Shiraz UniversityJournal of Legal Studies2008-792618120260421The Approach of the English Adjudication System in Response to Vexatious Claims and Defenses and Its Comparison with Iranian LawThe Approach of the English Adjudication System in Response to Vexatious Claims and Defenses and Its Comparison with Iranian Law140815010.22099/jls.2024.48593.5031FAHoseinShahsavari Shirazi. Ph.D. Student, Department of Humanities, Faculty of Law, Islamic Azad University, South Tehran branch, Tehran, IranSoheilTaheri, Assistant Professor, Department of Humanities, Faculty of Law, Islamic Azad University, South Tehran branch, Tehran, IranSeyed MortezaGhasemzadeh ZaviyehProfessor, Department of Humanities, Faculty of Law, Islamic Azad University, South Tehran branch, Tehran, IranJournal Article20231014<strong>Introduction</strong><br />The fundamental rule of access to justice for all conflicts with the necessity of preventing vexatious claims, which are a clear instance of abuse of the right to litigate. Legislators, in facing this conflict and based on the rule of "preventing the greater evil by tolerating the lesser evil," attempt to prevent greater harm (the waste of justice) by accepting the lesser harm (restricting vexatious claims). However, the Iranian legislator has not provided a clear criterion for identifying a vexatious claim, and its approach is merely focused on establishing "the claimant's knowledge of being unjustified"; a condition whose proof, especially in matters of fact, is very difficult and sometimes impossible for courts.<br />The present research aims to examine the approach of the English adjudication system in preventing and combating vexatious claims and defenses and comparing it with the existing gaps in Iranian law. Its main problem is how the English legal system has been able to establish an efficient balance between the right of access to court and the necessity of preventing abuse of the adjudication process. The hypothesis of this research is based on the premise that the English legal system, by providing various orders, has limited and sometimes conditioned the right of access to court in cases of abuse, and through this, has offered innovations and safeguards beyond what exists in Iranian law.<br /><strong>Method</strong><br />The present writing, using a descriptive-analytical method and a comparative approach, examines and compares the status and methods of combating vexatious claims in the Iranian and English legal systems. The main basis of this analysis is library resources, including positive laws, legal doctrine, and especially judicial precedents. In this regard, first, the legal foundations and judicial practice of the two countries are described, and then, in a comparative analysis, the balance between the right of access to justice and the prevention of its abuse is evaluated.<br /><strong>Findings</strong><br />The findings show that the Iranian adjudication system, due to the lack of effective deterrents, has a very weak approach in preventing the filing of vexatious claims, which has led to the inflation of cases, the useless occupation of court time, and the imposition of heavy costs on the judiciary and the litigants. In the Iranian legislative system, a vexatious claim is not defined, nor is there a clear criterion for identifying it. Despite this, to combat vexatious claims, sanctions such as the defendant's authority to request "security for a vexatious claim" and the claimant's conviction to pay three times the litigation costs (Article 109 of the Civil Procedure Code) and the possibility of the defendant claiming damages resulting from the filing of a baseless claim (Article 515 of the Civil Procedure Code) have been provided. Moreover, the approach of the Iranian legislator is merely focused on establishing the claimant's knowledge and bad faith, and it lacks any provision regarding fictitious claims filed through collusion between the parties.<br />In contrast, the English adjudication system has not explicitly defined a vexatious claim either. However, by employing illustrative elements, it has created effective solutions for identifying and combating it. For example, in this system, terms such as "vexatious claim" are used, and specific indicators for identifying it are provided, which give the judge the authority to limit the claimant's access to judicial services. However, the majority of instances of vexatious claims in English law fall under a more general conceptual framework termed "abuse of process." What makes the English legal system progressive is the creation of a balance between individual rights and the interests of society through the provision of a diverse range of sanctions. Unlike the unitary and ineffective approach in Iranian law, the English system considers a spectrum of reactions, from mere dismissal of the claim to the issuance of various restrictive orders in multiple courts, as tools to combat vexatious claims, each employed according to its specific circumstances.<br /><br /><strong>Conclusion</strong><br />The English legal system, due to its possession of preventive tools and proportionate and diverse sanctions, has a more efficient capacity in managing vexatious claims than the Iranian legal system. To remedy the existing weaknesses in Iran, the following legislative reforms are suggested: First, drafting a codified list of prohibited claims (such as a claim for forcible entry filed after losing a ownership lawsuit) so that judicial service offices refrain from registering them. Second, creating an integrated system to identify persons who repeatedly file unsuccessful claims and making the filing of new claims by them conditional upon obtaining permission from a judicial authority.<strong>Introduction</strong><br />The fundamental rule of access to justice for all conflicts with the necessity of preventing vexatious claims, which are a clear instance of abuse of the right to litigate. Legislators, in facing this conflict and based on the rule of "preventing the greater evil by tolerating the lesser evil," attempt to prevent greater harm (the waste of justice) by accepting the lesser harm (restricting vexatious claims). However, the Iranian legislator has not provided a clear criterion for identifying a vexatious claim, and its approach is merely focused on establishing "the claimant's knowledge of being unjustified"; a condition whose proof, especially in matters of fact, is very difficult and sometimes impossible for courts.<br />The present research aims to examine the approach of the English adjudication system in preventing and combating vexatious claims and defenses and comparing it with the existing gaps in Iranian law. Its main problem is how the English legal system has been able to establish an efficient balance between the right of access to court and the necessity of preventing abuse of the adjudication process. The hypothesis of this research is based on the premise that the English legal system, by providing various orders, has limited and sometimes conditioned the right of access to court in cases of abuse, and through this, has offered innovations and safeguards beyond what exists in Iranian law.<br /><strong>Method</strong><br />The present writing, using a descriptive-analytical method and a comparative approach, examines and compares the status and methods of combating vexatious claims in the Iranian and English legal systems. The main basis of this analysis is library resources, including positive laws, legal doctrine, and especially judicial precedents. In this regard, first, the legal foundations and judicial practice of the two countries are described, and then, in a comparative analysis, the balance between the right of access to justice and the prevention of its abuse is evaluated.<br /><strong>Findings</strong><br />The findings show that the Iranian adjudication system, due to the lack of effective deterrents, has a very weak approach in preventing the filing of vexatious claims, which has led to the inflation of cases, the useless occupation of court time, and the imposition of heavy costs on the judiciary and the litigants. In the Iranian legislative system, a vexatious claim is not defined, nor is there a clear criterion for identifying it. Despite this, to combat vexatious claims, sanctions such as the defendant's authority to request "security for a vexatious claim" and the claimant's conviction to pay three times the litigation costs (Article 109 of the Civil Procedure Code) and the possibility of the defendant claiming damages resulting from the filing of a baseless claim (Article 515 of the Civil Procedure Code) have been provided. Moreover, the approach of the Iranian legislator is merely focused on establishing the claimant's knowledge and bad faith, and it lacks any provision regarding fictitious claims filed through collusion between the parties.<br />In contrast, the English adjudication system has not explicitly defined a vexatious claim either. However, by employing illustrative elements, it has created effective solutions for identifying and combating it. For example, in this system, terms such as "vexatious claim" are used, and specific indicators for identifying it are provided, which give the judge the authority to limit the claimant's access to judicial services. However, the majority of instances of vexatious claims in English law fall under a more general conceptual framework termed "abuse of process." What makes the English legal system progressive is the creation of a balance between individual rights and the interests of society through the provision of a diverse range of sanctions. Unlike the unitary and ineffective approach in Iranian law, the English system considers a spectrum of reactions, from mere dismissal of the claim to the issuance of various restrictive orders in multiple courts, as tools to combat vexatious claims, each employed according to its specific circumstances.<br /><br /><strong>Conclusion</strong><br />The English legal system, due to its possession of preventive tools and proportionate and diverse sanctions, has a more efficient capacity in managing vexatious claims than the Iranian legal system. To remedy the existing weaknesses in Iran, the following legislative reforms are suggested: First, drafting a codified list of prohibited claims (such as a claim for forcible entry filed after losing a ownership lawsuit) so that judicial service offices refrain from registering them. Second, creating an integrated system to identify persons who repeatedly file unsuccessful claims and making the filing of new claims by them conditional upon obtaining permission from a judicial authority.https://jls.shirazu.ac.ir/article_8150_2c1d5393ff4b6be52f824a2719767686.pdfShiraz UniversityJournal of Legal Studies2008-792618120260421Comparative Analysis of the Condition of Dividing the Husband's Property in Iranian Law with the Regime of Participation in Acquired Property in Turkish LawComparative Analysis of the Condition of Dividing the Husband's Property in Iranian Law with the Regime of Participation in Acquired Property in Turkish Law4176758510.22099/jls.2024.50118.5160FABetul ZahraAkyol. PhD student in private law, Faculty of Administrative Sciences and Economics, Isfahan University, Isfahan, IranMehdiShahabiAssociate Professor. Department of Private Law, Faculty of Administrative Sciences and Economics, University of Isfahan, Isfahan, IranMohammad SadeghTabatabaeiAssociate Professor. Department of Private Law, Faculty of Administrative Sciences and Economics, University of Isfahan, Isfahan, IranAYŞE NURKILINÇ, AYŞE. Ayse Nur Kilinc, Assistant Professor, Department of Private Law, Faculty of Law, Haji Bayram Veli University, Ankara, TurkeyJournal Article20240514<strong>Introduction </strong><br />The marital condition of "dividing the husband's property," if signed by the spouses, results in the gratuitous transfer of up to half of the husband's acquired assets during the marital life to the wife. The qualifications raised in this condition, regarding the limits, terms, extent, and method of enforcement, indicate a legal vacuum in the system of spousal property sharing in Iran. In contrast, the financial regime of participation in acquired property in the Turkish legal system, unlike the division condition which is applied only in cases of divorce initiated by the wife, governs the financial relations of the spouses even in non-divorce situations. It only subjects the <br />spouses' acquired property to division and protects the division of personal property. Therefore, this financial regime is not evaluated as contradicting the principle of the wife's financial independence in the Iranian legal system, which is a very important point. The question this article is written to answer is: Can the legal financial regime of Turkey be utilized to fill the gaps in the condition of dividing the husband's property? Can the division condition be systematized within the framework of a financial regime, and are the wrongful acts of the husband or wife effective in reducing or rejecting their financial share?<br /> <br /><strong>Method</strong><br />In response to the research problem, and considering the comparative nature of the subject, the comparative analysis method has been used. Of course, the authors have moved away from a purely descriptive approach and have pursued a normative approach in their analysis, because their concern has been to find technical normative solutions for the issues and challenges of Iran's family legal system. To explain, a substantive and formal comparative analysis of the division condition with the regime of participation in the spouses' acquired property in Turkish law indicates numerous deficiencies and gaps concerning the financial system governing spousal financial relations in the Iranian legal system.<br /><strong>Findings</strong><br />It seems that the principle of the wife's financial independence and the wife's lack of financial liability on one hand, as well as the husband's financial obligations on the other hand, could challenge the acceptance of the participation in acquired property regime in Iranian law. By examining the aforementioned challenges, one can argue that at least some authoritative jurisprudential opinions recognize the spouses' will as the source of validity for what is considered an obligation, or deem the principle of the supremacy of the parties' will to prevail over the two aforementioned obstructive principles. Moreover, the contract of partnership (Sharikat) is valid between spouses in Islamic jurisprudence, and spouses can, based on their own inclination and agreement, especially if the two categories of obstacles and challenges mentioned above are moderated, apply the partnership contract to the financial affairs of their shared life. Because in Imamiyyah jurisprudence, the wife has the full right to dispose of her own property, and given that the instances of the husband's financial obligation are subjects of debate and disagreement, it can be accepted that the wife—and in fact the legislator—faces no obstacle to concluding a partnership contract and accepting the system of property sharing. It seems that in today's society as well, custom finds sharing in the spouses' acquired financial share to be fair and acceptable; because women are often employed and, alongside men, bear the economic burden of shared life, but in practice, the resultant assets enter the man's ownership, which contradicts distributive justice, and it is appropriate that the financial regime of participation in acquired property be accepted in Iran's legal system and family laws.<br /><strong>Conclusion</strong><br />This systematization of the spouses' financial relations based on property sharing, while organizing the spouses' financial relations, will also be effective in strengthening the non-financial relations between spouses. For example, in examining the scope of the financial regime of participation in the spouses' acquired property in Turkish law, we encounter instances that, in addition to clarifying the laws governing spousal financial relations, also delineate family red lines, such as the spouses' misconduct and immoral behavior, for example, committing crimes such as adultery or attempting to kill or murdering the spouse. These red lines are effective in determining the financial share of the spouse who commits them and reduce that share. Furthermore, granting the wife priority over other heirs regarding the right of usufruct and residence in the marital home, as well as the furnishings of the marital home from the decedent's estate, in addition to preventing the sale of the property by other heirs and creditors, can prevent successive harms to the wife and children. The legislator's explicitness in stating the aforementioned instances, while preventing judicial inconsistency and the application of judges' personal preferences, can prevent the occurrence of family disputes. In the authors' opinion, modeling the aforementioned instances from Turkish law would be a very effective step towards filling the legal gaps in the condition of dividing the husband's property.<strong>Introduction </strong><br />The marital condition of "dividing the husband's property," if signed by the spouses, results in the gratuitous transfer of up to half of the husband's acquired assets during the marital life to the wife. The qualifications raised in this condition, regarding the limits, terms, extent, and method of enforcement, indicate a legal vacuum in the system of spousal property sharing in Iran. In contrast, the financial regime of participation in acquired property in the Turkish legal system, unlike the division condition which is applied only in cases of divorce initiated by the wife, governs the financial relations of the spouses even in non-divorce situations. It only subjects the <br />spouses' acquired property to division and protects the division of personal property. Therefore, this financial regime is not evaluated as contradicting the principle of the wife's financial independence in the Iranian legal system, which is a very important point. The question this article is written to answer is: Can the legal financial regime of Turkey be utilized to fill the gaps in the condition of dividing the husband's property? Can the division condition be systematized within the framework of a financial regime, and are the wrongful acts of the husband or wife effective in reducing or rejecting their financial share?<br /> <br /><strong>Method</strong><br />In response to the research problem, and considering the comparative nature of the subject, the comparative analysis method has been used. Of course, the authors have moved away from a purely descriptive approach and have pursued a normative approach in their analysis, because their concern has been to find technical normative solutions for the issues and challenges of Iran's family legal system. To explain, a substantive and formal comparative analysis of the division condition with the regime of participation in the spouses' acquired property in Turkish law indicates numerous deficiencies and gaps concerning the financial system governing spousal financial relations in the Iranian legal system.<br /><strong>Findings</strong><br />It seems that the principle of the wife's financial independence and the wife's lack of financial liability on one hand, as well as the husband's financial obligations on the other hand, could challenge the acceptance of the participation in acquired property regime in Iranian law. By examining the aforementioned challenges, one can argue that at least some authoritative jurisprudential opinions recognize the spouses' will as the source of validity for what is considered an obligation, or deem the principle of the supremacy of the parties' will to prevail over the two aforementioned obstructive principles. Moreover, the contract of partnership (Sharikat) is valid between spouses in Islamic jurisprudence, and spouses can, based on their own inclination and agreement, especially if the two categories of obstacles and challenges mentioned above are moderated, apply the partnership contract to the financial affairs of their shared life. Because in Imamiyyah jurisprudence, the wife has the full right to dispose of her own property, and given that the instances of the husband's financial obligation are subjects of debate and disagreement, it can be accepted that the wife—and in fact the legislator—faces no obstacle to concluding a partnership contract and accepting the system of property sharing. It seems that in today's society as well, custom finds sharing in the spouses' acquired financial share to be fair and acceptable; because women are often employed and, alongside men, bear the economic burden of shared life, but in practice, the resultant assets enter the man's ownership, which contradicts distributive justice, and it is appropriate that the financial regime of participation in acquired property be accepted in Iran's legal system and family laws.