صلاحیت شعب دیوان عدالت اداری در رسیدگی به شکایت از نهادهای عمومی غیردولتی

The jurisdiction of the Administrative Justice Court chambers regarding complaints about the actions and decisions of public non-governmental institutions (PNGOs) has been a contentious issue within the Iranian administrative justice system. Currently, Article 10 of the 2013 Law of the Administrative Justice Court (amended in 2023) raises doubts about the Court's ability to handle complaints against PNGOs beyond municipalities and social security organizations, as explicitly mentioned in the article.
This descriptive-analytical research seeks to answer the question: "What is the ideal model for the Administrative Justice Court chambers to oversee decisions and actions of PNGOs?" It aims to clarify the extent of the chambers' competence in dealing with such complaints.
Based on the investigation, current practice suggests that the chambers cannot handle complaints from PNGOs. Under present circumstances, the Court can only hear complaints about the decisions and actions of PNGOs specified in Article 10(1)(a) of the Law, those with a revolutionary nature, and those designated by special laws for judicial supervision by the Court.
The research findings argue that this approach contradicts the original intent of the legislator as reflected in Article 173 of the Constitution, which uses the term "government units." It also clashes with the developmental approach adopted in the 2012 Law of the Administrative Justice Court. Therefore, the authors propose that the Court chambers modify their procedures to allow for handling complaints against all PNGOs, based on the evidence presented.
 
Rationale for Expanding Jurisdiction
Article 173 of the Constitution establishes the framework for the Administrative Justice Court's jurisdiction within the Iranian legal system. This article serves as the foundation for the Court's existence, granting it the authority to address public grievances concerning officials, government units, or regulations.
While the term "non-governmental" appears in the title "public non-governmental institutions," these entities are still considered part of the governing body within the country's administrative system. The term "non-governmental" should not mislead us regarding their role and benefit from public authorities. In reality, all PNGOs are dependent elements within the administrative structure. They are categorized as "non-governmental" only due to specific administrative needs, such as a lack of technical, local, or professional concentration.
If the legal system acknowledges that PNGOs exercise some governance functions, it must recognize them as part of the "government" concept and subject to the Administrative Justice Court's oversight as the general authority for judicial supervision.
 
Expanding Jurisdiction Through Legislative Interpretation
From a parliamentary law perspective, with a developmental view of the Court's jurisdiction, the chambers' authority should not be limited to the PNGOs specified in Article 10(1)(a). Instead, it should encompass all PNGOs, including those with a revolutionary nature and those designated by special laws.
The argument hinges on the fact that Article 10 initially refers to "decisions and actions of government units" before listing specific authorities under its purview. This term "government units" undoubtedly reflects the concept of "government" used in Article 173. Therefore, the arguments presented for the meaning of "government" in Article 173 also apply here, and it could be interpreted broadly (encompassing the ruling class). Furthermore, the word "including" in the mentioned section suggests that the listed PNGOs are illustrative examples, and all PNGOs should fall under the Court chambers' jurisdiction.
 
Critique of the 2023 Amendment Process
For the aforementioned reasons, the Administrative Justice Court chambers should amend their procedures to allow for overseeing all PNGOs. Critically, the legislator's approach to the 2023 amendment process raises concerns. Despite the identified problems and numerous amendments made to the 2013 Law, the legislator avoided amending Articles 10 and 12, which define the chambers' and the Court's general jurisdiction. This omission was likely due to considerations such as avoiding delays in getting the amendments passed by the Council of Expediency. Consequently, the ambiguities and problems identified in these articles remain.
It was anticipated that Article 10, similar to Article 12, would explicitly grant jurisdiction over all PNGOs to the chambers. This would have provided the necessary legal basis for amending the existing procedures in this area.