Examining the possibility or refusal of women's leadership from the perspective of political jurisprudence and fundamental rights of the Islamic Republic of Iran

Introduction: "Leadership Council from among the Sources of Emulation (Marja'iyya)", "Individual Leadership with the Condition of Being a Source of Emulation (Marja')", and "Individual Leadership with the Condition of Ijtihad (Jurisprudential Reasoning)" are three models of leadership in the constitutional law of the Islamic Republic of Iran. In the current constitution, gender is not listed among the conditions for the leadership position. However, with the stipulation of Marja'iyya in the 1979 constitution, the notion that being male is a condition for assuming leadership might come to mind. Within the hegemonic discourse of Shia political jurisprudence, women's right to political leadership is denied. Even their right to political participation at other levels is not widely accepted or given much consideration. "Examining the Possibility or Impossibility of Women's Leadership from the Perspective of Political Jurisprudence and the Constitutional Law of the Islamic Republic of Iran" is the title of research whose main issue is assessing the feasibility of women's leadership based on the criteria of Shia political jurisprudence and the constitutional law of the Islamic Republic of Iran.
Method: This research is conducted using linguistic analysis through a systematic rereading of religious texts and propositions. The analytical method in this research is based on the methodological criteria of jurisprudential knowledge and its authorization processes—namely, the rules and requirements outlined in the principles of jurisprudence (Usul al-Fiqh). This research adopts a critical-theoretical processing approach and utilizes a combined-integrative method for data collection.
Results: In the two models of "Leadership Council from among the Sources of Emulation" and "Individual Leadership with the Condition of Being a Source of Emulation", the possibility of women's jurisprudential Marja'iyya is a condition. Likewise, in the council model, the possibility of women's membership in the advisory council is an issue. In the model of "Individual Leadership with the Condition of Ijtihad", there is no dispute over the possibility of women achieving jurisprudential Ijtihad; however, within the construct of Velayat-e Faqih (Guardianship of the Islamic Jurist), the permissibility of women's guardianship is an issue worthy of examination. This research, focusing on the leadership position in the constitution, is solely concerned with the competence or incompetence of women for assuming this position. The discussion is aimed at assessing the feasibility of assuming the leadership position within the confines of the constitution. This focus is based on the belief that only the binding covenant of the constitution is obligatory. While there may be different notions and foundations regarding women's rights and guardianship/leadership in Shia jurisprudence, what is important and indeed binding is the constitution.
Based on the outcome of this research, it appears there is no significant evidence supporting the prohibition or deprivation of women from holding the position of leadership by women within the power structure of the Islamic Republic. The arguments of opponents of women's leadership in no way indicate a prohibition against women's leadership within the power structure of the Islamic Republic. In other words, there is no serious obstacle to women assuming the leadership position in the Islamic Republic of Iran. The main condition is qualification and competence, not gender. Furthermore, regarding the researched issue, the primary principle (al-asl al-awwali) is also permissibility and allowance. One can even refer to the principle of the non-stipulation of being male (‘adam ishritat al-dhukūrah). This is with the explanation that whoever claims the stipulation of being male is obliged to provide evidence to substantiate their notion.
 
Conclusions: This research examines the possibility of women's leadership from the perspective of political jurisprudence and Iranian constitutional law. Based on the research results, it is shown that the Iranian constitution does not stipulate gender for leadership. Also, the jurisprudential arguments of opponents of the "male-ness" (dhukūrat) condition for leadership lack sufficient validity. Therefore, there are no serious legal or jurisprudential obstacles to women's leadership. The essential criterion is the qualification and competence of the human individual, transcending their gender. Women's jurisprudence, as a construct of the jurist's lifeworld, is heavily influenced by the pre-existing assumptions and foundations of juristic scholars concerning gender and women's capabilities. Indeed, the process of jurisprudential cognition and knowledge is a mental and embodied process. While acknowledging the method that monitors the sources of jurists' thought, this research argues that to critique the claim of women's incompetence for leadership, one must engage with the same verbal (zuhūrāt and iṭlāqāt) or implicit (labī) arguments and language used by the claimants. This is done by centering the belief in the "principle of permissibility" (asl al-ibāḥah) and critiquing the claimants' evidence within the framework of the traditionally accepted criteria of ijtihad and inference (istinbāṭ).