<br /><strong>Conclusion</strong><br />This systematization of the spouses' financial relations based on property sharing, while organizing the spouses' financial relations, will also be effective in strengthening the non-financial relations between spouses. For example, in examining the scope of the financial regime of participation in the spouses' acquired property in Turkish law, we encounter instances that, in addition to clarifying the laws governing spousal financial relations, also delineate family red lines, such as the spouses' misconduct and immoral behavior, for example, committing crimes such as adultery or attempting to kill or murdering the spouse. These red lines are effective in determining the financial share of the spouse who commits them and reduce that share. Furthermore, granting the wife priority over other heirs regarding the right of usufruct and residence in the marital home, as well as the furnishings of the marital home from the decedent's estate, in addition to preventing the sale of the property by other heirs and creditors, can prevent successive harms to the wife and children. The legislator's explicitness in stating the aforementioned instances, while preventing judicial inconsistency and the application of judges' personal preferences, can prevent the occurrence of family disputes. In the authors' opinion, modeling the aforementioned instances from Turkish law would be a very effective step towards filling the legal gaps in the condition of dividing the husband's property.https://jls.shirazu.ac.ir/article_7585_e064eef75c4a95969bdb05ca5db0b72a.pdfShiraz UniversityJournal of Legal Studies2008-792618120260421Conceptual and Evidential Ambiguities in the Domain of the Criterion of Right (Haq) and Rule (Hukm) in the Realm of Family LawConceptual and Evidential Ambiguities in the Domain of the Criterion of Right (Haq) and Rule (Hukm) in the Realm of Family Law77120783110.22099/jls.2025.50744.5187FAHoseinJavarAssociate Professor of Private Law Department, College of Farabi, University of Tehran, IranMohaddesehOsuli Yamchi. PhD in Fiqh and Fundamentals of Islamic Law, Farabi Campus, University of TehranJournal Article20240721<strong>Introduction</strong><br />One of the important discussions in the realm of persons' wills is the extent to which the will of individuals can be effective. This question arises in all legal fields, but in some cases, such as family law, it has become more challenging due to the expansion of permissiveness and right-oriented discourse in this area. Furthermore, family law issues gain double importance because they are considered more practical and challenging. Therefore, the feasibility of the effectiveness of will in propositions based on authority, especially in the family realm, holds particular significance. The "authority" and "capabilities" of persons to dispose of their own affairs, whether such rights are renounceable, waivable, or limitable, are analyzed within the two categories of "right" (Haq) and "rule" (Hukm). There are several important questions in this regard: First, do these two terms have the same meaning but are expressed in two different forms, or are they different in essence and meaning in addition to verbal differences?<br />Based on the viewpoint that considers them different, the criteria for distinguishing and the differentiating principles of the two must be properly understood. Although in legal terminology, words such as "may" (mitavanad) and "has the right to" (haq darad) might also be used to mean "dominion and exclusivity," it is important to note that in many cases, in the wording used by the legislator, both the nature of "right" and the nature of "rule" are expressed with the word "may" (mitavanad). Therefore, it is not possible to determine the nature of persons' dominion and authority solely by using legal wording; rather, specific criteria must exist to determine, with their help, the nature of persons' authority and the limit and scope of the effectiveness of persons' wills. Thus, to discuss the foundations and principles governing the scope of the effectiveness of will and to organize the legal situations resulting from the exercise of will and the effect of renouncing or limiting a right, it is necessary to determine this criterion and its relationship with limiting the spouses' will. As a result of using the criteria for distinguishing right from rule, the characteristics of right and rule must also be properly identified. Because each of these two, in its own subject and context, entails specific effects, and in some cases, one can also identify the nature of being a right or being an obligation through these effects. Also, where there is no reason or indication for distinction, it is necessary to establish a principle and primary rule to resolve doubt and uncertainty. The techniques for establishing such a principle are also important. As a complement to the research problem, it is necessary to answer the question: What is the substantive difference between mandatory rules (rules of law) and permissive/alternative rules (rules of option), and by what criterion are these two categories of rules distinguished from each other?<br /> <br /><strong>Methods</strong><br />This research has been conducted in light of a precise analysis of the nature of persons' authorities in the realm of marriage and the manner of its description in the words of jurists (fuqaha), using the documentary method to collect necessary data from authoritative jurisprudential and legal sources, as well as employing descriptive and analytical methods in data processing.<br /><strong>Findings</strong><br />An examination of the present writing shows that there are multiple criteria for determining the nature of legal and jurisprudential propositions. In some cases, it was observed that the existing context is that of a terminological right (Haq), but due to factors such as the authority being personal to the individual (non-transferable) or a specificity existing in the subject, its transfer to another person is precluded. An example is the right of division (of time among co-wives). In such cases, what is being discussed is a right, but the application of some characteristics of a terminological right (right in the specific sense) faces an obstacle; however, the existence of an obstacle does not mean the negation of the nature of being a right. Criteria such as renounceability (isqat-paziri), claimability (talabe-paziri), and divisibility (tajzie-paziri) offer better indications. Among the mentioned criteria, the criterion of renounceability (isqat-paziri) is considered the definitive and ultimate criterion, in such a way that there is no right unless it is renounceable. Alongside attention to the mentioned criteria, it is also important to note that sometimes the legislator has not been precise enough in using wording, and sometimes has used ambiguous terms, and due to homonymy (ishtirak-e lafzi), a kind of fallacy has followed in the method of deriving meaning from the law. Therefore, in the manner of citing legal wording, it is necessary to avoid such fallacies and mistakes in the use of ambiguous terms. To this end, paying attention to the real meaning of right (Haq) and distinguishing it from the metaphorical meaning of right is important. Furthermore, to complete the criteria for distinguishing right from rule in the realm of family law, the establishment of a principle in the present issue relies on important principles such as the principle of not being a rule (asl-e hukm nabudan), the principle of presumption of continuity (istishab), the principle of precaution (ihtiyat) in important matters (such as the physical integrity and life of persons, matters related to moral dignity and reputation of persons (such as sensitive informational and communicational data), and discussions related to lineage and kinship).<br /><strong>Conclusion</strong><br /> Mandatory rules (rules of law) are associated with superior pillars, public interest, and public order, and arise in an imposing process accompanied by authority. "In terms of the material element," they are norms that appear in legal structures and frameworks. "In terms of the psychological element," the mandatory nature of these rules is rooted in the legal conscience. "In terms of objective," protecting legal structures and public interests, ensuring the proper course of affairs, and safeguarding public security and morality are counted among the objectives of mandatory rules. "In terms of content," if the content of a regulation pertains to structures or constructs designed to regulate legal relations and to create order, safeguard public order in its legal aspects or in relation to firm cultural foundations and their sanctions (good morals), it is considered mandatory. "In terms of mode of expression," written law may include commands, prohibitions, or negations. Of course, in many cases, positive indicative themes (in the form of commands) and negative ones (in the form of prohibitions) are more common, but it is not limited to legal expression, and one may benefit from aspects of soft law for norm identification and its gradations. "In terms of gradation," due to the existence of a hierarchy among legal norms and a hierarchy of public order, mandatory rules may also be graded in comparison to one another. Permissive/alternative rules (rules of option), interpretive rules, supplemental rules, substitutive rules, and facultative rules are intended to complement incomplete wills, to express matters neglected by the parties to a legal relationship, or to interpret and construe cases of silence, and they refer to the power of persons' authority to agree contrary to them or the authority to renounce a right. The tone (mode of expression) of the legislator, attention to the content of the rule, the protected interests and normative contexts, the possibility or impossibility of the interference of individuals' will, and the use of a practical principle are among the most important methods of distinguishing mandatory rules from permissive/alternative rules in the family realm. Of course, the establishment of a general principle in family law is not justified. In financial matters and matters that do not provide a special interest, one may base it on the principle of being permissive/alternative, and in other cases, base it on being mandatory.<strong>Introduction</strong><br />One of the important discussions in the realm of persons' wills is the extent to which the will of individuals can be effective. This question arises in all legal fields, but in some cases, such as family law, it has become more challenging due to the expansion of permissiveness and right-oriented discourse in this area. Furthermore, family law issues gain double importance because they are considered more practical and challenging. Therefore, the feasibility of the effectiveness of will in propositions based on authority, especially in the family realm, holds particular significance. The "authority" and "capabilities" of persons to dispose of their own affairs, whether such rights are renounceable, waivable, or limitable, are analyzed within the two categories of "right" (Haq) and "rule" (Hukm). There are several important questions in this regard: First, do these two terms have the same meaning but are expressed in two different forms, or are they different in essence and meaning in addition to verbal differences?<br />Based on the viewpoint that considers them different, the criteria for distinguishing and the differentiating principles of the two must be properly understood. Although in legal terminology, words such as "may" (mitavanad) and "has the right to" (haq darad) might also be used to mean "dominion and exclusivity," it is important to note that in many cases, in the wording used by the legislator, both the nature of "right" and the nature of "rule" are expressed with the word "may" (mitavanad). Therefore, it is not possible to determine the nature of persons' dominion and authority solely by using legal wording; rather, specific criteria must exist to determine, with their help, the nature of persons' authority and the limit and scope of the effectiveness of persons' wills. Thus, to discuss the foundations and principles governing the scope of the effectiveness of will and to organize the legal situations resulting from the exercise of will and the effect of renouncing or limiting a right, it is necessary to determine this criterion and its relationship with limiting the spouses' will. As a result of using the criteria for distinguishing right from rule, the characteristics of right and rule must also be properly identified. Because each of these two, in its own subject and context, entails specific effects, and in some cases, one can also identify the nature of being a right or being an obligation through these effects. Also, where there is no reason or indication for distinction, it is necessary to establish a principle and primary rule to resolve doubt and uncertainty. The techniques for establishing such a principle are also important. As a complement to the research problem, it is necessary to answer the question: What is the substantive difference between mandatory rules (rules of law) and permissive/alternative rules (rules of option), and by what criterion are these two categories of rules distinguished from each other?<br /> <br /><strong>Methods</strong><br />This research has been conducted in light of a precise analysis of the nature of persons' authorities in the realm of marriage and the manner of its description in the words of jurists (fuqaha), using the documentary method to collect necessary data from authoritative jurisprudential and legal sources, as well as employing descriptive and analytical methods in data processing.<br /><strong>Findings</strong><br />An examination of the present writing shows that there are multiple criteria for determining the nature of legal and jurisprudential propositions. In some cases, it was observed that the existing context is that of a terminological right (Haq), but due to factors such as the authority being personal to the individual (non-transferable) or a specificity existing in the subject, its transfer to another person is precluded. An example is the right of division (of time among co-wives). In such cases, what is being discussed is a right, but the application of some characteristics of a terminological right (right in the specific sense) faces an obstacle; however, the existence of an obstacle does not mean the negation of the nature of being a right. Criteria such as renounceability (isqat-paziri), claimability (talabe-paziri), and divisibility (tajzie-paziri) offer better indications. Among the mentioned criteria, the criterion of renounceability (isqat-paziri) is considered the definitive and ultimate criterion, in such a way that there is no right unless it is renounceable. Alongside attention to the mentioned criteria, it is also important to note that sometimes the legislator has not been precise enough in using wording, and sometimes has used ambiguous terms, and due to homonymy (ishtirak-e lafzi), a kind of fallacy has followed in the method of deriving meaning from the law. Therefore, in the manner of citing legal wording, it is necessary to avoid such fallacies and mistakes in the use of ambiguous terms. To this end, paying attention to the real meaning of right (Haq) and distinguishing it from the metaphorical meaning of right is important. Furthermore, to complete the criteria for distinguishing right from rule in the realm of family law, the establishment of a principle in the present issue relies on important principles such as the principle of not being a rule (asl-e hukm nabudan), the principle of presumption of continuity (istishab), the principle of precaution (ihtiyat) in important matters (such as the physical integrity and life of persons, matters related to moral dignity and reputation of persons (such as sensitive informational and communicational data), and discussions related to lineage and kinship).<br /><strong>Conclusion</strong><br /> Mandatory rules (rules of law) are associated with superior pillars, public interest, and public order, and arise in an imposing process accompanied by authority. "In terms of the material element," they are norms that appear in legal structures and frameworks. "In terms of the psychological element," the mandatory nature of these rules is rooted in the legal conscience. "In terms of objective," protecting legal structures and public interests, ensuring the proper course of affairs, and safeguarding public security and morality are counted among the objectives of mandatory rules. "In terms of content," if the content of a regulation pertains to structures or constructs designed to regulate legal relations and to create order, safeguard public order in its legal aspects or in relation to firm cultural foundations and their sanctions (good morals), it is considered mandatory. "In terms of mode of expression," written law may include commands, prohibitions, or negations. Of course, in many cases, positive indicative themes (in the form of commands) and negative ones (in the form of prohibitions) are more common, but it is not limited to legal expression, and one may benefit from aspects of soft law for norm identification and its gradations. "In terms of gradation," due to the existence of a hierarchy among legal norms and a hierarchy of public order, mandatory rules may also be graded in comparison to one another. Permissive/alternative rules (rules of option), interpretive rules, supplemental rules, substitutive rules, and facultative rules are intended to complement incomplete wills, to express matters neglected by the parties to a legal relationship, or to interpret and construe cases of silence, and they refer to the power of persons' authority to agree contrary to them or the authority to renounce a right. The tone (mode of expression) of the legislator, attention to the content of the rule, the protected interests and normative contexts, the possibility or impossibility of the interference of individuals' will, and the use of a practical principle are among the most important methods of distinguishing mandatory rules from permissive/alternative rules in the family realm. Of course, the establishment of a general principle in family law is not justified. In financial matters and matters that do not provide a special interest, one may base it on the principle of being permissive/alternative, and in other cases, base it on being mandatory.https://jls.shirazu.ac.ir/article_7831_80bf272d1eb25764e66e38a7f36fd6bc.pdfShiraz UniversityJournal of Legal Studies2008-792618120260421Feasibility of Obligating the Guardian Council to Adhere to Its Previous PrecedentsFeasibility of Obligating the Guardian Council to Adhere to Its Previous Precedents121152831910.22099/jls.2025.51085.5205FAVahidHeydariPh.D. Student in Public Law, Faculty of Law, University of ImamSadiq Universty, Tehran, IranHamedNikoonahadAssistant Professor, Department of Public Law and Economic Law, Faculty of Law, Shahid Beheshti University, Tehran, IranKamalKadkhodamoradi. Ph.D. Student in Public Law, Faculty of Law, University of ImamSadiq Universty, Tehran, IranJournal Article20240826<strong>Introduction</strong><br />As the guardian of the legal framework of the Islamic Republic of Iran, the Guardian Council plays a crucial role in the normative legal process through core functions such as the interpretation of the Constitution, supervision of the conformity or inconsistency of legislation with the Constitution and Islamic law (Shari‘a), and review of the compatibility of executive regulations with Shari‘a. In fulfilling these responsibilities, the Council has, in some instances, considered itself bound by its previous opinions or jurisprudential precedents when reviewing referred legislation (bills and proposals approved by the Islamic Consultative Assembly) or religious inquiries from the Administrative Court of Justice. However, there are also cases where, despite the similarity between the legislation under review and prior cases, the Council has issued opinions contradicting its earlier positions. The intersection of cases in which the Guardian Council adhered<br />to its previous rulings and those in which it departed from its precedent—despite substantive similarities—has prompted inquiry into the underlying logic governing the Council’s decision-making. This raises the central research question: “To what extent can the Guardian Council be legally compelled to follow its previous precedents in similar cases?” Examining the Council’s jurisprudence over more than four decades offers valuable insights into the performance and internal logic of this institution.