Introduction
The transfer of the right to sue is located at the intersection of two fundamental realms of private law, namely the law of obligations and civil procedure, and in this respect it is considered one of the clear manifestations of the influence of financial law in judicial relations. In the classical view, the right to sue was considered merely a means of defending a substantive right and did not have economic independence; however, legal and economic developments, especially in modern legal systems, have led to this right being recognized as a legal position with transferability and financial value. However, the transferability of the right to sue has always been a matter of controversy, because it apparently conflicts with principles such as the relativity of contracts, the limitation of the effects of consent, and the need to 




Analysis of the Institution of Transfer of the Right to Sue …                   Mostafa Harati




maintain the balance of proceedings. In French law, this institution remained on the fringes of the obligations system until the 21st-century reforms, but with the amendment of Articles 1699 to 1701 of the Civil Code and the consolidation of judicial practice, it was recognized as an independent institution in the field of transferring rights in litigation. In contrast, in Iranian law, although there are no explicit regulations on the transfer of the right to sue, the fundamental question is whether the possibility of recognizing and applying this institution can be inferred based on the general principles of contracts and the rules of Imami jurisprudence. The aim of this research is to explain the theoretical foundations of the transfer of the right to sue, examine its limits and conditions in French law, and assess the feasibility of its acceptance in Iranian law with a comparative approach.
 
Methods
This research has been conducted using a descriptive-analytical method and a comparative approach. In the theoretical dimension, legal texts, legal doctrines, and leading judicial opinions in French law, especially the decisions of the Supreme Court and the courts of appeal, have been examined, and the legal foundations of the institution of transfer of the right of action have been analyzed. In addition, the general principles of contract law in Iranian law, especially Article 10 of the Civil Code, as well as the foundations of Imami jurisprudence, including the theory of ownership in the guise of liability and peace over disputed rights, have been examined as analytical support. In the comparative dimension, the historical course of the development of this institution from the classical concept of purchasing disputed rights to the modern form of transferring financial claims has been reconstructed, and its substantive and formal effects in the two legal systems of Iran and France have been compared. The inductive method has also been used to extract the economic and litigation-oriented functions of this institution in French judicial practice.
 
Results and Discussion
The findings of the study show that in French law, the transfer of the right to sue after the recent reforms is not considered simply as a branch of the transfer of claim, but is considered an independent institution with specific substantive and formal effects. According to the new regulations, a third party can acquire the disputed right of action from the creditor and, by entering the proceedings, have the same rights and obligations that the original holder of the claim had. At the same time, the French legislator has tried to balance economic efficiency, prevent speculative transfers, and protect the rights of the defendant in the lawsuit by anticipating mechanisms such as the possibility of paying the debt at the time of transfer by the debtor. This economic function has caused the transfer of the right to sue in the commercial and banking fields, especially in the purchase and sale of claims and claims for compensation, to become an effective tool for accelerating the collection of claims and reducing the delay in proceedings.




Volume 18, Issue 3, Autumn 2026




In Iranian law, although the Civil Code and the Civil Procedure Code have not explicitly identified this institution, an examination of the principles governing the legal system shows that there are necessary foundations for its acceptance. Article 10 of the Civil Code, by recognizing the validity of private contracts, provides the possibility of agreeing on the transfer of the right to sue—provided that it does not contradict public order and mandatory laws. In addition, institutions such as peace on disputed rights and the jurisprudential theory of what is in the liability provide the necessary jurisprudential capacity to justify the transfer of disputed legal situations. Comparative studies show that the concern about weakening the principle of the relativity of contracts is not a convincing justification for the absolute negation of the transfer of the right to sue, and this principle can be modified with a functional interpretation that is in line with contemporary economic needs.
 
Conclusion
The transfer of the right to sue, as an interdisciplinary institution, has transformed from a marginal concept into an efficient mechanism in modern law. The experience of French law shows that by establishing clear rules and appropriate procedural guarantees, this institution can be used without violating the fundamental principles of contracts. In Iranian law, utilizing the capacities of Article 10 of the Civil Code and the rules of Imami jurisprudence can pave the way for the gradual acceptance of this institution and lead to the promotion of economic efficiency, coherence between civil law and procedural law, and the realization of judicial justice.