Progressive Natural Law Thinking about the Place of the Variable in the Natural Law Doctrine of Dabin, Renard, and Stammler

The essential function of natural law is to be the criterion of justice. And therefore, the relationship of natural law with the positivist approach to law, if it calls into question the said function, can lead to the passage of the theory of natural law. The doctrinal anguish of the first half of the 20th century resided in the development of a theory of natural law based on the interaction of reality and metaphysics. The pre-eminence of metaphysics over reality as the foundation of natural law debauchery on a natural law that has no relation to social realities. We must leave formal justice and we must not fear that this passage means the transition from justice to equity. The main question is how and to what extent the relationship between natural law and social variables exist. Stammbler's natural law with variable content, seems to question the inherent function of natural law; because it depends on contingency. Renard's natural law with progressive content is not, like Dabin's natural law with variable applications, exact. The anguish of having minimal metaphysics and the necessity of the passage from being to having to be requires the natural right to progressive applications.
The author tries to substantiate his hypothesis, "natural rights with evolutionary implementations" by comparing the three models proposed by Dabin, Renard, and Stammler for the relationship between natural Law and the variable matter, and criticizing these three models.