نوع مقاله : مقاله پژوهشی
نویسندگان
1 گروه حقوق دانشکدهٔ علوم اداری و اقتصاد دانشگاه اصفهان.
2 دانشجوی کارشناسی ارشد علوم قضایی دانشگاه علوم قضایی و خدمات اداری تهران.
چکیده
کلیدواژهها
موضوعات
عنوان مقاله [English]
نویسندگان [English]
The central problematique of this research is the feasibility of privatizing "enforcement"—understood as the operation through which the legal order is translated into factual compliance in the material world. The objective is to analyze the fundamental question of whether the State can delegate enforcement to private actors, and whether the status of the agent (State employee or private person) makes a difference from the standpoint of legal theory. The method employed is a theoretical-foundational analysis grounded in principles of public law and concepts such as the legitimate monopoly of violence. The findings indicate that despite exaggerated claims for privatization—stemming from an overly formal definition of the public function—the provision of certain goods, most notably the enforcement of judgments, necessarily involves the potential use of coercive force. As the institution holding the legitimate monopoly on violence within political society, the State's responsibility in this domain is non-transferable; otherwise, it would undermine its very purpose and create a form of teleological contradiction. Furthermore, attribution of an act to the State requires both the primacy of public interest over private interest and the conscientious loyalty of the agent. Delegating enforcement to the private sector substitutes the profit motive for conscientious loyalty to public law, contradicting the modern State's foundations.
کلیدواژهها [English]
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