<br /> <br /><strong>Methods</strong><br />This study adopts a jurisprudential-analytical method, with data collected through documentary and library-based research. The Council's decisions are analyzed with the aim of extracting a precedent-oriented rationale. The presentation of various interpretive approaches in this study is based on this analytical framework. The proposed solution—formulating a general principle of adherence with narrowly defined exceptions—is also derived from the precedent-based analysis conducted.<br /><strong> </strong><br /><strong>Results and discussion</strong><br />Three primary approaches emerge regarding the feasibility of compelling the Guardian Council to follow its prior precedents:<br /><br />The adherence approach, which advocates that the Council should follow its previous rulings in similar cases, based on the necessity of maintaining legal certainty and stability, and ensuring the predictability of legal norms.<br />2. The dynamic interpretation approach, which emphasizes the evolving nature of the Council’s legal reasoning. This view highlights the institutional structure and the rotating composition of the Council’s members and argues that binding the Council to its past positions would hinder the necessary dynamism of the legal system.<br />The qualified adherence approach, which presumes adherence to previous precedent as the default rule, but allows for deviation only when justified by clear and objective grounds—such as constitutional amendments, the issuance of general state policies, governmentally mandated rulings (ḥukm ḥukūmatī), or when the Council provides well-documented and substantiated reasoning for departing from precedent.<br /><br /> <br /><strong>Conclusions</strong><br />Institutionalizing the principle of precedent adherence—subject to exceptional and justified deviation—would enable the legislature to more effectively anticipate and respond to potential objections from the Guardian Council. This would improve the efficiency of the legislative process and reduce the likelihood of prolonged lawmaking cycles or the passage of ineffective or unconstitutional laws. If legislators are able to predict likely objections in advance, they can draft laws in a way that preempts foreseeable challenges by the Council. In regulatory contexts, two key outcomes would follow: (1) decisions of the Guardian Council could serve as persuasive precedent in proceedings before the Administrative Court of Justice, and (2) the court would be able to adjudicate such cases more efficiently, with reduced procedural delays. Regulators could avoid enacting provisions previously deemed incompatible with Shari‘a, and citizens would be less likely to file complaints that are predictably doomed to failure based on existing precedent. Moreover, the application of the Guardian Council's precedent would not be limited solely to the review of legislation in light of Islamic principles and constitutional norms; it could also be extended to electoral supervision. Future research should explore key follow-up questions such as: What would be the implications of binding the Guardian Council to its precedents for the legislative system? To what extent does adherence to precedent shape the structure of lawmaking in Iran? Additionally, could the Council be held legally accountable—whether civilly or politically—for unjustified departures from its core precedents?<strong>Introduction</strong><br />As the guardian of the legal framework of the Islamic Republic of Iran, the Guardian Council plays a crucial role in the normative legal process through core functions such as the interpretation of the Constitution, supervision of the conformity or inconsistency of legislation with the Constitution and Islamic law (Shari‘a), and review of the compatibility of executive regulations with Shari‘a. In fulfilling these responsibilities, the Council has, in some instances, considered itself bound by its previous opinions or jurisprudential precedents when reviewing referred legislation (bills and proposals approved by the Islamic Consultative Assembly) or religious inquiries from the Administrative Court of Justice. However, there are also cases where, despite the similarity between the legislation under review and prior cases, the Council has issued opinions contradicting its earlier positions. The intersection of cases in which the Guardian Council adhered<br />to its previous rulings and those in which it departed from its precedent—despite substantive similarities—has prompted inquiry into the underlying logic governing the Council’s decision-making. This raises the central research question: “To what extent can the Guardian Council be legally compelled to follow its previous precedents in similar cases?” Examining the Council’s jurisprudence over more than four decades offers valuable insights into the performance and internal logic of this institution.<br /> <br /><strong>Methods</strong><br />This study adopts a jurisprudential-analytical method, with data collected through documentary and library-based research. The Council's decisions are analyzed with the aim of extracting a precedent-oriented rationale. The presentation of various interpretive approaches in this study is based on this analytical framework. The proposed solution—formulating a general principle of adherence with narrowly defined exceptions—is also derived from the precedent-based analysis conducted.<br /><strong> </strong><br /><strong>Results and discussion</strong><br />Three primary approaches emerge regarding the feasibility of compelling the Guardian Council to follow its prior precedents:<br /><br />The adherence approach, which advocates that the Council should follow its previous rulings in similar cases, based on the necessity of maintaining legal certainty and stability, and ensuring the predictability of legal norms.<br />2. The dynamic interpretation approach, which emphasizes the evolving nature of the Council’s legal reasoning. This view highlights the institutional structure and the rotating composition of the Council’s members and argues that binding the Council to its past positions would hinder the necessary dynamism of the legal system.<br />The qualified adherence approach, which presumes adherence to previous precedent as the default rule, but allows for deviation only when justified by clear and objective grounds—such as constitutional amendments, the issuance of general state policies, governmentally mandated rulings (ḥukm ḥukūmatī), or when the Council provides well-documented and substantiated reasoning for departing from precedent.<br /><br /> <br /><strong>Conclusions</strong><br />Institutionalizing the principle of precedent adherence—subject to exceptional and justified deviation—would enable the legislature to more effectively anticipate and respond to potential objections from the Guardian Council. This would improve the efficiency of the legislative process and reduce the likelihood of prolonged lawmaking cycles or the passage of ineffective or unconstitutional laws. If legislators are able to predict likely objections in advance, they can draft laws in a way that preempts foreseeable challenges by the Council. In regulatory contexts, two key outcomes would follow: (1) decisions of the Guardian Council could serve as persuasive precedent in proceedings before the Administrative Court of Justice, and (2) the court would be able to adjudicate such cases more efficiently, with reduced procedural delays. Regulators could avoid enacting provisions previously deemed incompatible with Shari‘a, and citizens would be less likely to file complaints that are predictably doomed to failure based on existing precedent. Moreover, the application of the Guardian Council's precedent would not be limited solely to the review of legislation in light of Islamic principles and constitutional norms; it could also be extended to electoral supervision. Future research should explore key follow-up questions such as: What would be the implications of binding the Guardian Council to its precedents for the legislative system? To what extent does adherence to precedent shape the structure of lawmaking in Iran? Additionally, could the Council be held legally accountable—whether civilly or politically—for unjustified departures from its core precedents?https://jls.shirazu.ac.ir/article_8319_d9feed52fe75032ad28302ceefa33760.pdfShiraz UniversityJournal of Legal Studies2008-792618120260421Article 454 of the Civil Code in the Mirror of Unified Judicial Precedent No. 810 and the Effect of Rescission on Contracts Subsequent to the Subject MatterArticle 454 of the Civil Code in the Mirror of Unified Judicial Precedent No. 810 and the Effect of Rescission on Contracts Subsequent to the Subject Matter153188808110.22099/jls.2025.51577.5233FATayebeYazdani. Ph.D. Student, Department of Law, Faculty of Theology, Meybod University, Meybod, IranNasrolahJafariAssociate Professor, Department of Law, Faculty of Theology, Meybod University, Meybod, Iran0000-0002-5960-8622Journal Article20241107<strong>Introduction</strong><br /> In many transactions, the buyer pays the price in installments, and in return, the seller stipulates that if any installment is not paid, the sale shall be rescinded or the seller shall have the right of rescission (Khiyar). This practice has become particularly prevalent in relation to transactions involving immovable property. In this regard, one of the ambiguities and points of divergence in judicial practice is the legal status of transfers and dispositions that conflict with the seller's right of option (Khiyar), and the answer to the question: Does the existence of a right of rescission (Khiyar al-faskh) constitute an obstacle to the transfer of the sold property (mabi') by the buyer? In answer to this question, briefly, it must be said that the existence of a right of option (Khiyar) does not preclude the validity of dispositions made by the party against whom the right of option exists (man alayh al-khiyar), unless there has been an implicit stipulation or an express condition prohibiting dispositive transfers of the corporeal property (ayn) or its usufruct (manfa'ah). In effect, the effect of rescission (faskh) is prospective, and exercising the right of rescission after the sale of the property by the first buyer cannot invalidate the subsequent sale. This is unless the buyer had initially undertaken not to make any dispositive transfer, and thus his right of transfer had been limited in some way. On this basis, the esteemed Prosecutor General of the Country, in order to resolve the conflict between two judgments issued by Branches 16 and 25 of the Court of Appeal of Mazandaran Province, considering an optional sale (bay' khiyari) as non-binding (ghar nafiz) and void (batil) in the absence of the consent of the party holding the right of option (man lahu al-khiyar) in the event of the contract's dissolution, deemed the parties obligated to return the sold property (mabi'), and this led to the issuance of Unified Judicial Precedent No. 810 dated 04/03/1400 (May 25, 2021).<br /> <br /><strong>Methods</strong><br /> This research has been conducted with an analytical approach and using library resources to collect opinions and analyze and examine them. Its aim is to answer the question: "Based on Unified Judicial Precedent No. 810, what effect does the dissolution of the underlying contract have on subsequent transactions and their status, and on what basis has this precedent obligated the buyer to return the sold property (mabi')?" For this purpose, we first explain the nature of the condition leading to the dissolution of the underlying contract in the event of non-payment of installments of the price, then examine the effect of the dissolution of the underlying contract on subsequent transactions and their status, and finally, analyze the foundations of the Unified Judicial Precedent.<br /> <br /><strong>Findings</strong><br /> According to Unified Judicial Precedent No. 810, if it is stipulated within a contract of sale that, in the event of non-payment of the price installments on the specified dates, the seller has the right to rescind (faskh) and recover the sold property (mabi'), then upon the realization of the condition and the exercise of the right of rescission, even if the buyer, without considering the right of rescission, has sold the sold property to another person, the sold property must be returned to the seller, and the subsequent transfer is void (batil). The findings of the article indicate that when the seller stipulates in the contract that the transaction will be dissolved if any installment of the price is not paid, jurisprudential (fiqhi) and principles (usuli) rules dictate that the buyer does not have the right to make dispositions conflicting with the right of option (Khiyar) in the sold property. Because, although ownership of the sold property is transferred upon the conclusion of the transaction, and dispositions of the sold property are generally permissible, since the parties themselves, at the time of concluding the transaction by accepting the condition in the contract, have accepted the limitation on their dispositions, therefore, based on Articles 454, 455, and 460 of the Civil Code, they are obligated to refrain from any disposition that conflicts with the right of the party holding the option (dhi al-khiyar). This condition is a type of implicit, tacit condition (shart-e zamani-ye ertekeazi) which, by the dictate of reason (hukm-e aql), must be observed by the parties, and the contracting parties are inevitably bound to accept its effects, which is the restitution of the counter-values (atawayn/considerations) upon the dissolution of the contract.<br /><br /><strong>Conclusion</strong><br />Therefore, the basis for the dissolution of contracts subsequent to the subject matter is the implicit condition prohibiting dispositive transfers of the corporeal property (ayn) and its usufruct (manfa'ah), which is referred to in Article 454 of the Civil Code. According to the maxim "what is known by custom is like a stipulated condition" (al-ma'ruf 'urfan ka al-mashrut shartan) and "believers are bound by their stipulations" (al-mu'minuna 'inda shurutihim), this condition must be respected. Thus, Unified Judicial Precedent No. 810, based on these very foundations, upon the realization of the condition and the exercise of rescission, has deemed the buyer obligated to return the sold property (mabi').<strong>Introduction</strong><br /> In many transactions, the buyer pays the price in installments, and in return, the seller stipulates that if any installment is not paid, the sale shall be rescinded or the seller shall have the right of rescission (Khiyar). This practice has become particularly prevalent in relation to transactions involving immovable property. In this regard, one of the ambiguities and points of divergence in judicial practice is the legal status of transfers and dispositions that conflict with the seller's right of option (Khiyar), and the answer to the question: Does the existence of a right of rescission (Khiyar al-faskh) constitute an obstacle to the transfer of the sold property (mabi') by the buyer? In answer to this question, briefly, it must be said that the existence of a right of option (Khiyar) does not preclude the validity of dispositions made by the party against whom the right of option exists (man alayh al-khiyar), unless there has been an implicit stipulation or an express condition prohibiting dispositive transfers of the corporeal property (ayn) or its usufruct (manfa'ah). In effect, the effect of rescission (faskh) is prospective, and exercising the right of rescission after the sale of the property by the first buyer cannot invalidate the subsequent sale. This is unless the buyer had initially undertaken not to make any dispositive transfer, and thus his right of transfer had been limited in some way. On this basis, the esteemed Prosecutor General of the Country, in order to resolve the conflict between two judgments issued by Branches 16 and 25 of the Court of Appeal of Mazandaran Province, considering an optional sale (bay' khiyari) as non-binding (ghar nafiz) and void (batil) in the absence of the consent of the party holding the right of option (man lahu al-khiyar) in the event of the contract's dissolution, deemed the parties obligated to return the sold property (mabi'), and this led to the issuance of Unified Judicial Precedent No. 810 dated 04/03/1400 (May 25, 2021).<br /> <br /><strong>Methods</strong><br /> This research has been conducted with an analytical approach and using library resources to collect opinions and analyze and examine them. Its aim is to answer the question: "Based on Unified Judicial Precedent No. 810, what effect does the dissolution of the underlying contract have on subsequent transactions and their status, and on what basis has this precedent obligated the buyer to return the sold property (mabi')?" For this purpose, we first explain the nature of the condition leading to the dissolution of the underlying contract in the event of non-payment of installments of the price, then examine the effect of the dissolution of the underlying contract on subsequent transactions and their status, and finally, analyze the foundations of the Unified Judicial Precedent.<br /> <br /><strong>Findings</strong><br /> According to Unified Judicial Precedent No. 810, if it is stipulated within a contract of sale that, in the event of non-payment of the price installments on the specified dates, the seller has the right to rescind (faskh) and recover the sold property (mabi'), then upon the realization of the condition and the exercise of the right of rescission, even if the buyer, without considering the right of rescission, has sold the sold property to another person, the sold property must be returned to the seller, and the subsequent transfer is void (batil). The findings of the article indicate that when the seller stipulates in the contract that the transaction will be dissolved if any installment of the price is not paid, jurisprudential (fiqhi) and principles (usuli) rules dictate that the buyer does not have the right to make dispositions conflicting with the right of option (Khiyar) in the sold property. Because, although ownership of the sold property is transferred upon the conclusion of the transaction, and dispositions of the sold property are generally permissible, since the parties themselves, at the time of concluding the transaction by accepting the condition in the contract, have accepted the limitation on their dispositions, therefore, based on Articles 454, 455, and 460 of the Civil Code, they are obligated to refrain from any disposition that conflicts with the right of the party holding the option (dhi al-khiyar). This condition is a type of implicit, tacit condition (shart-e zamani-ye ertekeazi) which, by the dictate of reason (hukm-e aql), must be observed by the parties, and the contracting parties are inevitably bound to accept its effects, which is the restitution of the counter-values (atawayn/considerations) upon the dissolution of the contract.<br /><br /><strong>Conclusion</strong><br />Therefore, the basis for the dissolution of contracts subsequent to the subject matter is the implicit condition prohibiting dispositive transfers of the corporeal property (ayn) and its usufruct (manfa'ah), which is referred to in Article 454 of the Civil Code. According to the maxim "what is known by custom is like a stipulated condition" (al-ma'ruf 'urfan ka al-mashrut shartan) and "believers are bound by their stipulations" (al-mu'minuna 'inda shurutihim), this condition must be respected. Thus, Unified Judicial Precedent No. 810, based on these very foundations, upon the realization of the condition and the exercise of rescission, has deemed the buyer obligated to return the sold property (mabi').https://jls.shirazu.ac.ir/article_8081_92112bcb02692379953ee9d68a7222e5.pdfShiraz UniversityJournal of Legal Studies2008-792618120260421The Legal Status of Tamkin and Consent in Marital Sexual Violence with a Comparative ViewThe Legal Status of Tamkin and Consent in Marital Sexual Violence with a Comparative View189228800310.22099/jls.2025.51838.5241FANiloofarGholipourMA. in Criminal Law & Criminology, Department of Law, Faculty of Literature and Humanities, University of Guilan, Rasht, IranMahinSobhaniAssistant Prof. , Department of Law, Faculty of Literature and Humanities, University of Guilan, Rasht, IranHosseinAghababaeiAssociate Prof., Department of Law, Faculty of Literature and Humanities, University of Guilan, Rasht, IranJournal Article20241205<strong>Introduction</strong><br />After marriage, the couple accepts rights and duties toward each other; one of them is the right of sexual enjoyment but exercising this right should not cause any harm or sexual violence. Sexual violence includes behaviors that cause sexual harassment against a person without her will and the relation between them makes no difference therefore marital sexual violence is criminalized as a type of domestic violence in many national legal systems while some countries do not recognize it as a certain crime. The aim in this article is to discuss about the criminalization of this phenomenon and the circumstance of consent in marital sexual acts in different counties and emphasizing on the importance of criminalizing it in countries like Iran.