نوع مقاله : مقاله پژوهشی
نویسنده
دانشیار گروه حقوق، دانشکده علوم اداری و اقتصاد، دانشگاه اصفهان، اصفهان، ایران
چکیده
کلیدواژهها
عنوان مقاله [English]
نویسنده [English]
Introduction
Classical natural law, in contrast to modern natural law, demonstrates a deeper allegiance to social tradition. This allegiance should not be dismissed as a negative trait, for it ensures the precedence of Aristotelian thought over the natural law derived from the paradigm of modernity. Indeed, Aristotelian frameworks often appear more efficacious and pragmatic when compared to contemporary positivism. To state plainly, a natural law that fails to adapt to reality becomes the very foundation for the rise of legal positivism—including its more extreme manifestations. Yet, this fidelity to tradition within classical natural law also poses an internal challenge, threatening its identity, nature, and function with a crisis that must be navigated to yield meaningful outcomes. The core function of natural law lies in facilitating the transition from what is to what ought to be, thereby guiding and refining positive law. This assertion, of course, does not negate the role of positive law itself. Rather, positive law complements classical natural law by
providing a framework for its objectification and implementation, serving as the culmination of the dialectical process inherent in classical natural law. Classical natural law theorists appear preoccupied with this transition from what is to what ought to be, a process bound by a specific framework. This framework must be reconstructed through the logical progression from Mythos to Physis, then to Logos, and finally to Arete. A critical question arises: Can this transition occur without metaphysical dominance over a changing reality? The role of metaphysics in this legal tradition, as well as the interplay between metaphysics and nature, remains a subject demanding rigorous examination. In the lexicon of Greek philosophy, this interaction might be understood as the coexistence of myth and nature (Physis). Myth here embodies the latent idealism within Aristotelian ontology, while Arete, though an elusive and unconventional concept, represents the path toward that idealism. Nature—even in its Zeusian form—cannot inherently possess normative function. Instead, it is the Greek Logos, rooted in Themis (itself imbued with the essence of Mythos), that confers normative authority upon the nature of things. Logos, crucially, is not merely a human metaphysical construct akin to Kantian reasoning. At times, Logos is interpreted mechanistically and reduced to rigid rules. Yet it transcends such limitations, serving as an argument that endows both nature and Arete with normative character. However, the very notion of the "nature of things" invites scrutiny: Is Aristotelian natural law immutable? If it is subject to change, how can a variable standard serve as the measure of Jus or the validity of positive law? Assuming mutability in natural law, must we conclude that the proofs symbolized by Logos are purely empirical? Or does Logos instead reside uniquely within natural-mechanical rules, rendering the pursuit of idealism through Mythos and Arete obsolete—thereby reducing Zeus to a ruler and erasing Themis?
Method
Given that classical natural law embodies the interplay between metaphysics and reality, neither a purely empirical nor a purely deductive method suffices for its analysis. Acknowledging this, the author adopts a moderate positivist approach to data analysis. This method is not merely descriptive; it employs a normative perspective to address the aforementioned questions.
Results and Discussion
If idealism is to be discussed in this context, is it solely a historical-Greek construct? Should Arete thus be relegated to the annals of history, with the conclusion that no liaison exists between classical natural law and modern human rights—the latter being a product of contemporary metaphysics? If
we acknowledge a metaphysical dimension in Aristotelian thought, framed as Mythos and Arete, can this foundation accommodate modern human rights within Aristotelian natural law? Should the answer prove negative, what form of rights would Aristotelian idealism align with when assuming normative force? Aristotle resolves this challenge by emphasizing the nature of things—particularly the historical-social nature of humanity (Physis)—as the source of justice’s validity. Human nature, being evolutionary, harbors a form of idealism that ensures progression beyond what is toward what ought to be. In other words, a profound connection binds Aristotelian Physis to Arete. This minimal metaphysical presence must be recognized as the outcome of Mythos in Aristotelian thought—a truth that, being mythic, eludes pure reason and is graspable only through persuasive, rather than argumentative, logic.
Aristotelian thought charts a logical trajectory beginning with Greek myth, advancing through Physis, mediated by Logos, and culminating in Arete. Disrupting any link in this chain risks trapping thought in sophistry or reducing it to modern *jus-naturalism*. Nevertheless, the nature of Aristotelian evolutionary idealism and its endpoint present further challenges. Perceiving universalism—and its quintessential expression, human rights—as the terminus of this evolution calls into question classical natural law’s loyalty to social tradition. Universalism, as a cultural metanarrative, clashes with cultural relativism, echoing Kantian globalization of right. While natural law’s realism necessitates the concept of right, this must not mirror Kantian metaphysics, which imposes metaphysical dominion over nature, thereby voiding natural law’s traditionalist allegiance.
Conclusion
If Aristotelian Jus originates from an evolving nature of things, there is no justification for excluding this nature as the source of subject-centered right or reducing its compatibility to objectified right. Aristotle’s focus on human nature implies the acceptance of an Aristotelian subject—why should this subject not also ground Aristotelian natural right? Resolving Kant’s subject-centered challenge does not entail retreating to Michel Villey’s traditionalism or substituting subject with object. Instead, the solution lies in a nuanced understanding of the Aristotelian subject: one that does not presume pre-social existence but embraces sociality as its defining trait.
کلیدواژهها [English]
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