The Simulation of U.S. Military Action against Syria within the Framework of International law

Document Type : Research Paper

Author

Ph.D. in International Relations, Islamic Azad University, Isfahan, Iran

Abstract

Abstract
The purpose of this article is to discuss the legal implications of the use of force by the U.S. against Syria in 2013, and various other legal issues relevant to the conflict in Syria. The U.S. believes that the use of chemical weapons worsens the humanitarian crisis in Syria, and therefore humanitarian intervention under Responsibility to Protect is justified. The key question after the chemical attack in Syria is that the military action by the U.S. against Syria can be justified in terms of international law? The more important question is whether anything about the use of chemical weapons provides a distinct legal ground for action. Because of this, discussion focused on the legality of humanitarian intervention in non-international armed conflicts as well as the arguments surrounding the responsibility to protect. But in this debate, we argue thaht what are the arguments that the United States can make in favor of the international legality of such action, and what are the arguments against? Formalist and pragmatic approaches to international law provide very different answers.
 
 
 

Keywords


 
 
الف. فارسی
امیدی، علی و مسعود رضائی(1390)، «ملاحظات حقوقی جنگ روسیه و گرجستان»، فصلنامه تحقیقات سیاسی بین‌المللی، سال سوم، شماره 6، بهار.
ذاکریان، مهدی(1390)، «شبیه‌سازی در روابط بین‌الملل: مدل‌سازی و نظریه‌پردازی در ایران»، فصلنامه مطالعات بین‌المللی، سال هشتم، شماره 2.
 
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