<br /><br /><strong>Methods</strong><br />By examining the concept of marital sexual violence and using descriptive analytical method, and national and international sources, such as books, articles, documents and laws, while comparing other legal systems like England, USA, Australia, France and Germany, with Iran and proposing questions such as Can making provisions like Tamkin be a justifier to any kind of sexual conduct? If not, what are the borders and limitations for it? Does the consent to marriage equal the consent to any sexual relationship? Is consent essential in marital sexual relationship or the obligation to comply (Tamkin) is against it? this research attempts to present applicable solutions for recognition of this phenomenon in Iran and other countries which did not criminalize marital sexual violence.<br /> <br /><strong>Results</strong><br />While countries like USA or Australia know this crime as any sexual behavior which may occur despite the lack of consent in victim and the relation between them does not make difference, other countries like Iran and India make some limitations for criminalizing this behavior and eliminate sexual violence in marriage. By studying the countries which consider the occurrence of sexual violence as a type of domestic violence between couples, it is clearly revealed that by emphasizing on the concept and importance of consent they mostly want to consider the mere lack of consent in any sexual behavior as a reason for sexual violence, even if the victim is the perpetrator's spouse; because they generally believe that the consent to marriage does not equal to the consent for sexual relationship and the couples need to ask for consent at any time they want to do any sexual act. On the other side, those countries which does not criminalize marital sexual violence, often believe that the consent to sexual conduct is granted in the consent to marriage. Therefore, the law in these countries like Iran makes the obligation to comply in sex for wives. Article 1102 of Iranian Civil Law says that occurrence of a valid marriage is the start of the occurrence of rights and duties for couples and one of the responsibilities assumed for women is the obligation to comply("Tamkin"), which in its specific concept means making the possibility of sexual fulfillment for the husband. This duty is that important for lawmakers that disobedience may cause the sanction of not paying the expenses of the essential needs to the wife which can be known as a kind of punishment. But there is not any similar duty for husbands and it makes the anticipation that women's sexual rights are totally denied in Iranian legal system. In Iran, due to the lack of limits on Tamkin, the only legal solution for women is to request a divorce by proving hardship ("Osr va Haraj") and there is no crime under the title of marital sexual violence.<br /><br /><strong>Conclusion</strong><br />Criminalizing marital sexual violence in legal systems such as America, Australia, France, Germany and England seem to be on the right way, because emphasizing on the importance of the concepts like consent which can change a sexual act to a sexual crime is undeniable. In Iran even if the obligation to comply (Tamkin) in law may not inherently include every kind of sexual behavior in marriage, like uncommon ones, but making these types of provisions can facilitate the criminal acts such as sexual violence with the legal support and this itself reveals the importance of absolute criminalization of marital sexual violence by using legal and jurisprudential capacities.<br /><br /><strong>Introduction</strong><br />After marriage, the couple accepts rights and duties toward each other; one of them is the right of sexual enjoyment but exercising this right should not cause any harm or sexual violence. Sexual violence includes behaviors that cause sexual harassment against a person without her will and the relation between them makes no difference therefore marital sexual violence is criminalized as a type of domestic violence in many national legal systems while some countries do not recognize it as a certain crime. The aim in this article is to discuss about the criminalization of this phenomenon and the circumstance of consent in marital sexual acts in different counties and emphasizing on the importance of criminalizing it in countries like Iran.<br /><br /><strong>Methods</strong><br />By examining the concept of marital sexual violence and using descriptive analytical method, and national and international sources, such as books, articles, documents and laws, while comparing other legal systems like England, USA, Australia, France and Germany, with Iran and proposing questions such as Can making provisions like Tamkin be a justifier to any kind of sexual conduct? If not, what are the borders and limitations for it? Does the consent to marriage equal the consent to any sexual relationship? Is consent essential in marital sexual relationship or the obligation to comply (Tamkin) is against it? this research attempts to present applicable solutions for recognition of this phenomenon in Iran and other countries which did not criminalize marital sexual violence.<br /> <br /><strong>Results</strong><br />While countries like USA or Australia know this crime as any sexual behavior which may occur despite the lack of consent in victim and the relation between them does not make difference, other countries like Iran and India make some limitations for criminalizing this behavior and eliminate sexual violence in marriage. By studying the countries which consider the occurrence of sexual violence as a type of domestic violence between couples, it is clearly revealed that by emphasizing on the concept and importance of consent they mostly want to consider the mere lack of consent in any sexual behavior as a reason for sexual violence, even if the victim is the perpetrator's spouse; because they generally believe that the consent to marriage does not equal to the consent for sexual relationship and the couples need to ask for consent at any time they want to do any sexual act. On the other side, those countries which does not criminalize marital sexual violence, often believe that the consent to sexual conduct is granted in the consent to marriage. Therefore, the law in these countries like Iran makes the obligation to comply in sex for wives. Article 1102 of Iranian Civil Law says that occurrence of a valid marriage is the start of the occurrence of rights and duties for couples and one of the responsibilities assumed for women is the obligation to comply("Tamkin"), which in its specific concept means making the possibility of sexual fulfillment for the husband. This duty is that important for lawmakers that disobedience may cause the sanction of not paying the expenses of the essential needs to the wife which can be known as a kind of punishment. But there is not any similar duty for husbands and it makes the anticipation that women's sexual rights are totally denied in Iranian legal system. In Iran, due to the lack of limits on Tamkin, the only legal solution for women is to request a divorce by proving hardship ("Osr va Haraj") and there is no crime under the title of marital sexual violence.<br /><br /><strong>Conclusion</strong><br />Criminalizing marital sexual violence in legal systems such as America, Australia, France, Germany and England seem to be on the right way, because emphasizing on the importance of the concepts like consent which can change a sexual act to a sexual crime is undeniable. In Iran even if the obligation to comply (Tamkin) in law may not inherently include every kind of sexual behavior in marriage, like uncommon ones, but making these types of provisions can facilitate the criminal acts such as sexual violence with the legal support and this itself reveals the importance of absolute criminalization of marital sexual violence by using legal and jurisprudential capacities.<br /><br />https://jls.shirazu.ac.ir/article_8003_47d2d66e469f33ac7d918db212a4364f.pdfShiraz UniversityJournal of Legal Studies2008-792618120260421Intersectionality of Law and Emotion: Entry Points for Emotion in Legal ProceedingsIntersectionality of Law and Emotion: Entry Points for Emotion in Legal Proceedings229278802110.22099/jls.2025.51843.5242FAMeisaKamyabPhD graduate in Public Law, Public and Economic Law, Law Faculty, Shahid Beheshti University, Tehran, IranJournal Article20241230<strong>Introduction</strong><br />This article is based on the premise that the traditional dichotomy of law and emotion faces serious challenges. This premise is deduced from the empirical findings of neuroscience regarding the existence of mirror neurons, which make feeling the emotions of others possible and inevitable, along with the dual-process model of decision-making. This model requires the cooperation of rational and emotional processing and shows that moral judgment is dependent on emotions.<br />Every legal actor, whether serving as a legislator or donning the judicial robe, may agree that “emotion inevitably enters the legal decision-making process, whether legal actors are aware of it or not.” However, this broad claim offers no practical guidance for clarifying the specific. ways in which emotion influences judicial decision-making. In order to clarify some of these entry points, the article begins with the premise that law, a priori, cannot be for or against emotions. Emotionality is a dimension of human nature; however, responses to emotion are determined within a framework <br />and according to the objectives of the law. Therefore, it does not take a normative stance on the value of any specific emotion. Although some argue that certain moral emotions contribute to the formation and sustainability of moral systems across cultures, emotions are not inherently moralistic or beneficial for morality. Instead, they play a constructive role in moral responses.<br /> Judges may err due to reliance on irrelevant emotions, by improperly applying or excessively amplifying appropriate emotions. As an effort to make emotions reliable, correcting these errors requires identifying the points at which emotion enters the legal process. When this reliability is reconsidered, encouraging judges to consider emotions in interpreting rights equips them with a corrective tool against excessive legal formalism and attracts their attention to otherwise overlooked violated rights. The integration of emotions moderates the detached voice of outdated legal analysis and makes it more human-centered. Therefore, “studies on law and emotion” demonstrate the vital role of emotion in everyone’s legal life.<br /> Protecting abstract legal concepts requires judges to develop a strong emotional understanding of specific situations and individuals during their reasoning process. This article seeks to create a coherent body of literature, building on previous findings regarding the role of emotion in legal decision-making based on neuroscience studies and the importance of empathy in judgment. It aims to make the abstract concept of “emotion in judicial decision-making” more concrete by presenting examples and thereby enlightening legal actors about its impacts.<br /> <br /><strong>Methods</strong><br />This manuscript tries to address the non-enumerated ways in which emotions enter legal proceedings and judicial decision-making. Answering this question requires case studies and analysis of legal texts. It should be noted that the answers provided merely represent a partial reality and are not exhaustive.<br />This study falls within the category of normative legal research and seeks to offer an explanation of law, legal concepts, and principles. This research adopts a library-based approach.<strong> </strong>Materials are gathered through case studies and legal texts analysis. The present analysis uses the legal doctrine approach within “Law and Emotion” scholarship, in the sense that it tries to analyze how emotion is, could be, or should be reflected in a particular area of legal doctrine. It is also related to the legal actor approach, as it shows how lawmakers or judges bring emotional concepts into the legal sphere consciously or unconsciously.<br /> <br /><strong>Results </strong><br />Emotion in judicial proceedings can serve as a tool for judges, guiding their minds toward the importance of concepts like justice and altruism (orienting role), expanding general legal concepts such as human dignity and fairness (tracking role), or placing them in a suitable position to respond to rights violations (serving role) through empathy or courage.<br />The law, whether dealing with criminal law, fundamental rights and freedoms, or private fields such as property, family, or procedural law, carries an emotional charge. Thus, a judge’s task is inherently infused with emotion, and it is unreasonable to expect them to function as machines devoid of any human sensibility. The laws themselves generate emotions and provide judges with opportunities to manage these emotions through their judicial decisions. Accordingly, the role of judges should shift from suppressing emotions to cultivating constructive and adaptive emotions through judicial decisions. Understanding the entry points of emotion in legal decision-making provides an opportunity to leverage judicial and institutional capacities to foster adaptive emotions by considering them in legal interpretation.<br /> <br /><strong>Conclusions </strong><br />Emotions are both a tool in the judicial work and a factor that influences the subject matter of judicial activity, namely, the law itself. They are also shaped by legislation and jurisprudence. A judge who engages with legal content replete with emotional elements cannot reasonably be expected to set emotion aside. The only viable approach is to become aware of emotions and regulate them, rather than suppressing or denying emotional responses. Many rules designed to regulate adjudication, particularly those embodied in procedural law, have pursued this very goal. However, confining judges to extreme formalism silences the constructive role of emotions in law. If judges are encouraged to attend to emotions in interpreting rights, they will possess a corrective tool against excessive formalism. The use of emotion in legal interpretation helps ensure that the real-world effects of law are taken seriously. It also highlights the human rights that may have been overlooked. Therefore, law and adjudication can function as powerful instruments for cultivating constructive emotions, those that, irrespective of their positive or negative valence, ultimately contribute to the formation of a cohesive society.<strong>Introduction</strong><br />This article is based on the premise that the traditional dichotomy of law and emotion faces serious challenges. This premise is deduced from the empirical findings of neuroscience regarding the existence of mirror neurons, which make feeling the emotions of others possible and inevitable, along with the dual-process model of decision-making. This model requires the cooperation of rational and emotional processing and shows that moral judgment is dependent on emotions.<br />Every legal actor, whether serving as a legislator or donning the judicial robe, may agree that “emotion inevitably enters the legal decision-making process, whether legal actors are aware of it or not.” However, this broad claim offers no practical guidance for clarifying the specific. ways in which emotion influences judicial decision-making. In order to clarify some of these entry points, the article begins with the premise that law, a priori, cannot be for or against emotions. Emotionality is a dimension of human nature; however, responses to emotion are determined within a framework <br />and according to the objectives of the law. Therefore, it does not take a normative stance on the value of any specific emotion. Although some argue that certain moral emotions contribute to the formation and sustainability of moral systems across cultures, emotions are not inherently moralistic or beneficial for morality. Instead, they play a constructive role in moral responses.<br /> Judges may err due to reliance on irrelevant emotions, by improperly applying or excessively amplifying appropriate emotions. As an effort to make emotions reliable, correcting these errors requires identifying the points at which emotion enters the legal process. When this reliability is reconsidered, encouraging judges to consider emotions in interpreting rights equips them with a corrective tool against excessive legal formalism and attracts their attention to otherwise overlooked violated rights. The integration of emotions moderates the detached voice of outdated legal analysis and makes it more human-centered. Therefore, “studies on law and emotion” demonstrate the vital role of emotion in everyone’s legal life.<br /> Protecting abstract legal concepts requires judges to develop a strong emotional understanding of specific situations and individuals during their reasoning process. This article seeks to create a coherent body of literature, building on previous findings regarding the role of emotion in legal decision-making based on neuroscience studies and the importance of empathy in judgment. It aims to make the abstract concept of “emotion in judicial decision-making” more concrete by presenting examples and thereby enlightening legal actors about its impacts.<br /> <br /><strong>Methods</strong><br />This manuscript tries to address the non-enumerated ways in which emotions enter legal proceedings and judicial decision-making. Answering this question requires case studies and analysis of legal texts. It should be noted that the answers provided merely represent a partial reality and are not exhaustive.<br />This study falls within the category of normative legal research and seeks to offer an explanation of law, legal concepts, and principles. This research adopts a library-based approach.<strong> </strong>Materials are gathered through case studies and legal texts analysis. The present analysis uses the legal doctrine approach within “Law and Emotion” scholarship, in the sense that it tries to analyze how emotion is, could be, or should be reflected in a particular area of legal doctrine. It is also related to the legal actor approach, as it shows how lawmakers or judges bring emotional concepts into the legal sphere consciously or unconsciously.<br /> <br /><strong>Results </strong><br />Emotion in judicial proceedings can serve as a tool for judges, guiding their minds toward the importance of concepts like justice and altruism (orienting role), expanding general legal concepts such as human dignity and fairness (tracking role), or placing them in a suitable position to respond to rights violations (serving role) through empathy or courage.<br />The law, whether dealing with criminal law, fundamental rights and freedoms, or private fields such as property, family, or procedural law, carries an emotional charge. Thus, a judge’s task is inherently infused with emotion, and it is unreasonable to expect them to function as machines devoid of any human sensibility. The laws themselves generate emotions and provide judges with opportunities to manage these emotions through their judicial decisions. Accordingly, the role of judges should shift from suppressing emotions to cultivating constructive and adaptive emotions through judicial decisions. Understanding the entry points of emotion in legal decision-making provides an opportunity to leverage judicial and institutional capacities to foster adaptive emotions by considering them in legal interpretation.