From Absolute Monarchy to the Absolute Guardianship of the Islamic Jurist (Velayat-e Mutlaqeh-ye Faqih)

Introduction
The term "absolute guardianship" (Velayat-e Mutlaqeh) in the context of the Islamic Jurist (Faqih) bears a superficial linguistic resemblance to "absolute monarchy," a political system often associated with tyranny and the concentration of unchecked power. This semantic overlap risks distorting the concept in the public mind and could potentially pave the way for an authoritarian or despotic interpretation of Islamic governance. The primary objective of this article is to dissect this apparent similarity and demonstrate that it is only verbal. The core research question is: What is the relationship between the general/absolute guardianship of the Faqih and absolute monarchy? Furthermore, considering that absolute governments are now widely deemed degenerate, the article investigates whether Islamic political theory can genuinely be reconciled with the theory of absolute rule. The analysis aims to provide a clear, nuanced understanding of Velayat-e Faqih, distinguishing it from absolutist models of power.




From Absolute Monarchy to the Absolute Guardianship …




Methods
This research employs a descriptive-analytical method. It begins by examining the historical, linguistic, and theological roots of both "absolutism" as a Western political concept and "absolute guardianship" (Velayat-e Mutlaqeh or Velayat-e Ammah) within Shia Islamic jurisprudence (fiqh) and theology (kalam). The study analyzes the works of Islamic jurists to trace the evolution of the term and its intended meaning. It then contrasts these findings with the defining characteristics of political absolutism, as understood in Western political thought and history, to identify substantive differences rather than mere linguistic parallels.
 
Findings
The investigation yields several key findings:
3.1. The Nature of Political Absolutism: In Western political tradition, absolutism (e.g., as embodied by Louis XIV of France) signifies a concentration of unlimited, sovereign power in a single ruler, often justified by the "divine right of kings." This power is typically not subject to institutional checks and balances from judicial, legislative, or electoral bodies. While some historians argue that traditions and customs acted as de facto limits, the theoretical framework of absolutism rejects any formal, legal limitations on the monarch's will.
3.2. The Meaning of "Absolute" in Velayat-e Faqih: Within Shia jurisprudence, the terms "general guardianship" (Velayat-e Ammah) and "absolute guardianship" (Velayat-e Mutlaqeh) are used interchangeably. Crucially, the word "absolute" (mutlaqeh) here is a description of the scope of authority (pertaining to public affairs), not a description of the nature of that power (being free from all constraints). It means the jurist has guardianship over general matters of society, not that his power is unlimited. This is a critical distinction often lost in translation.
3.3. inherent Constraints on the Faqih's Authority: Contrary to absolutism, the Islamic jurist's authority is conceptually bound by multiple critical constraints:

Public Acceptance: The legitimacy of the Faqih is contingent upon public consent, often manifested through free elections.
Oversight and Accountability: The Faqih and his appointees are subject to oversight mechanisms.
Constitutional Framework: His authority is limited by the national covenant, typically embodied in a constitution.
Obligation to Consult (Shura): The Faqih is religiously obliged to avoid autocracy and must consult with experts and knowledgeable councils.
 





Volume 18, Issue 1, Spring 2026
 





Adherence to Sharia: Even the Prophet and Imams were bound by divine law and justice; they could not rule arbitrarily. By extension, the Faqih's authority is a subset of this and is therefore intrinsically limited by Islamic principles of justice and rationality.

3.4. Rejection of Arbitrary Power: The article finds it irrational to suggest that Islamic law would grant any individual, including a Faqih, absolute and arbitrary power over people's lives and property, as this leads to social corruption and decay. Furthermore, it is illogical for a people to establish a constitutional system that includes the office of the Faqih, only for that same Faqih to be permitted to act above the very constitution that legitimizes his position.
 
 Conclusion
The central conclusion is that the similarity between "Absolute Guardianship of the Jurist" and "absolute monarchy" is purely terminological, not substantive. Velayat-e Mutlaqeh does not endorse an arbitrary, despotic, or individualistic concentration of power. Instead, it defines a specific type of authority—guardianship in public affairs—that is necessarily and inherently constrained by a framework of public consent, constitutional law, mandatory consultation, and divine principles of justice. However, the article acknowledges a significant risk: the potential for an authoritarian reading of Velayat-e Faqih. If the Faqih's authority is expanded to near-divine levels, rendered immune to oversight, and demands unconditional obedience, it effectively morphs into the very absolute rule it claims to oppose. Therefore, the integrity of the concept depends entirely on its interpretation and implementation within a framework of checks and balances. A correct, sharia-compliant understanding of Velayat-e Faqih is fundamentally incompatible with the classical model of absolute monarchy.