نوع مقاله : مقاله پژوهشی
نویسندگان
1 دانشیار گروه حقوق خصوصی، دانشکدگان فارابی دانشگاه تهران
2 دکتری فقه و مبانی حقوق اسلامی، دانشکدگان فارابی دانشگاه تهران، ایران
چکیده
کلیدواژهها
موضوعات
عنوان مقاله [English]
نویسندگان [English]
Introduction
One of the important discussions in the realm of persons' wills is the extent to which the will of individuals can be effective. This question arises in all legal fields, but in some cases, such as family law, it has become more challenging due to the expansion of permissiveness and right-oriented discourse in this area. Furthermore, family law issues gain double importance because they are considered more practical and challenging. Therefore, the feasibility of the effectiveness of will in propositions based on authority, especially in the family realm, holds particular significance. The "authority" and "capabilities" of persons to dispose of their own affairs, whether such rights are renounceable, waivable, or limitable, are analyzed within the two categories of "right" (Haq) and "rule" (Hukm). There are several important questions in this regard: First, do these two terms have the same meaning but are expressed in two different forms, or are they different in essence and meaning in addition to verbal differences?
Based on the viewpoint that considers them different, the criteria for distinguishing and the differentiating principles of the two must be properly understood. Although in legal terminology, words such as "may" (mitavanad) and "has the right to" (haq darad) might also be used to mean "dominion and exclusivity," it is important to note that in many cases, in the wording used by the legislator, both the nature of "right" and the nature of "rule" are expressed with the word "may" (mitavanad). Therefore, it is not possible to determine the nature of persons' dominion and authority solely by using legal wording; rather, specific criteria must exist to determine, with their help, the nature of persons' authority and the limit and scope of the effectiveness of persons' wills. Thus, to discuss the foundations and principles governing the scope of the effectiveness of will and to organize the legal situations resulting from the exercise of will and the effect of renouncing or limiting a right, it is necessary to determine this criterion and its relationship with limiting the spouses' will. As a result of using the criteria for distinguishing right from rule, the characteristics of right and rule must also be properly identified. Because each of these two, in its own subject and context, entails specific effects, and in some cases, one can also identify the nature of being a right or being an obligation through these effects. Also, where there is no reason or indication for distinction, it is necessary to establish a principle and primary rule to resolve doubt and uncertainty. The techniques for establishing such a principle are also important. As a complement to the research problem, it is necessary to answer the question: What is the substantive difference between mandatory rules (rules of law) and permissive/alternative rules (rules of option), and by what criterion are these two categories of rules distinguished from each other?
Methods
This research has been conducted in light of a precise analysis of the nature of persons' authorities in the realm of marriage and the manner of its description in the words of jurists (fuqaha), using the documentary method to collect necessary data from authoritative jurisprudential and legal sources, as well as employing descriptive and analytical methods in data processing.
Findings
An examination of the present writing shows that there are multiple criteria for determining the nature of legal and jurisprudential propositions. In some cases, it was observed that the existing context is that of a terminological right (Haq), but due to factors such as the authority being personal to the individual (non-transferable) or a specificity existing in the subject, its transfer to another person is precluded. An example is the right of division (of time among co-wives). In such cases, what is being discussed is a right, but the application of some characteristics of a terminological right (right in the specific sense) faces an obstacle; however, the existence of an obstacle does not mean the negation of the nature of being a right. Criteria such as renounceability (isqat-paziri), claimability (talabe-paziri), and divisibility (tajzie-paziri) offer better indications. Among the mentioned criteria, the criterion of renounceability (isqat-paziri) is considered the definitive and ultimate criterion, in such a way that there is no right unless it is renounceable. Alongside attention to the mentioned criteria, it is also important to note that sometimes the legislator has not been precise enough in using wording, and sometimes has used ambiguous terms, and due to homonymy (ishtirak-e lafzi), a kind of fallacy has followed in the method of deriving meaning from the law. Therefore, in the manner of citing legal wording, it is necessary to avoid such fallacies and mistakes in the use of ambiguous terms. To this end, paying attention to the real meaning of right (Haq) and distinguishing it from the metaphorical meaning of right is important. Furthermore, to complete the criteria for distinguishing right from rule in the realm of family law, the establishment of a principle in the present issue relies on important principles such as the principle of not being a rule (asl-e hukm nabudan), the principle of presumption of continuity (istishab), the principle of precaution (ihtiyat) in important matters (such as the physical integrity and life of persons, matters related to moral dignity and reputation of persons (such as sensitive informational and communicational data), and discussions related to lineage and kinship).
Conclusion
Mandatory rules (rules of law) are associated with superior pillars, public interest, and public order, and arise in an imposing process accompanied by authority. "In terms of the material element," they are norms that appear in legal structures and frameworks. "In terms of the psychological element," the mandatory nature of these rules is rooted in the legal conscience. "In terms of objective," protecting legal structures and public interests, ensuring the proper course of affairs, and safeguarding public security and morality are counted among the objectives of mandatory rules. "In terms of content," if the content of a regulation pertains to structures or constructs designed to regulate legal relations and to create order, safeguard public order in its legal aspects or in relation to firm cultural foundations and their sanctions (good morals), it is considered mandatory. "In terms of mode of expression," written law may include commands, prohibitions, or negations. Of course, in many cases, positive indicative themes (in the form of commands) and negative ones (in the form of prohibitions) are more common, but it is not limited to legal expression, and one may benefit from aspects of soft law for norm identification and its gradations. "In terms of gradation," due to the existence of a hierarchy among legal norms and a hierarchy of public order, mandatory rules may also be graded in comparison to one another. Permissive/alternative rules (rules of option), interpretive rules, supplemental rules, substitutive rules, and facultative rules are intended to complement incomplete wills, to express matters neglected by the parties to a legal relationship, or to interpret and construe cases of silence, and they refer to the power of persons' authority to agree contrary to them or the authority to renounce a right. The tone (mode of expression) of the legislator, attention to the content of the rule, the protected interests and normative contexts, the possibility or impossibility of the interference of individuals' will, and the use of a practical principle are among the most important methods of distinguishing mandatory rules from permissive/alternative rules in the family realm. Of course, the establishment of a general principle in family law is not justified. In financial matters and matters that do not provide a special interest, one may base it on the principle of being permissive/alternative, and in other cases, base it on being mandatory.
کلیدواژهها [English]
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