<br /> <br /><strong>Conclusions </strong><br />Emotions are both a tool in the judicial work and a factor that influences the subject matter of judicial activity, namely, the law itself. They are also shaped by legislation and jurisprudence. A judge who engages with legal content replete with emotional elements cannot reasonably be expected to set emotion aside. The only viable approach is to become aware of emotions and regulate them, rather than suppressing or denying emotional responses. Many rules designed to regulate adjudication, particularly those embodied in procedural law, have pursued this very goal. However, confining judges to extreme formalism silences the constructive role of emotions in law. If judges are encouraged to attend to emotions in interpreting rights, they will possess a corrective tool against excessive formalism. The use of emotion in legal interpretation helps ensure that the real-world effects of law are taken seriously. It also highlights the human rights that may have been overlooked. Therefore, law and adjudication can function as powerful instruments for cultivating constructive emotions, those that, irrespective of their positive or negative valence, ultimately contribute to the formation of a cohesive society.https://jls.shirazu.ac.ir/article_8021_8462a18d040f466dceb196c63b316279.pdfShiraz UniversityJournal of Legal Studies2008-792618120260421An Analysis of Abuse of Process through Corporate Restructuring in International Investment Disputes under the ICSID ConventionAn Analysis of Abuse of Process through Corporate Restructuring in International Investment Disputes under the ICSID Convention279318802810.22099/jls.2025.52055.5253FAMohammad JavadAbdollahi. Assistant Prof., Department of Law, Kho.C., Islamic Azad University, Khomeinishahr, IranMOHAMMADKarimi. PhD Student Of Private Law, Najafabad Branch, Islamic Azad University, Najafabad, IranJournal Article20250103<strong>Introduction</strong><br />Bilateral investment treaties are designed to foster mutual economic cooperation and protect foreign investments. However, these treaties are sometimes exploited by investors—whether individuals or corporations—who are not originally entitled to their protections. One prominent method of such exploitation is corporate restructuring, undertaken specifically to gain access to treaty benefits. The ICSID Arbitration Tribunal has encountered multiple cases involving such tactics and has, in several decisions, emphasized its unwillingness to entertain jurisdiction where it finds an abuse of process. Such practices undermine the core objectives of the ICSID Convention, particularly the promotion of genuine international investment and sustainable development in host countries. This paper seeks to provide a detailed legal analysis of process abuse, especially through corporate restructuring. It evaluates the criteria used by ICSID tribunals to identify and respond to such abuse and aims to shed light on how international legal mechanisms can preserve the integrity of investment arbitration. <br /><br /><strong>Methods</strong><br />This study employs both doctrinal (library-based) research and qualitative analysis using questionnaires. First, the legal concept of abuse of process is explained and distinguished from the closely related concept of abuse of rights. The paper then examines how abuse of process can be realized through corporate restructuring and reviews legal responses to this issue. Finally, the role of good faith and other key legal principles in preventing abuse is assessed, providing insight into how tribunals evaluate such cases and maintain fairness in international investment arbitration.<br /> <br /><strong>Findings</strong><br />Through detailed analysis, the paper finds that corporate restructuring carried out with the sole purpose of accessing treaty protection constitutes a violation of the international principle of good faith. Such actions are often viewed as circumventing the legitimate objectives of BITs, which include encouraging foreign investment, ensuring fair treatment of investors, and contributing to the economic development of host states. ICSID tribunals, aligning with scholarly views and arbitral precedents, have consistently refused to recognize jurisdiction in cases where claimants restructure merely to benefit from treaty protections they were not originally entitled to. These tribunals have identified specific jurisdictional criteria—personal jurisdiction, temporal jurisdiction, subject matter jurisdiction, and consent—which must all be satisfied for a claim to proceed. When claimants fail to meet even one of these criteria, particularly in situations involving strategic restructuring close to the emergence of a dispute, their claims are typically dismissed. This has led to a growing body of case law supporting host states' objections based on abuse of process.<br /> <br /><strong>Conclusion</strong><br />In light of the absence of a clear definition of "investment" under Article 25 of the ICSID Convention, tribunals have relied on rigorous analysis of jurisdictional requirements and the overarching principle of good faith to safeguard the legitimacy of the arbitration process. The consistent application of these standards serves to deter opportunistic behavior by investors and to prevent the manipulation of BIT provisions through bad-faith restructuring. The findings of this study underscore the importance of upholding procedural integrity and ensuring that ICSID proceedings are not misused. By doing so, the system can better serve its original purpose—protecting legitimate investors while supporting fair and sustainable international investment practices.<strong>Introduction</strong><br />Bilateral investment treaties are designed to foster mutual economic cooperation and protect foreign investments. However, these treaties are sometimes exploited by investors—whether individuals or corporations—who are not originally entitled to their protections. One prominent method of such exploitation is corporate restructuring, undertaken specifically to gain access to treaty benefits. The ICSID Arbitration Tribunal has encountered multiple cases involving such tactics and has, in several decisions, emphasized its unwillingness to entertain jurisdiction where it finds an abuse of process. Such practices undermine the core objectives of the ICSID Convention, particularly the promotion of genuine international investment and sustainable development in host countries. This paper seeks to provide a detailed legal analysis of process abuse, especially through corporate restructuring. It evaluates the criteria used by ICSID tribunals to identify and respond to such abuse and aims to shed light on how international legal mechanisms can preserve the integrity of investment arbitration. <br /><br /><strong>Methods</strong><br />This study employs both doctrinal (library-based) research and qualitative analysis using questionnaires. First, the legal concept of abuse of process is explained and distinguished from the closely related concept of abuse of rights. The paper then examines how abuse of process can be realized through corporate restructuring and reviews legal responses to this issue. Finally, the role of good faith and other key legal principles in preventing abuse is assessed, providing insight into how tribunals evaluate such cases and maintain fairness in international investment arbitration.<br /> <br /><strong>Findings</strong><br />Through detailed analysis, the paper finds that corporate restructuring carried out with the sole purpose of accessing treaty protection constitutes a violation of the international principle of good faith. Such actions are often viewed as circumventing the legitimate objectives of BITs, which include encouraging foreign investment, ensuring fair treatment of investors, and contributing to the economic development of host states. ICSID tribunals, aligning with scholarly views and arbitral precedents, have consistently refused to recognize jurisdiction in cases where claimants restructure merely to benefit from treaty protections they were not originally entitled to. These tribunals have identified specific jurisdictional criteria—personal jurisdiction, temporal jurisdiction, subject matter jurisdiction, and consent—which must all be satisfied for a claim to proceed. When claimants fail to meet even one of these criteria, particularly in situations involving strategic restructuring close to the emergence of a dispute, their claims are typically dismissed. This has led to a growing body of case law supporting host states' objections based on abuse of process.<br /> <br /><strong>Conclusion</strong><br />In light of the absence of a clear definition of "investment" under Article 25 of the ICSID Convention, tribunals have relied on rigorous analysis of jurisdictional requirements and the overarching principle of good faith to safeguard the legitimacy of the arbitration process. The consistent application of these standards serves to deter opportunistic behavior by investors and to prevent the manipulation of BIT provisions through bad-faith restructuring. The findings of this study underscore the importance of upholding procedural integrity and ensuring that ICSID proceedings are not misused. By doing so, the system can better serve its original purpose—protecting legitimate investors while supporting fair and sustainable international investment practices.https://jls.shirazu.ac.ir/article_8028_fefc7a6d5f979fa618c95324aa1c2aed.pdfShiraz UniversityJournal of Legal Studies2008-792618120260421The Position and Application of the Right to Personal Data Portability in the Competition Law of Digital PlatformsThe Position and Application of the Right to Personal Data Portability in the Competition Law of Digital Platforms319358803510.22099/jls.2025.52067.5251FAEbrahimRahbariAssistant Professor, International Trade Law & Intellectual Property and Cyberspace Law Department, Faculty of Law, Shahid Beheshti University, Tehran, IranArianMasoudi Tafreshi. Master in Intellectual Property Law, Faculty of Law, Shahid Beheshti university, Tehran, IranJournal Article20250101<strong>Introduction</strong><br />When users of digital platforms intend to migrate to a new platform, they face costs during migration or "multi-homing." The lack of access for the migrating user to their own personal data on the new platform is one of the most prominent of these costs. Since this switching cost makes it difficult for nascent platforms to compete with incumbent platforms, in recent years a right known as the "right to personal data portability" has attracted the attention of competition policymakers. In Iran, this right was also recognized in 2020 (1399 AH) in the document "Policies and Macro Requirements for Supporting Competition and Combating Monopoly of Virtual Space Platforms." The main question of the present article is whether the right to personal data portability can in practice be a tool to increase inter-platform competition? And if the answer is negative, what solutions can be proposed to the legislator to increase the efficiency of the right to data portability in the competition law of virtual space platforms?.<br /><br /><strong>Method</strong><br />This article attempts to answer the above question using a descriptive-analytical method.<br /> <br /><strong>Findings</strong><br />The results of the study show that currently the personal data portability regime in Iranian platform markets faces three obstacles to increasing competition: The first obstacle is the legal limitation of platforms and migrating users in the full implementation of the right to personal data portability due to the conflict of this right with the privacy of third-party users of the platform. For example, on the "Instagram" platform, the information that matters to the migrating user is not only their own personal data but also includes data created by the user's friends and followers who are somehow connected to them (such as their likes and comments). In another example, sellers active on the "Digikala" platform, when migrating to another platform, intend both to transfer their own data, such as product images and descriptions, and also consider transferring their customers' data, such as feedback and positive reviews recorded about the products. This is while the transfer of personal data belonging to third parties (in the above hypotheses, the user's friends on the Instagram platform and the seller's customers on the Digikala platform) faces limitations under personal data protection laws; a limitation whose legal source is Article 59 of the Electronic Commerce Law and clauses 1-1 and 2-1 of the "Directive on Improving the Protection of Privacy of Users of Virtual Space Platforms."<br />The second obstacle is the absolute nature of clause 3 of Article 4 of the document "Policies and Macro Requirements for Supporting Competition and Combating Monopoly of Virtual Space Platforms," which obliges all digital platforms active in Iran to establish a data portability process. This imposes unnecessary costs on nascent platforms lacking market power and can itself become a barrier to entry into the platform market. The third and final obstacle is the possibility of providing for copyright or contractual rights for the platform owner over users' data. If provided for in the platform's terms of use, this can condition and defer the transfer of migrating users' data upon the consent of the platform in whose favor the condition is made.<br /> <br /><strong>Conclusion</strong><br />In order to increase the efficiency of the right to personal data portability in the competition law of digital platforms, suggestions have been presented in this article to the Iranian competition legislator: First, newly established and nascent platforms should be exempt from implementing the personal data portability regime at the beginning of their operation; but after two years of operation or until the platform reaches a dominant economic position according to the determination of the Competition Council (whichever of the two deadlines occurs earlier), the platform owner should be obliged to implement data portability tools for users. Second, regarding platforms that are subject to the obligation of data portability, an obligation should be created to provide a transparent and easy process in the platform's user interface for users to declare their consent to the transfer of their data by their audience; in such a way that the platform user can allow their audience (followers or connections) to transfer personal data related to the audience (but created by the user) to other platforms and also have access to that data on competing platforms. Third, the legislator should deem agreements between platforms and users regarding ownership or the exclusive right to exploit data belonging to the platform owner as ineffective and unenforceable with respect to the potential suspension of the right to personal data portability. Nevertheless, it should not be forgotten that the aforementioned agreements should still be enforceable and binding in other respects, especially against data-scraping persons, in order to prevent instances of unfair competition among platform owners.<strong>Introduction</strong><br />When users of digital platforms intend to migrate to a new platform, they face costs during migration or "multi-homing." The lack of access for the migrating user to their own personal data on the new platform is one of the most prominent of these costs. Since this switching cost makes it difficult for nascent platforms to compete with incumbent platforms, in recent years a right known as the "right to personal data portability" has attracted the attention of competition policymakers. In Iran, this right was also recognized in 2020 (1399 AH) in the document "Policies and Macro Requirements for Supporting Competition and Combating Monopoly of Virtual Space Platforms." The main question of the present article is whether the right to personal data portability can in practice be a tool to increase inter-platform competition? And if the answer is negative, what solutions can be proposed to the legislator to increase the efficiency of the right to data portability in the competition law of virtual space platforms?.<br /><br /><strong>Method</strong><br />This article attempts to answer the above question using a descriptive-analytical method.<br /> <br /><strong>Findings</strong><br />The results of the study show that currently the personal data portability regime in Iranian platform markets faces three obstacles to increasing competition: The first obstacle is the legal limitation of platforms and migrating users in the full implementation of the right to personal data portability due to the conflict of this right with the privacy of third-party users of the platform. For example, on the "Instagram" platform, the information that matters to the migrating user is not only their own personal data but also includes data created by the user's friends and followers who are somehow connected to them (such as their likes and comments). In another example, sellers active on the "Digikala" platform, when migrating to another platform, intend both to transfer their own data, such as product images and descriptions, and also consider transferring their customers' data, such as feedback and positive reviews recorded about the products. This is while the transfer of personal data belonging to third parties (in the above hypotheses, the user's friends on the Instagram platform and the seller's customers on the Digikala platform) faces limitations under personal data protection laws; a limitation whose legal source is Article 59 of the Electronic Commerce Law and clauses 1-1 and 2-1 of the "Directive on Improving the Protection of Privacy of Users of Virtual Space Platforms."<br />The second obstacle is the absolute nature of clause 3 of Article 4 of the document "Policies and Macro Requirements for Supporting Competition and Combating Monopoly of Virtual Space Platforms," which obliges all digital platforms active in Iran to establish a data portability process. This imposes unnecessary costs on nascent platforms lacking market power and can itself become a barrier to entry into the platform market. The third and final obstacle is the possibility of providing for copyright or contractual rights for the platform owner over users' data. If provided for in the platform's terms of use, this can condition and defer the transfer of migrating users' data upon the consent of the platform in whose favor the condition is made.<br /> <br /><strong>Conclusion</strong><br />In order to increase the efficiency of the right to personal data portability in the competition law of digital platforms, suggestions have been presented in this article to the Iranian competition legislator: First, newly established and nascent platforms should be exempt from implementing the personal data portability regime at the beginning of their operation; but after two years of operation or until the platform reaches a dominant economic position according to the determination of the Competition Council (whichever of the two deadlines occurs earlier), the platform owner should be obliged to implement data portability tools for users. Second, regarding platforms that are subject to the obligation of data portability, an obligation should be created to provide a transparent and easy process in the platform's user interface for users to declare their consent to the transfer of their data by their audience; in such a way that the platform user can allow their audience (followers or connections) to transfer personal data related to the audience (but created by the user) to other platforms and also have access to that data on competing platforms. Third, the legislator should deem agreements between platforms and users regarding ownership or the exclusive right to exploit data belonging to the platform owner as ineffective and unenforceable with respect to the potential suspension of the right to personal data portability. Nevertheless, it should not be forgotten that the aforementioned agreements should still be enforceable and binding in other respects, especially against data-scraping persons, in order to prevent instances of unfair competition among platform owners.https://jls.shirazu.ac.ir/article_8035_c18ae39ae932eb5f4704f1175f55f929.pdfShiraz UniversityJournal of Legal Studies2008-792618120260421The Perspective of Renewable Energy in the View of Intellectual Property Rights: The Object Lesson for Iranian LawThe Perspective of Renewable Energy in the View of Intellectual Property Rights: The Object Lesson for Iranian Law359398794810.22099/jls.2025.52078.5252FAAmidMohammadiAssistant Professor in Private Law, Department of Law, Faculty of humanity, University of Jahrom, Jahrom, IranJournal Article20250102<strong>Introduction</strong><br />Energy is a fundamental necessity for the continuation of economic development, the provision of welfare, and the assurance of human comfort. The use of fossil fuels (such as oil, gas, coal, etc.) has been so rapid and uncontrolled that it has not only disrupted ecological balance but also threatens the very existence of humanity. To address this issue, there has been a growing inclination toward harnessing energy from renewable sources. Consequently, renewable energy has become one of the most critical topics in the realm of development of knowledge boundaries within the field of law. From this perspective, renewable energies are regarded as divine blessings and a bridge between nature and humanity, serving as an alternative energy source and a strategic choice for sustainable social and economic development.