease case—may substantially improve the enforceability of such awards. Ultimately, the recognition and enforcement of blockchain arbitral awards largely depend on the approach adopted by national courts toward the interpretation of arbitration rules and the acceptance of emerging technologies.
کلیدواژهها [English]
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