نوع مقاله : مقاله پژوهشی
نویسنده
دانشآموخته فقه و حقوق، مدرسه عالی و دانشگاه شهید مطهری (ره)، تهران، ایران
چکیده
کلیدواژهها
موضوعات
عنوان مقاله [English]
نویسنده [English]
Abstract
Technological developments in the sphere of international security have transformed the nature, scope, and speed of conflicts, confronting the classical paradigms of law and strategy with fundamental challenges. While the twentieth century was the era of symmetric warfare, the twenty-first century is characterized by asymmetric and hybrid threats operating in the "gray zone" between peace and war. The Twelve-Day War of Summer 1404 (2025), initiated by the Zionist regime's direct attacks on Iran's military and nuclear facilities, served as a turning point in modern conflicts. This event highlighted those legal concepts derived from the Westphalian order, such as the prohibition on the use of force (Article 2(4) of the UN Charter) and self-defense (Article 51), require redefinition to address the realities of the digital age. The core problem of this research stems from the tension between traditional law and modern technology. The primary objective is to analyze Iran's legal-strategic response to this aggression and to answer the question: What strategy did Iran adopt to legitimize its defensive actions against a technological and asymmetric threat? The Doctrine of Asymmetric and Combined Response: An Analysis of Iran's Legal-Political …
Methods
This research employs an analytical-descriptive approach, relying on a "documented case study" method. The study first examines the theoretical foundations of the "right to self-defense" and the legal challenges posed by emerging technologies, utilizing sources such as the "Tallinn Manual" to interpret cyber operations within the framework of armed attacks. Subsequently, the article conducts a detailed analysis of the Twelve-Day War's timeline, evaluating the military and cyber actions of both parties. The methodology involves scrutinizing the legal arguments presented by both sides—specifically Israel's invocation of the "preemptive defense" doctrine versus Iran's reliance on "self-defense" and "countermeasures"—against customary international law criteria such as necessity, proportionality, and immediacy. The focus is on extracting Iran's strategic behavioral pattern from operational data and official political stances.
Results and Discussion
The findings indicate that Israel's initial military strike on June 13, 2025, justified under the rejected doctrine of "preemptive defense," lacked the prerequisite of an "imminent threat" and thus constituted a clear violation of international law and an act of aggression. In response, the analysis reveals that Iran, rather than engaging in a symmetric response (e.g., air-to-air combat), implemented an innovative doctrine termed the "Asymmetric and Hybrid Response Doctrine." This doctrine comprised three simultaneous components:
Asymmetric Kinetic Response: Iran shifted the battlefield from air superiority (the enemy's advantage) to missile and drone warfare. "Operation True Promise 3," involving hundreds of ballistic missiles targeting strategic Israeli infrastructure, was designed to impose direct costs and psychological shock, justified legally under Article 51.
Offensive Cyber Warfare: Complementing the kinetic strikes, Iran launched extensive cyberattacks against Israel's critical infrastructure (banking, media, services). The strategic goal was the "functional paralysis" of the enemy's society, framed as legitimate countermeasures against prior Israeli sabotage.
Expansion of the Front (Gray Zone): The activation of proxy actors, such as the Houthis, to launch attacks from different fronts served to exhaust Israel's air defense resources and create "legal ambiguity" regarding state attribution.
The discussion highlights that this "legal-military" conflict exposed the inefficacy of collective security institutions like the UN Security Council and demonstrated how both parties utilized international law as a tool.
Conclusions
The research concludes that Iran successfully combined classical deterrence with modern asymmetric warfare tools to execute a unique "legal-operational strategy." This approach not only responded to the immediate threat but also aimed to shape future legal norms in cyberspace. However, the conflict underscored significant gaps in international humanitarian law, particularly regarding the protection of dual-use infrastructure in hybrid wars. The article suggests that adapting to these new realities requires the formulation of a "Digital Additional Protocol" to the Geneva Conventions and the establishment of an independent international body for the technical attribution of cyberattacks to prevent miscalculations and the escalation of future conflicts.
کلیدواژهها [English]
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