<br /> The issue of renewable energy lies at the intersection of human rights, environmental law, intellectual property rights, and technology transfer.<br />This paper endeavors to explore the transformation toward a clean energy system through the prism of intellectual property rights. In this regard, one of the environmental dimensions pertaining to intellectual property rights is shaped by emerging technologies associated with renewable energy. According to some scholars, the relationship between intellectual property rights and renewable energy offers a new perspective on the current and future state of this category of energy.<br />The issue of renewable energy lies down at the intersection of human rights, environmental rights, intellectual property rights, and technology transfer. This article attempts to examine the evolution a clean energy system through intellectual property rights. In this regard, one of the environmental dimensions of intellectual property rights is the new technologies related to renewable energy. According to some researchers, the relationship between intellectual property rights and renewable energy provides a new perspective on the current and future status of these types of energies.<br /><strong> </strong><strong>Methods</strong><strong> </strong><br />Despite the necessity and significance of renewable energies, the primary challenge in expanding the use of clean energies lies in the conflict of interests between the global North and the South concerning the transfer of technology related to energy resources. Industrialized developed countries, which are primarily equipped with renewable energy technologies, have acquired the technical expertise through substantial investments in research and development. However, they are reluctant to share these technologies, a stance that inherently incompatible with the goal of safeguarding the right to life and enjoyment of a healthy environment. Consequently, this study aims to address the fundamental question of how to respect intellectual property rights while facilitating the transfer of clean technologies to developing countries? The research employs an analytical and descriptive methodology, utilizing library-based resources for data collection.<br />Examining the prospective of proponents and opponents of supporting renewable energy in light of intellectual property rights raises the question of whether the monopolistic tendencies arising from intellectual assets act as a barrier to the transfer of technology in this category of energy, or whether they should be moderated and facilitated in light of public domain. Fundamentally, what is the role of intellectual property rights in promoting and disseminating technologies that enable clean energy? Investment in renewable energy projects typically requires substantial financial resources, policies tailored to the deployment of equipment to align with absorption infrastructure and domestic industrial capacities, as well as high revenue-<br />generation risks, which often entail a long waiting period for return on investment.<br /><strong>Findings</strong><br />Acknowledging the importance of decarbonizing clean technologies, environmental and technological tools have gained attention at both national and international levels, ranging from comprehensive policies aimed at mitigating climate change to the shift toward new sources of renewable energy. The significance of this issue highlights that the international dissemination of low-carbon technologies has been a cornerstone of climate-related negotiations since the adoption of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change.<br />The research shows that intellectual property rights can play a role in mitigating climate change by fully protecting clean energy technologies. While protecting intellectual property rights can help develop renewable energy technologies, it can also obstacle to the transfer of renewable energy technologies. Intellectual property owners are more likely transfer technologies related to renewable energy industries if they are confident and have sufficient guarantees. In contrast, the lack of adequate protection of intellectual property rights in developing countries can block access to such technologies. Therefore, the realm of clean technologies defines the boundary of the subject where it intersects with the approach of protecting intellectual property rights. In order to protect fundamental human rights and to overcome the challenges ahead, it has not only been recommended to consider intellectual property related to the transfer of renewable energy technologies as belonging to the public domain; but also, it has even been proposed to remove environmentally friendly technologies from the scope of patentable inventions and make them accessible to all countries.<br />On this basis, the protection of renewable energy under the umbrella of intellectual property rights, while supporting innovations and advancements in this field, emphasizes the promotion of technology transfer while respecting exclusive intellectual property rights. However, within this framework, environmental considerations are not a condition for the protectability of an invention. Essentially, technologies for generating electricity from natural resources represent innovations that encompass technical and tacit knowledge, which can be safeguarded under intellectual property rights. Therefore, intellectual property rights constitute a key factor in the innovation process and decision-making for investments in research and development activities.<br /><strong>Conclusions</strong><br />Today, the imbalance in electricity supply in our country has become a serious issue, and frequent blackouts, aside from causing public dissatisfaction, threaten the production and sustainability of industries. It seems that in domestic law, given the vast scope of green energy resources and the abundant potential capacities available—such as solar, hydro, wind, geothermal, biomass, marine currents, and more—within Iran's geography, adopting strategies such as simplifying and facilitating the process of applying for and approving patents related to these types of energy, providing financial support and incentives for their innovators, and promoting research and development by creating a platform for foreign direct investment, particularly with a focus on renewable energies that have not yet reached maturity, could guide the country toward embracing renewable energy under the framework of intellectual property rights.<strong>Introduction</strong><br />Energy is a fundamental necessity for the continuation of economic development, the provision of welfare, and the assurance of human comfort. The use of fossil fuels (such as oil, gas, coal, etc.) has been so rapid and uncontrolled that it has not only disrupted ecological balance but also threatens the very existence of humanity. To address this issue, there has been a growing inclination toward harnessing energy from renewable sources. Consequently, renewable energy has become one of the most critical topics in the realm of development of knowledge boundaries within the field of law. From this perspective, renewable energies are regarded as divine blessings and a bridge between nature and humanity, serving as an alternative energy source and a strategic choice for sustainable social and economic development.<br /> The issue of renewable energy lies at the intersection of human rights, environmental law, intellectual property rights, and technology transfer.<br />This paper endeavors to explore the transformation toward a clean energy system through the prism of intellectual property rights. In this regard, one of the environmental dimensions pertaining to intellectual property rights is shaped by emerging technologies associated with renewable energy. According to some scholars, the relationship between intellectual property rights and renewable energy offers a new perspective on the current and future state of this category of energy.<br />The issue of renewable energy lies down at the intersection of human rights, environmental rights, intellectual property rights, and technology transfer. This article attempts to examine the evolution a clean energy system through intellectual property rights. In this regard, one of the environmental dimensions of intellectual property rights is the new technologies related to renewable energy. According to some researchers, the relationship between intellectual property rights and renewable energy provides a new perspective on the current and future status of these types of energies.<br /><strong> </strong><strong>Methods</strong><strong> </strong><br />Despite the necessity and significance of renewable energies, the primary challenge in expanding the use of clean energies lies in the conflict of interests between the global North and the South concerning the transfer of technology related to energy resources. Industrialized developed countries, which are primarily equipped with renewable energy technologies, have acquired the technical expertise through substantial investments in research and development. However, they are reluctant to share these technologies, a stance that inherently incompatible with the goal of safeguarding the right to life and enjoyment of a healthy environment. Consequently, this study aims to address the fundamental question of how to respect intellectual property rights while facilitating the transfer of clean technologies to developing countries? The research employs an analytical and descriptive methodology, utilizing library-based resources for data collection.<br />Examining the prospective of proponents and opponents of supporting renewable energy in light of intellectual property rights raises the question of whether the monopolistic tendencies arising from intellectual assets act as a barrier to the transfer of technology in this category of energy, or whether they should be moderated and facilitated in light of public domain. Fundamentally, what is the role of intellectual property rights in promoting and disseminating technologies that enable clean energy? Investment in renewable energy projects typically requires substantial financial resources, policies tailored to the deployment of equipment to align with absorption infrastructure and domestic industrial capacities, as well as high revenue-<br />generation risks, which often entail a long waiting period for return on investment.<br /><strong>Findings</strong><br />Acknowledging the importance of decarbonizing clean technologies, environmental and technological tools have gained attention at both national and international levels, ranging from comprehensive policies aimed at mitigating climate change to the shift toward new sources of renewable energy. The significance of this issue highlights that the international dissemination of low-carbon technologies has been a cornerstone of climate-related negotiations since the adoption of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change.<br />The research shows that intellectual property rights can play a role in mitigating climate change by fully protecting clean energy technologies. While protecting intellectual property rights can help develop renewable energy technologies, it can also obstacle to the transfer of renewable energy technologies. Intellectual property owners are more likely transfer technologies related to renewable energy industries if they are confident and have sufficient guarantees. In contrast, the lack of adequate protection of intellectual property rights in developing countries can block access to such technologies. Therefore, the realm of clean technologies defines the boundary of the subject where it intersects with the approach of protecting intellectual property rights. In order to protect fundamental human rights and to overcome the challenges ahead, it has not only been recommended to consider intellectual property related to the transfer of renewable energy technologies as belonging to the public domain; but also, it has even been proposed to remove environmentally friendly technologies from the scope of patentable inventions and make them accessible to all countries.<br />On this basis, the protection of renewable energy under the umbrella of intellectual property rights, while supporting innovations and advancements in this field, emphasizes the promotion of technology transfer while respecting exclusive intellectual property rights. However, within this framework, environmental considerations are not a condition for the protectability of an invention. Essentially, technologies for generating electricity from natural resources represent innovations that encompass technical and tacit knowledge, which can be safeguarded under intellectual property rights. Therefore, intellectual property rights constitute a key factor in the innovation process and decision-making for investments in research and development activities.<br /><strong>Conclusions</strong><br />Today, the imbalance in electricity supply in our country has become a serious issue, and frequent blackouts, aside from causing public dissatisfaction, threaten the production and sustainability of industries. It seems that in domestic law, given the vast scope of green energy resources and the abundant potential capacities available—such as solar, hydro, wind, geothermal, biomass, marine currents, and more—within Iran's geography, adopting strategies such as simplifying and facilitating the process of applying for and approving patents related to these types of energy, providing financial support and incentives for their innovators, and promoting research and development by creating a platform for foreign direct investment, particularly with a focus on renewable energies that have not yet reached maturity, could guide the country toward embracing renewable energy under the framework of intellectual property rights.https://jls.shirazu.ac.ir/article_7948_b79366d1722b4fef86b9ff28dc456c3f.pdfShiraz UniversityJournal of Legal Studies2008-792618120260421A Comparative Analysis of Case Law Concerning Valuation of Monetary Debts after Their MaturityA Comparative Analysis of Case Law Concerning Valuation of Monetary Debts after Their Maturity399442805110.22099/jls.2025.52343.5272FAHassanMohseniProf. of Faculty of Law & Political Science at UT, Tehran, IranTahaArabasadiPhD Student in Private Law at UT, Tehran, IranAmirGhaffari. PhD Student in Private Law at UT, Tehran, IranJournal Article20250131<strong>Introduction</strong><br />From maturity until extinction, monetary debts do not remain fixed. There is a possibility that they may increase in quantum and impose themselves on the debtor as a result of the intervening evolutions. The debtor, on the other hand, is unlikely to agree to any change in the quantum of the debt, and this may lead to a dispute between the creditor and the debtor. The first question that the authors face in the article is what are the possible causes of changing the quantum of an outstanding debt from its maturity date to its payment date? In response to this question, the first thing to note is the decrease in the value of money. The decrease in value of money is objective in certain instances thus is based on the official inflation rate announced by the Central Bank of Iran, and is subjective in other cases thus depending on the specific transaction. In this regard, failure to pay the debt upon maturity can lead to problems for the creditor who will expect to receive the money at that time, including having to compensate third parties. In addition to this, he was deprived of the benefit that he would have gained had he received the money in a timely manner. Therefore, failure to pay a debt on time will result in, in addition to the decrease in value of money, other types of damages such as actual losses suffered, loss of profits and gains lost, each of which should be analyzed separately. However, the parties will normally attempt to agree in advance on the amount of damages resulting from non-payment of debts. It is, however, important to note that depending on whether this agreement concerns the decrease in value of money, actual losses suffered, or profits not realized, different implications will result, which should be assessed separately. Consequently, in this article, after discussing objective and subjective methods of compensation of decrease in value of money, damages and loss of profits resulting from failure to pay debts, as well as the taxonomy of the agreements relating to such damages, the combining of these various damages is examined in the final section.<br /> <br /><strong>Methods</strong><br />Using the library resources, this article uses a comparative approach and an analytical-descriptive approach in accordance with Iranian and Common Law case law.<br /> <br /><strong>Results</strong><br />It is the main objective of this article to identify the accessories of monetary debts, including subjective and objective compensation for the decrease in value of money, actual losses and lost profits. This is because under Iranian law, all of the above headings of damages are considered to subsume under the notion of late payment damages (“<em>khesāratē-ta’khirē-ta’diyē</em>”). As the authors of this article address in their article, the principal concern is how and by what method debts are calculated and evaluated after maturity? As a response to this question, the authors differentiate various types of accessories related to monetary debts after their maturity. A second question to consider is the limits that apply to parties' agreement regarding each of these types of accessories and also the possibly of claiming for all of said accessories in a specific case. It is the thesis of this article that an agreement on each of these accessories is valid and that, by separating them from each other, it is possible to claim for all of them simultaneously.<br /> <br /><strong>Conclusions</strong><br />As a result of various factors, it is possible for the amount of a debt to change after maturity date. Thus, if staggering inflation has occurred, the first step should be to revaluate the monetary debt in accordance with the rate determined by the Central Bank of Iran. However, if the parties' intention concerns subject of a specific commercial transaction, the decrease in value should be compensated according to the inflation in value of said subject, instead of the CBI's rate. In addition, damages incurred and lost profits due to a delay in payment of the debt after the maturity date should also be evaluated using objective and subjective criteria.<strong>Introduction</strong><br />From maturity until extinction, monetary debts do not remain fixed. There is a possibility that they may increase in quantum and impose themselves on the debtor as a result of the intervening evolutions. The debtor, on the other hand, is unlikely to agree to any change in the quantum of the debt, and this may lead to a dispute between the creditor and the debtor. The first question that the authors face in the article is what are the possible causes of changing the quantum of an outstanding debt from its maturity date to its payment date? In response to this question, the first thing to note is the decrease in the value of money. The decrease in value of money is objective in certain instances thus is based on the official inflation rate announced by the Central Bank of Iran, and is subjective in other cases thus depending on the specific transaction. In this regard, failure to pay the debt upon maturity can lead to problems for the creditor who will expect to receive the money at that time, including having to compensate third parties. In addition to this, he was deprived of the benefit that he would have gained had he received the money in a timely manner. Therefore, failure to pay a debt on time will result in, in addition to the decrease in value of money, other types of damages such as actual losses suffered, loss of profits and gains lost, each of which should be analyzed separately. However, the parties will normally attempt to agree in advance on the amount of damages resulting from non-payment of debts. It is, however, important to note that depending on whether this agreement concerns the decrease in value of money, actual losses suffered, or profits not realized, different implications will result, which should be assessed separately. Consequently, in this article, after discussing objective and subjective methods of compensation of decrease in value of money, damages and loss of profits resulting from failure to pay debts, as well as the taxonomy of the agreements relating to such damages, the combining of these various damages is examined in the final section.