The Swinging Pendulum of Constitutionalism in the Interaction between Constituent Power and Constitutional Rights (With Reference to the US Legal System)

Document Type : Research Paper

Authors

1 Associate Professor, Department of Public Law, Faculty of Law, Qom University, Qom, Iran

2 Assistant Professor of Public Law, Payame Noor University, Tehran, Iran

3 Ph D Student in Public Law, Department of Public Law, Faculty of Law, Qom University, Qom, Iran

Abstract

Introduction
The profound transformations in governmental structures and foundational principles since the Renaissance have given rise to pivotal concepts such as constituent power and constitutional rights, which have become determinative elements in shaping modern governance frameworks. These concepts fundamentally influence both the establishment of political authority and the protection of individual liberties. While historical political power was traditionally consolidated through hierarchical systems based on hereditary succession and trusteeship models, the modern era has witnessed a paradigm shift toward constituent and participatory approaches that have radically transformed legal and political principles. The primary objective of this research is to conduct a comprehensive examination of the dynamic interaction and inherent tension between two fundamental constitutional elements: constituent power as the legitimate expression of collective public will and constitutional rights as essential safeguards for individual freedoms. From this analytical perspective, the central research question emerges: Through what mechanisms and upon what foundational principles can these two critical dimensions be effectively reconciled? This study adopts a rigorous descriptive-analytical methodology, drawing upon extensive library resources and established legal theories, to investigate the complex dynamics of this interaction and to elucidate the mediating role of constitutionalism as the predominant governing ideology in contemporary states.
Methods
To thoroughly address the research objectives, this study employs a multi-layered descriptive-analytical methodology that incorporates several investigative approaches. The research process commenced with an exhaustive review of specialized constitutional law literature, systematically comparing theoretical frameworks of both conservative and progressive constitutionalism. Foundational library resources and peer-reviewed scholarly articles- particularly seminal works by prominent theorists including Loughlin, Chemerinsky, and Hirschl- formed the substantive basis for developing a precise analytical discourse. The methodological approach begins with a detailed historical analysis tracing the evolution of political power from rigid hierarchical models to more dynamic constituent frameworks, thereby establishing the necessary theoretical foundation. Subsequently, through meticulous examination of constitutional rights' role in protecting individual freedoms and shaping judicial interpretation doctrines, the research delineates the multifaceted dimensions of the interaction between constituent power and constitutional guarantees. The methodology culminates in a sophisticated textual and comparative analysis that derives the comprehensive theoretical framework of constitutionalism as an operative governance ideology.
Findings
The research yields significant findings demonstrating that constitutionalism, as an all-encompassing governance ideology, performs an indispensable mediating function in regulating the complex interplay between collective public will (manifested as constituent power) and constitutional rights protections. This ideological framework essentially represents an institutionalized equilibrium where majority preferences in political decision-making processes must be carefully balanced against inviolable protections for individual rights. The investigation reveals two predominant constitutional approaches that embody this tension: The conservative constitutional approach advocates strongly for judicial restraint principles, seeking to limit judicial intervention in constitutional interpretation matters. This perspective elevates popular votes and legislative decisions as the primary legitimate expressions of public will, while assigning the judiciary a deliberately constrained interpretive role focused primarily on maintaining stability in constitutional principles and doctrines. In contrast, the progressive constitutional approach emphasizes the necessity of flexible constitutional interpretation methodologies that permit adaptation to evolving socio-political realities. The findings conclusively demonstrate that supreme courts in developed jurisdictions, particularly the United States, have historically played a decisive role in defining constitutional provisions and mediating conflicts between majority will and minority rights through robust judicial review mechanisms. Legal historical analysis reveals numerous landmark instances where activist courts have vigorously defended vulnerable minority groups and facilitated progressive social reforms during critical historical junctures. Furthermore, the study illuminates how the simultaneous existence of conservative and progressive constitutional paradigms inevitably generates systemic tensions, as each approach institutionalizes fundamentally different preferences regarding the appropriate balance between constitutional rights protections and constituent power expressions. While conservative philosophy stresses judicial non-interference in democratic policymaking processes, progressive ideology justifies strategic judicial intervention during constitutional crises to uphold fundamental human rights and protect marginalized groups. In essence, constitutionalism functions as a sophisticated mediating mechanism that navigates between expansive constitutional interpretation and principled judicial restraint, ultimately shaping national legal architectures and influencing macro-level policy directions.
The research additionally establishes that constitutional stability and longevity are best achieved through the deliberate use of broadly-phrased, interpretation-friendly language in constitutional provisions, enabling their continued relevance across evolving social contexts and generational changes. However, this necessary ambiguity inherently creates varying degrees of interpretive discretion and judicial review authority that remain contested in constitutional theory and practice.
Conclusion
Based on the comprehensive research results, it can be authoritatively concluded that constitutionalism serves as an exceptionally effective governance ideology for mediating between constituent power expressions and constitutional rights protections in modern political systems. Institutional tools such as judicial review enable precise yet flexible responses to the enduring challenges arising from the tension between majority rule principles and minority rights protections, thereby playing a vital role in sustaining both justice and democracy in constitutional orders. The study ultimately demonstrates that the swinging pendulum of constitutionalism reflects the necessary and creative tension between these fundamental constitutional forces.

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Main Subjects


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