Examining the Military Objective Criterion in International Humanitarian Law: Emphasis on Israel's Attack on the Islamic Republic of Iran Broadcasting during the 12-Day War

Introduction
Technological transformations, the rise of information operations, and the growing strategic role of media infrastructures in contemporary armed conflicts have blurred the traditional boundaries of the battlefield. Within this evolving landscape, a fundamental legal question arises: under what conditions may a state media outlet qualify as a "military objective" under international humanitarian law (IHL)? This article examines this question through the reported Israeli strike against the Islamic Republic of Iran Broadcasting (IRIB) during the June 2025 twelve-day conflict. The study revisits Article 52(2) of the 1977 Additional Protocol I and its interaction with the principles of distinction, proportionality, and precautions in attack. Its primary objective is to advance a restrictive, evidence-based interpretation of the notion of "military objective" consistent with the protective rationale of IHL and to assess whether the strike meets these legal thresholds. 
Examining the Military Objective Criterion in International Humanitarian Law: …
Methods
The research adopts a  doctrinal and  comparative legal methodology. It first analyzes the normative framework governing the definition of military objectives under Additional Protocol I and authoritative interpretations by the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC). It then reviews relevant state practice and precedents, notably the 1999 NATO bombing of Radio Television of Serbia (RTS), as well as reported attacks against media facilities in Iraq (2003) and Palestine. Building on this analysis, the article develops a three-pronged operational framework derived from Article 52(2): (a) effective contribution to military action, (b) the existence of a definite and concrete military advantage at the time of attack, and (c) a direct temporal and causal nexus between the destruction of the object and the anticipated military advantage. This framework is applied to publicly available evidence concerning IRIB, with the rule of doubt favoring civilian status where reasonable uncertainty persists.
Findings
The findings demonstrate that state ownership or propagandistic activity alone does not suffice to remove civilian protection. Article 52(2) requires the cumulative fulfillment of effective contribution and definite military advantage, supported by objective and verifiable evidence contemporaneous with the attack. Publicly available information regarding IRIB primarily reflects media and political activities rather than direct operational involvement in hostilities. No independently verifiable evidence has been disclosed indicating integration with command-and-control systems or transmission of tactical military data. Moreover, a concrete and immediate causal link between the destruction of the broadcasting facility and a definite military advantage has not been established. Even assuming arguendo, a military use, available information does not conclusively demonstrate full compliance with the obligations of precautions and proportionality. Reported civilian harm and the disruption of public information services raise serious concerns regarding the proportionality assessment.
Conclusion
The article concludes that labeling state media as a "military objective" demands a narrow and evidence-driven interpretation. In the IRIB case, based on currently available public information, the criteria of Article 52(2) do not appear to be fully satisfied, and the rule of doubt should operate in favor of civilian protection. The study recommends the development of clearer international operational guidelines and independent fact-finding mechanisms to assess alleged military use of media infrastructure, thereby preventing the erosion of civilian protection  in information-driven conflicts and safeguarding the core protective purpose of international humanitarian law.