نوع مقاله : مقاله پژوهشی
نویسندگان
1 دانشجوی دکترای تخصصی گروه حقوق عمومی، واحد شیراز، دانشگاه آزاد اسلامی، شیراز، ایران
2 استادیار گروه حقوق عمومی، واحد شیراز، دانشگاه آزاد اسلامی، شیراز، ایران
چکیده
کلیدواژه‌ها
موضوعات
عنوان مقاله [English]
نویسندگان [English]
Introduction
This article reconstructs Richard Rorty’s democratic outlook as an integrated constellation of Dialogue, Irony, and Solidarity, arguing that for Rorty democracy is primarily a cultural–ethical project rather than merely a governmental form. The central problem is how political legitimacy and social cohesion can be sustained once metaphysical foundations and timeless standards of truth are abandoned. The article pursues three objectives: (1) to clarify Rory’s shift from truth-as-correspondence to truth-as-justification within a linguistic community; (2) to explain his displacement of philosophy from the role of final arbiter of truth to a practice of vocabulary-enrichment and cultural conversation; and (3) to show how ethics and politics are reoriented toward reducing cruelty and expanding empathy rather than grounding norms in universal rational principles. Accordingly, the main question is : How can a Rortyan Democracy Maintain Collective Decision-
Dialogue, Irony, and Solidarity in Richard Rorty's Democracy Farhad Dadfar
Making and Institutional Reform While Affirming Pluralism without appealing to Fixed Foundations?
Methods
The study is descriptive–analytical and based on documentary research. It first examines Rorty’s epistemological and linguistic premises—his critique of epistemological foundationalism, rejection of Representationalism of Truth, the linguistic turn, and the historicity of meaning—to clarify the consequences for truth and rationality. It then extends these premises to political and public-law concerns by conceptualizing Dialogue as the mechanism of social learning and provisional agreement, Irony as the civic virtue of recognizing the contingency of one’s “final vocabularies,” and Solidarity as the cultural adhesive enabling coexistence under deep pluralism. Finally, the article situates Rory’s constellation through a focused comparison with two influential modern paradigms (a normatively grounded, justice-centered Rawlsian approach and a rationality-centered deliberative Habermasian approach) and formulates the main theoretical challenges of the Rortyan position.
Results and Discussion
The first finding is that Rory’s anti-foundationalism relocates truth from an eternal, independent standard to Acceptability within Free Conversation. Rationality, consequently, is not a faculty for accessing a language-transcendent reality but a capacity for participating in justification, criticism, and re-description inside a community of speakers. Political legitimacy thus depends less on discovering ultimate principles than on sustaining dialogic procedures that remain open to revision. Second, the linguistic turn and the historicity of meaning undermine the ideal of certainty and instead place at the center a practical competence for living with contingency. Disagreement is not a defect of democratic order but a driver of collective learning—provided that conflict remains Dialogue Eligible and does not collapse into exclusion or silencing.
Third, the article shows that Irony plays a decisive ethical–political role. The ironic citizen is aware that her final vocabularies are contingent products of history and culture; therefore, she resists sacralizing her own language as a universal measure. This awareness produces epistemic humility and, in the public sphere, supports tolerance by reducing symbolic violence—humiliation and the rhetorical elimination of the other.
Fourth, once metaphysical foundations are rejected, Solidarity replaces the foundation-building function formerly attributed to “Truth.” Social cohesion is generated through moral imagination, empathy, and the practical commitment to avoid cruelty. Institutions are democratic to the extent that they expand the conditions for conversation, accountability, and reform. From this perspective, freedom of expression, transparency, and public accountability are not peripheral rights but Institutional Preconditions for sustaining conversation and producing defensible norms under pluralism.
Volume 18, Issue 3, Autumn 2026
Finally, the comparative perspective indicates that Rorty offers less a closed institutional blueprint than a Criterion for Evaluating Democracy: the degree of dialogic openness, revisability, and the capacity to reduce cruelty. The major challenge is that without robust prerequisites for equality and effective participation, “conversation” may operate under asymmetric power and thereby reproduce exclusion rather than correct it.
Conclusions
The article concludes that Rory’s democratic constellation is a continuous cultural–institutional project: truth is reconceived as dialogical justification, irony provides the ethical infrastructure for tolerance and fallibilism, and solidarity secures cohesion within pluralism. The practical implication for public law is to prioritize procedural guarantees of dialogue—free expression, accountability, and real revisability—while resisting the transformation of any narrative into a final and coercive “Truth.”
کلیدواژه‌ها [English]
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