<br /> <br /><strong>Methods</strong><br />Using the library resources, this article uses a comparative approach and an analytical-descriptive approach in accordance with Iranian and Common Law case law.<br /> <br /><strong>Results</strong><br />It is the main objective of this article to identify the accessories of monetary debts, including subjective and objective compensation for the decrease in value of money, actual losses and lost profits. This is because under Iranian law, all of the above headings of damages are considered to subsume under the notion of late payment damages (“<em>khesāratē-ta’khirē-ta’diyē</em>”). As the authors of this article address in their article, the principal concern is how and by what method debts are calculated and evaluated after maturity? As a response to this question, the authors differentiate various types of accessories related to monetary debts after their maturity. A second question to consider is the limits that apply to parties' agreement regarding each of these types of accessories and also the possibly of claiming for all of said accessories in a specific case. It is the thesis of this article that an agreement on each of these accessories is valid and that, by separating them from each other, it is possible to claim for all of them simultaneously.<br /> <br /><strong>Conclusions</strong><br />As a result of various factors, it is possible for the amount of a debt to change after maturity date. Thus, if staggering inflation has occurred, the first step should be to revaluate the monetary debt in accordance with the rate determined by the Central Bank of Iran. However, if the parties' intention concerns subject of a specific commercial transaction, the decrease in value should be compensated according to the inflation in value of said subject, instead of the CBI's rate. In addition, damages incurred and lost profits due to a delay in payment of the debt after the maturity date should also be evaluated using objective and subjective criteria.https://jls.shirazu.ac.ir/article_8051_e71453f00fdb9d62bfffbbca4e721b61.pdfShiraz UniversityJournal of Legal Studies2008-792618120260421Organizing the "Power of Attorney Coupled with an Interest" Doctrine: A Review of Judicial PrecedentOrganizing the "Power of Attorney Coupled with an Interest" Doctrine: A Review of Judicial Precedent443482807110.22099/jls.2025.52682.5295FAMohammad HadiJavaherkalamAssistant Professor of Private Law, Faculty of Law and Political Science, Allameh Tabataba'i UniversityErfanGholamhosseiniMA in Private Law, Faculty of Law and Political Sciences, Allameh Tabataba'i University, Tehran, IranJournal Article20250310<strong>Introduction</strong><br />Legal acts that contracting parties create in the world of establishment (jahan-e sobut) are not always fully manifested in the world of proof (jahan-e esbat). The most prominent example of this situation is right-conferring agencies, such as agencies in the capacity of sale. In these cases, after the parties agree on granting or transferring certain rights, such as ownership, they suffice with drafting and granting a power of attorney document. In order to remove ambiguity from this inconsistency, the fundamental question is the nature and structure of the aforementioned agencies and the resulting changes in their effects. Furthermore, if these contracts are considered merely agency in its terminological or legal sense, upon the death or interdiction of the agent or principal, based on Article 678 of the Civil Code, the agency is dissolved; while this contradicts the intention of the contracting parties and the agent's acquired rights. Therefore, to resolve this conflict, the second question is the status of the agency and the right hidden behind it upon the occurrence of the causes of compulsory dissolution of agency.<br />The innovation of this research is explaining the nature of right-conferring agency within the same framework of the agency contract, but with effects distinct from terminological agency. In such a way that the structure of these agencies is analyzed based on the precedence of internal intention (eradeh-ye batani) and the influence of constructive conversations (goftogu-haye bena'i) to determine the true scope of the contract. In addition, based on the criterion of Article 777 of the Civil Code and the jurisprudential-legal foundations of this article, such as the theory of the sufficiency of the occurrence of permission (hoduth-e ezan), the compulsory causes of dissolution of the agency contract are excluded from the instances of dissolution of right-conferring agencies.<br /> <br /><strong>Methods</strong><br /> The present fundamental-applied article collects the necessary information using a library method from legal, jurisprudential sources, and court opinions, and with a descriptive-analytical approach, seeks to answer the aforementioned questions and organize the existing situation.<br /> <br /><strong>Findings</strong><br /> Right-conferring agency is a special type of agency contract with unique effects. Understanding its relationship with terminological agencies, as well as its specific characteristics, requires knowledge of the true nature and structure of this contract, centered on the internal intention of the contracting parties. Two analyses exist regarding the nature of right-conferring agency in the world of establishment: First, the power of attorney document that is manifested in the world of proof is only a part of the main and broader contract in the world of establishment; whereas its main effect, that hidden contract whose main pillar is hidden from view, will be the creation of a right. This analysis is based on the theory of conditions (shorut) or constructive provisions (mafad-e bena'i). Just as by considering internal intention as preponderant and effective, constructive agreements prior to the contract, such as agreement on the transfer of ownership, even without specification in the evidentiary document of the contract, enter the realm of the contract. Therefore, the power of attorney document is only a manifestation of a part of the comprehensive and true contract that has been concluded according to the will or common and internal intention of the contracting parties.<br />The second analysis, consistent with the latter part of Unified Judicial Precedent No. 847, holds that the granting of a right and representation is through two consecutive contracts; such that first, a right-creating contract, such as a sale, is concluded, then, following or based on this created right, an agency is also granted for matters such as receiving the official title deed of ownership. Whereas this same power of attorney document, by signifying the sale in the matter of proof, discloses the prior contract. Regarding the status of right-conferring agency upon the occurrence of compulsory causes of agency dissolution, such as death and interdiction, a distinction must be made between the right and the agency. The acquired and hidden right in the right-conferring agency, in terms of its position in this legal act, is no different from other acquired rights of individuals, and it remains. However, regarding the agency, it seems that based on the foundation of the said agency on the granted right and the explicit or implicit agreement of the contracting parties, as well as by invoking the criterion of Article 777 of the Civil Code, this category of agencies can be considered remaining even upon the death or interdiction of the contracting parties. Just as a study of the jurisprudential foundations of Article 777 of the Civil Code, as another type of right-conferring agency, shows that in an agency based on the right of pledge (rahaneh), the mere occurrence of permission (hoduth-e ezan) can be considered sufficient. Therefore, the compulsory causes of dissolution set forth in Article 678 of the Civil Code can be considered as pertaining to the customary state of agency, the subject of which is merely the principal's rights.<br /> <br /><strong>Conclusion</strong><br /> Right-conferring agency, unlike terminological agency, is not merely the granting of representation. Rather, behind it, a right is created for the agent, and the agency is granted as a part of the legal act creating the right or based upon it. Furthermore, regarding the dissolution or survival of right-conferring agency, it is thought that in addition to the survival of the agent's acquired right in these legal acts, the agency based on that right can also be considered as remaining.<strong>Introduction</strong><br />Legal acts that contracting parties create in the world of establishment (jahan-e sobut) are not always fully manifested in the world of proof (jahan-e esbat). The most prominent example of this situation is right-conferring agencies, such as agencies in the capacity of sale. In these cases, after the parties agree on granting or transferring certain rights, such as ownership, they suffice with drafting and granting a power of attorney document. In order to remove ambiguity from this inconsistency, the fundamental question is the nature and structure of the aforementioned agencies and the resulting changes in their effects. Furthermore, if these contracts are considered merely agency in its terminological or legal sense, upon the death or interdiction of the agent or principal, based on Article 678 of the Civil Code, the agency is dissolved; while this contradicts the intention of the contracting parties and the agent's acquired rights. Therefore, to resolve this conflict, the second question is the status of the agency and the right hidden behind it upon the occurrence of the causes of compulsory dissolution of agency.<br />The innovation of this research is explaining the nature of right-conferring agency within the same framework of the agency contract, but with effects distinct from terminological agency. In such a way that the structure of these agencies is analyzed based on the precedence of internal intention (eradeh-ye batani) and the influence of constructive conversations (goftogu-haye bena'i) to determine the true scope of the contract. In addition, based on the criterion of Article 777 of the Civil Code and the jurisprudential-legal foundations of this article, such as the theory of the sufficiency of the occurrence of permission (hoduth-e ezan), the compulsory causes of dissolution of the agency contract are excluded from the instances of dissolution of right-conferring agencies.<br /> <br /><strong>Methods</strong><br /> The present fundamental-applied article collects the necessary information using a library method from legal, jurisprudential sources, and court opinions, and with a descriptive-analytical approach, seeks to answer the aforementioned questions and organize the existing situation.<br /> <br /><strong>Findings</strong><br /> Right-conferring agency is a special type of agency contract with unique effects. Understanding its relationship with terminological agencies, as well as its specific characteristics, requires knowledge of the true nature and structure of this contract, centered on the internal intention of the contracting parties. Two analyses exist regarding the nature of right-conferring agency in the world of establishment: First, the power of attorney document that is manifested in the world of proof is only a part of the main and broader contract in the world of establishment; whereas its main effect, that hidden contract whose main pillar is hidden from view, will be the creation of a right. This analysis is based on the theory of conditions (shorut) or constructive provisions (mafad-e bena'i). Just as by considering internal intention as preponderant and effective, constructive agreements prior to the contract, such as agreement on the transfer of ownership, even without specification in the evidentiary document of the contract, enter the realm of the contract. Therefore, the power of attorney document is only a manifestation of a part of the comprehensive and true contract that has been concluded according to the will or common and internal intention of the contracting parties.<br />The second analysis, consistent with the latter part of Unified Judicial Precedent No. 847, holds that the granting of a right and representation is through two consecutive contracts; such that first, a right-creating contract, such as a sale, is concluded, then, following or based on this created right, an agency is also granted for matters such as receiving the official title deed of ownership. Whereas this same power of attorney document, by signifying the sale in the matter of proof, discloses the prior contract. Regarding the status of right-conferring agency upon the occurrence of compulsory causes of agency dissolution, such as death and interdiction, a distinction must be made between the right and the agency. The acquired and hidden right in the right-conferring agency, in terms of its position in this legal act, is no different from other acquired rights of individuals, and it remains. However, regarding the agency, it seems that based on the foundation of the said agency on the granted right and the explicit or implicit agreement of the contracting parties, as well as by invoking the criterion of Article 777 of the Civil Code, this category of agencies can be considered remaining even upon the death or interdiction of the contracting parties. Just as a study of the jurisprudential foundations of Article 777 of the Civil Code, as another type of right-conferring agency, shows that in an agency based on the right of pledge (rahaneh), the mere occurrence of permission (hoduth-e ezan) can be considered sufficient. Therefore, the compulsory causes of dissolution set forth in Article 678 of the Civil Code can be considered as pertaining to the customary state of agency, the subject of which is merely the principal's rights.<br /> <br /><strong>Conclusion</strong><br /> Right-conferring agency, unlike terminological agency, is not merely the granting of representation. Rather, behind it, a right is created for the agent, and the agency is granted as a part of the legal act creating the right or based upon it. Furthermore, regarding the dissolution or survival of right-conferring agency, it is thought that in addition to the survival of the agent's acquired right in these legal acts, the agency based on that right can also be considered as remaining.https://jls.shirazu.ac.ir/article_8071_6125c5166fdbb3613c1884f2621b0c11.pdfShiraz UniversityJournal of Legal Studies2008-792618120260421Foundations and Criteria for Distinguishing Legitimate from Illegitimate MonopolyFoundations and Criteria for Distinguishing Legitimate from Illegitimate Monopoly483534818310.22099/jls.2025.52684.5296FAُSeyyed MohsenFali. PhD student in private law, Faculty of Law and Political Science, Shiraz University, Shiraz, IranAliRezaeiAssociate Professor, Department of Private and Islamic Law, Faculty of Law and Political Science, Shiraz University, Shiraz, IranJournal Article20250310<strong>Introduction</strong><br />Monopoly occurs when there is only one or a few producers or sellers of a good or service. Monopoly in the trade of goods leads to the possibility of controlling the market for similar goods, which results in potential negative consequences such as price increases, economic stagnation, weakening of consumer rights, and so on. Therefore, the regulatory duty of economic regulations forces the government to combat it. However, some businesses are monopolized by the government or individuals, including legally protected persons, and are considered legitimate monopolies. But a number of monopolies, although anti-competitive due to various reasons and factors, are supportable because of their positive effects on economic growth, development of investment, increase in infrastructure, promotion of research and development, technology, and public welfare. Since laws and regulations do not draw a precise boundary between these two types of monopoly, this research, by presenting distinguishing foundations, seeks to identify and justify the criteria that differentiate these two types of monopoly.<br /><strong> </strong><br /><strong>Method</strong><br /> The method of this research is descriptive-analytical, and the data collection tool is library resources and the use of data available in databases, especially legal databases.<br /> <br /><strong>Findings</strong><br /> Examination of the subject shows that a distinction must be made between the foundations and the criteria that distinguish legitimate from illegitimate monopoly. There are foundations, principles, and rules that justify and even necessitate the distinction between legitimate and illegitimate monopoly, the most important of which are public order, consumer rights, and preventing harm to others. The criteria, which are established based on the identified and presented foundations, act as indicators for determining the type of monopoly and can be divided into legal, economic, and political types. Criteria such as the possibility of product substitution, market share calculation, and significant price increase prove the existence of a hypothetical monopolist from an economic perspective. In the next stage, legal science intervenes with criteria such as originality of the idea or effort, good faith, reasonableness of adopting certain supra-competitive methods, and fundamental evaluation to distinguish between legitimate monopoly and monopolies created by resorting to unfair and inequitable means, so that legitimate commercial efforts that lead to economic development are not wasted. The political criterion is the attitude of governments, which is rooted in their political thought, mainly situated between the two poles of communism and the concept of distributive justice, and liberalism and the concept of commutative justice.<br /> <br /><strong>Conclusion</strong><br /> The positive and negative consequences of monopoly are two sides of the same coin. Some believe that monopoly causes economic growth, increased production, lower prices, etc., while others believe that monopoly produces these same effects in a negative direction. Monopoly power created through effort, innovation, and commercial luck without seriously violating the rights of others should be protected by law because it enables merchants and commercial companies to increase investment, develop infrastructure, increase employment and production, and advance technical knowledge and technology. Therefore, the benefits of legitimate monopoly outweigh those of illegitimate monopoly, such as the possibility of abusing monopoly power. Consequently, with a regulatory tool that prevents the use of monopoly in a negative and destructive direction, it is possible to ensure the preservation of the positive effects of monopoly and encourage individuals to invest. Finally, given the positive effects of legitimate monopoly on economic growth, development of investment, increase in infrastructure, promotion of research, growth and technology, and public welfare, the theory of facilitating and supporting legitimate monopoly should be seriously considered.<strong>Introduction</strong><br />Monopoly occurs when there is only one or a few producers or sellers of a good or service. Monopoly in the trade of goods leads to the possibility of controlling the market for similar goods, which results in potential negative consequences such as price increases, economic stagnation, weakening of consumer rights, and so on. Therefore, the regulatory duty of economic regulations forces the government to combat it. However, some businesses are monopolized by the government or individuals, including legally protected persons, and are considered legitimate monopolies. But a number of monopolies, although anti-competitive due to various reasons and factors, are supportable because of their positive effects on economic growth, development of investment, increase in infrastructure, promotion of research and development, technology, and public welfare. Since laws and regulations do not draw a precise boundary between these two types of monopoly, this research, by presenting distinguishing foundations, seeks to identify and justify the criteria that differentiate these two types of monopoly.