Analyzing the Concept of "Existential Threat" and Evaluating its Consequences in the Light of Carl Schmitt's Views (Case Study of the Israel and United States Attacks on Iran)

Introduction
This article is structured to answer its central research question precisely, and is based on a descriptive–analytical method. Accordingly, research data were collected through the study and analysis of library and online sources, while documents, advisory opinions, and adjudicated cases of the International Court of Justice were examined as primary sources. By combining theoretical analysis with the study of judicial practice, the research seeks to clarify conceptual and legal frameworks, present conclusions grounded in legal reasoning and reliable evidence in a balanced and well-documented manner overall.
Methods
The concept of “existential threat,”  despite its prominence in recent years, has ancient roots and is one of the most contentious notions in international law and security studies, because it targets not a part of state power but the very survival of the state at the levels of territory, population, and sovereignty. In Carl Schmitt’s thought, this concept is tied to the idea of the “state of exception,” where the sovereign’s decision takes precedence over the law. However, post Charter international law has adopted a different approach, conditioning self defense exclusively on the occurrence of an actual armed attack. Contemporary security developments, especially in the Iran Israel conflict and the June 2025 attacks, have highlighted this gap between the political philosophical logic of existential threat and strict legal constraints in an unprecedented manner, placing the issue of turning this concept into a tool for justifying pre emptive actions at the center of the debate.
 Results and discussion
The concept of “existential threat,” despite its increasing prominence in political philosophy and security discourse, does not enjoy a rule creating status in contemporary international law. As such, it cannot serve as an independent legal basis for departing from the fundamental principles of the United Nations Charter, particularly the prohibition of the use of force. Carl Schmitt’s theory illustrates that existential threat acquires meaning within the framework of the “state of exception,” a condition in which the sovereign decision to preserve the survival of the political entity takes precedence over legal norms, thereby justifying the suspension of the legal order. However, this conceptual framework stands in fundamental tension with the structure of international law after 1945, whose central aim is to restrain unilateral state decision making and confine exceptional circumstances. An examination of positive international law and the jurisprudence of the International Court of Justice—from the Nicaragua case to the 1996 Advisory Opinion on the Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons—demonstrates that international law attributes legal relevance to existential threat only when it materializes in the form of an actual, attributable armed attack of sufficient intensity. Even the recognition of a “fundamental right of state survival” does not entail acceptance of pre emptive or preventive self-defence, but is limited to reactive self-defence in response to a genuine armed attack. Accordingly, transforming latent capabilities or subjective perceptions of danger into a legal justification for the use of force remains incompatible with the Charter framework. From a component-based perspective, this research shows that a broad interpretation of existential threat—one that considers technological capacity, identity-based hostility, or proxy networks sufficient—may be defensible within political philosophy. Yet, in international law, such an approach lowers the threshold of lawful self-defence and undermines the collective security system. By contrast, a narrow interpretation that conditions the existence of existential threat on the actual and simultaneous targeting of the fundamental elements of the state aligns more closely with international judicial practice. Moreover, even in its most severe forms, the invocation of existential threat cannot justify violations of peremptory norms of international humanitarian law.
Conclusions
 In international law, the concept of “existential threat,” despite its frequent use in political and security discourse, remains narrowly defined. Unlike Carl Schmitt, who prioritizes sovereign decision over law, the legal order of the United Nations Charter permits the use of force solely in response to an actual armed attack. The jurisprudence of the International Court of Justice confirms that perceived threats or subjective state assessments cannot justify pre emptive self defense, and that even in situations of survival, fundamental principles of international humanitarian law remain non derogable.