<br /><strong> </strong><br /><strong>Method</strong><br /> The method of this research is descriptive-analytical, and the data collection tool is library resources and the use of data available in databases, especially legal databases.<br /> <br /><strong>Findings</strong><br /> Examination of the subject shows that a distinction must be made between the foundations and the criteria that distinguish legitimate from illegitimate monopoly. There are foundations, principles, and rules that justify and even necessitate the distinction between legitimate and illegitimate monopoly, the most important of which are public order, consumer rights, and preventing harm to others. The criteria, which are established based on the identified and presented foundations, act as indicators for determining the type of monopoly and can be divided into legal, economic, and political types. Criteria such as the possibility of product substitution, market share calculation, and significant price increase prove the existence of a hypothetical monopolist from an economic perspective. In the next stage, legal science intervenes with criteria such as originality of the idea or effort, good faith, reasonableness of adopting certain supra-competitive methods, and fundamental evaluation to distinguish between legitimate monopoly and monopolies created by resorting to unfair and inequitable means, so that legitimate commercial efforts that lead to economic development are not wasted. The political criterion is the attitude of governments, which is rooted in their political thought, mainly situated between the two poles of communism and the concept of distributive justice, and liberalism and the concept of commutative justice.<br /> <br /><strong>Conclusion</strong><br /> The positive and negative consequences of monopoly are two sides of the same coin. Some believe that monopoly causes economic growth, increased production, lower prices, etc., while others believe that monopoly produces these same effects in a negative direction. Monopoly power created through effort, innovation, and commercial luck without seriously violating the rights of others should be protected by law because it enables merchants and commercial companies to increase investment, develop infrastructure, increase employment and production, and advance technical knowledge and technology. Therefore, the benefits of legitimate monopoly outweigh those of illegitimate monopoly, such as the possibility of abusing monopoly power. Consequently, with a regulatory tool that prevents the use of monopoly in a negative and destructive direction, it is possible to ensure the preservation of the positive effects of monopoly and encourage individuals to invest. Finally, given the positive effects of legitimate monopoly on economic growth, development of investment, increase in infrastructure, promotion of research, growth and technology, and public welfare, the theory of facilitating and supporting legitimate monopoly should be seriously considered.https://jls.shirazu.ac.ir/article_8183_700b56fd585dded9275ae3655e9f2e53.pdfShiraz UniversityJournal of Legal Studies2008-792618120260421The Relationship between Media Literacy and Attitude towards Fair Social Rights: A Case Study of Women in MashhadThe Relationship between Media Literacy and Attitude towards Fair Social Rights: A Case Study of Women in Mashhad535574817310.22099/jls.2025.52992.5311FAHassanYosofvandAssistant Professor, Department of Sociology, Faculty of Law and Social Sciences, Payame Noor University, Tehran, IranMohammadAliTavana. Associate Prof. Department of Political Science, Shiraz University, IranEffatDavari. Graduate Student, Payam Noor University, P.O. Box 3697-19395 Tehran, Iran0000-0002-8475-5800Journal Article20250503<strong>Introduction</strong><br />Becoming an active citizen is a complex process that requires legal equality of social groups or at least a feeling of equality with other citizens. The feeling of equality, fairness, economic independence, and the fulfillment of basic needs constitute the essence of fair social rights, and citizens' attitude towards these rights is the foundation of social justice. The media, as intermediaries, play a key role in shaping this attitude, and media literacy, including the skills of accessing, analyzing, evaluating, and engaging with media content, has become a determining factor in this process. In Iran, especially in the city of Mashhad with its specific cultural-religious context, women's attitude towards fair social rights is influenced by media literacy and religious values. This research was conducted with the aim of examining the relationship between media literacy and attitude towards fair social rights among women in Mashhad. The main objective of this study is to analyze the relationship between media literacy and attitude towards fair social rights (including economic independence, equality, fairness, and fulfillment of basic needs) among women in Mashhad. The secondary objectives include examining this relationship in different dimensions of fair social rights and analyzing differences in attitude based on demographic variables (age, education, income, occupation, and marital status).<br /><strong> </strong><br /><strong>Methods</strong><br />This research employed a survey method with a descriptive-correlational approach. The statistical population consisted of women residing in Mashhad (over 1.5 million according to the 2016 census). A sample of 350 individuals was selected using a multi-stage cluster sampling method from 7 urban districts (Districts 1, 2, 5, 7, 9, 11, and 12) and 17 neighborhoods. The data collection instrument was a questionnaire with a five-point Likert scale, whose content and face validity were confirmed by experts and whose reliability was confirmed by Cronbach's alpha (0.921 for media literacy and 0.935 for attitude towards justice). Data were analyzed using SPSS and AMOS software, including descriptive analysis (mean and standard deviation), Pearson correlation, t-test, ANOVA, and path analysis.<br /> <br /><strong>Findings</strong><br />The results showed that media literacy has a positive and significant relationship with attitude towards fair social rights (R² = 0.41). The behavioral dimension of media literacy (β = 0.40) had the greatest impact, while participation (β = 0.25) showed the least effect. Correlations indicated a strong relationship between the behavioral dimension and attitude towards justice (r = 0.70). Younger women (18-35 years), due to their interaction with digital media, had a stronger attitude towards economic independence, while older women (56-75 years) showed a greater tendency towards fairness and need fulfillment. High education and middle income were associated with attitude towards equality, and married women had a stronger attitude towards fairness and need fulfillment. The cultural-religious context of Mashhad strengthened the attitude towards fairness and need fulfillment.<br /> <br /><strong>Conclusion</strong><br />The findings were consistent with the theories of Rawls, Fairclough, Hall, Bandura, and Mead and showed that media literacy, especially through active behavior and critical analysis, strengthens the attitude towards fair social rights among Mashhad women. The religious values of Mashhad have highlighted fairness and need fulfillment more prominently and showed differences with Western studies that focus on individualism. Comparison with domestic studies also confirmed the influence of Mashhad's religious context. This research suggests that media literacy educational programs be aligned with local values and that social laws be revised to support a justice-oriented attitude. This study, by integrating Western and indigenous theories, presented a novel framework for analyzing media literacy in a cultural-religious context and highlighted the influence of collective values on attitude towards justice. Examining demographic differences in this context added to the richness of the social justice literature.<strong>Introduction</strong><br />Becoming an active citizen is a complex process that requires legal equality of social groups or at least a feeling of equality with other citizens. The feeling of equality, fairness, economic independence, and the fulfillment of basic needs constitute the essence of fair social rights, and citizens' attitude towards these rights is the foundation of social justice. The media, as intermediaries, play a key role in shaping this attitude, and media literacy, including the skills of accessing, analyzing, evaluating, and engaging with media content, has become a determining factor in this process. In Iran, especially in the city of Mashhad with its specific cultural-religious context, women's attitude towards fair social rights is influenced by media literacy and religious values. This research was conducted with the aim of examining the relationship between media literacy and attitude towards fair social rights among women in Mashhad. The main objective of this study is to analyze the relationship between media literacy and attitude towards fair social rights (including economic independence, equality, fairness, and fulfillment of basic needs) among women in Mashhad. The secondary objectives include examining this relationship in different dimensions of fair social rights and analyzing differences in attitude based on demographic variables (age, education, income, occupation, and marital status).<br /><strong> </strong><br /><strong>Methods</strong><br />This research employed a survey method with a descriptive-correlational approach. The statistical population consisted of women residing in Mashhad (over 1.5 million according to the 2016 census). A sample of 350 individuals was selected using a multi-stage cluster sampling method from 7 urban districts (Districts 1, 2, 5, 7, 9, 11, and 12) and 17 neighborhoods. The data collection instrument was a questionnaire with a five-point Likert scale, whose content and face validity were confirmed by experts and whose reliability was confirmed by Cronbach's alpha (0.921 for media literacy and 0.935 for attitude towards justice). Data were analyzed using SPSS and AMOS software, including descriptive analysis (mean and standard deviation), Pearson correlation, t-test, ANOVA, and path analysis.<br /> <br /><strong>Findings</strong><br />The results showed that media literacy has a positive and significant relationship with attitude towards fair social rights (R² = 0.41). The behavioral dimension of media literacy (β = 0.40) had the greatest impact, while participation (β = 0.25) showed the least effect. Correlations indicated a strong relationship between the behavioral dimension and attitude towards justice (r = 0.70). Younger women (18-35 years), due to their interaction with digital media, had a stronger attitude towards economic independence, while older women (56-75 years) showed a greater tendency towards fairness and need fulfillment. High education and middle income were associated with attitude towards equality, and married women had a stronger attitude towards fairness and need fulfillment. The cultural-religious context of Mashhad strengthened the attitude towards fairness and need fulfillment.<br /> <br /><strong>Conclusion</strong><br />The findings were consistent with the theories of Rawls, Fairclough, Hall, Bandura, and Mead and showed that media literacy, especially through active behavior and critical analysis, strengthens the attitude towards fair social rights among Mashhad women. The religious values of Mashhad have highlighted fairness and need fulfillment more prominently and showed differences with Western studies that focus on individualism. Comparison with domestic studies also confirmed the influence of Mashhad's religious context. This research suggests that media literacy educational programs be aligned with local values and that social laws be revised to support a justice-oriented attitude. This study, by integrating Western and indigenous theories, presented a novel framework for analyzing media literacy in a cultural-religious context and highlighted the influence of collective values on attitude towards justice. Examining demographic differences in this context added to the richness of the social justice literature.https://jls.shirazu.ac.ir/article_8173_8c1fda680973dde9a78a2fd374fced3a.pdfShiraz UniversityJournal of Legal Studies2008-792618120260421From Absolute Monarchy to the Absolute Guardianship of the Islamic Jurist (Velayat-e Mutlaqeh-ye Faqih)From Absolute Monarchy to the Absolute Guardianship of the Islamic Jurist (Velayat-e Mutlaqeh-ye Faqih)575610821610.22099/jls.2025.53862.5360FARAHIMNOBAHARAssociate Professor of Islamic jurisprudence, School of law, Shahid Beheshti University, Tehran, iranJournal Article20250801<strong>Introduction</strong><br />The term "absolute guardianship" (Velayat-e Mutlaqeh) in the context of the Islamic Jurist (Faqih) bears a superficial linguistic resemblance to "absolute monarchy," a political system often associated with tyranny and the concentration of unchecked power. This semantic overlap risks distorting the concept in the public mind and could potentially pave the way for an authoritarian or despotic interpretation of Islamic governance. The primary objective of this article is to dissect this apparent similarity and demonstrate that it is only verbal. The core research question is: What is the relationship between the general/absolute guardianship of the Faqih and absolute monarchy? Furthermore, considering that absolute governments are now widely deemed degenerate, the article investigates whether Islamic political theory can genuinely be reconciled with the theory of absolute rule. The analysis aims to provide a clear, nuanced understanding of Velayat-e Faqih, distinguishing it from absolutist models of power.<br /><br /><strong>Methods</strong><br />This research employs a descriptive-analytical method. It begins by examining the historical, linguistic, and theological roots of both "absolutism" as a Western political concept and "absolute guardianship" (Velayat-e Mutlaqeh or Velayat-e Ammah) within Shia Islamic jurisprudence (fiqh) and theology (kalam). The study analyzes the works of Islamic jurists to trace the evolution of the term and its intended meaning. It then contrasts these findings with the defining characteristics of political absolutism, as understood in Western political thought and history, to identify substantive differences rather than mere linguistic parallels.<br /><strong><em> </em></strong><br /><strong>Findings</strong><br />The investigation yields several key findings:<br /><strong>3.1. The Nature of Political Absolutism:</strong> In Western political tradition, absolutism (e.g., as embodied by Louis XIV of France) signifies a concentration of unlimited, sovereign power in a single ruler, often justified by the "divine right of kings." This power is typically not subject to institutional checks and balances from judicial, legislative, or electoral bodies. While some historians argue that traditions and customs acted as <em>de facto</em> limits, the theoretical framework of absolutism rejects any formal, legal limitations on the monarch's will.<br /><strong>3.2. The Meaning of "Absolute" in Velayat-e Faqih:</strong> Within Shia jurisprudence, the terms "general guardianship" (Velayat-e Ammah) and "absolute guardianship" (Velayat-e Mutlaqeh) are used interchangeably. Crucially, the word "absolute" (mutlaqeh) here is a <strong>description of the scope of authority</strong> (pertaining to public affairs), not a description of the <strong>nature of that power</strong> (being free from all constraints). It means the jurist has guardianship over <em>general</em> matters of society, not that his power is <em>unlimited</em>. This is a critical distinction often lost in translation.<br /><strong>3.3</strong><strong>. inherent Constraints on the Faqih's Authority:</strong> Contrary to absolutism, the Islamic jurist's authority is conceptually bound by multiple critical constraints:<br /><br /><strong>Public Acceptance</strong><strong>:</strong> The legitimacy of the Faqih is contingent upon public consent, often manifested through free elections.<br /><strong>Oversight and Accountability</strong><strong>:</strong> The Faqih and his appointees are subject to oversight mechanisms.<br /><strong>Constitutional Framework</strong><strong>:</strong> His authority is limited by the national covenant, typically embodied in a constitution.<br /><strong>Obligation to Consult (Shura)</strong><strong>:</strong> The Faqih is religiously obliged to avoid autocracy and must consult with experts and knowledgeable councils.<br /><strong>Adherence to Sharia</strong><strong>:</strong> Even the Prophet and Imams were bound by divine law and justice; they could not rule arbitrarily. By extension, the Faqih's authority is a subset of this and is therefore intrinsically limited by Islamic principles of justice and rationality.<br /><br /><strong>3.4. </strong><strong>Rejection of Arbitrary Power</strong><strong>:</strong> The article finds it irrational to suggest that Islamic law would grant any individual, including a Faqih, absolute and arbitrary power over people's lives and property, as this leads to social corruption and decay. Furthermore, it is illogical for a people to establish a constitutional system that includes the office of the Faqih, only for that same Faqih to be permitted to act above the very constitution that legitimizes his position.<br /> <br /><strong><em> </em></strong><strong>Conclusion</strong><br />The central conclusion is that the similarity between "Absolute Guardianship of the Jurist" and "absolute monarchy" is purely terminological, not substantive. Velayat-e Mutlaqeh does not endorse an arbitrary, despotic, or individualistic concentration of power. Instead, it defines a specific type of authority—guardianship in public affairs—that is necessarily and inherently constrained by a framework of public consent, constitutional law, mandatory consultation, and divine principles of justice. However, the article acknowledges a significant risk: the potential for an authoritarian reading of Velayat-e Faqih. If the Faqih's authority is expanded to near-divine levels, rendered immune to oversight, and demands unconditional obedience, it effectively morphs into the very absolute rule it claims to oppose. Therefore, the integrity of the concept depends entirely on its interpretation and implementation within a framework of checks and balances. A correct, sharia-compliant understanding of Velayat-e Faqih is fundamentally incompatible with the classical model of absolute monarchy.<strong>Introduction</strong><br />The term "absolute guardianship" (Velayat-e Mutlaqeh) in the context of the Islamic Jurist (Faqih) bears a superficial linguistic resemblance to "absolute monarchy," a political system often associated with tyranny and the concentration of unchecked power. This semantic overlap risks distorting the concept in the public mind and could potentially pave the way for an authoritarian or despotic interpretation of Islamic governance. The primary objective of this article is to dissect this apparent similarity and demonstrate that it is only verbal. The core research question is: What is the relationship between the general/absolute guardianship of the Faqih and absolute monarchy? Furthermore, considering that absolute governments are now widely deemed degenerate, the article investigates whether Islamic political theory can genuinely be reconciled with the theory of absolute rule. The analysis aims to provide a clear, nuanced understanding of Velayat-e Faqih, distinguishing it from absolutist models of power.<br /><br /><strong>Methods</strong><br />This research employs a descriptive-analytical method. It begins by examining the historical, linguistic, and theological roots of both "absolutism" as a Western political concept and "absolute guardianship" (Velayat-e Mutlaqeh or Velayat-e Ammah) within Shia Islamic jurisprudence (fiqh) and theology (kalam). The study analyzes the works of Islamic jurists to trace the evolution of the term and its intended meaning. It then contrasts these findings with the defining characteristics of political absolutism, as understood in Western political thought and history, to identify substantive differences rather than mere linguistic parallels.<br /><strong><em> </em></strong><br /><strong>Findings</strong><br />The investigation yields several key findings:<br /><strong>3.1. The Nature of Political Absolutism:</strong> In Western political tradition, absolutism (e.g., as embodied by Louis XIV of France) signifies a concentration of unlimited, sovereign power in a single ruler, often justified by the "divine right of kings." This power is typically not subject to institutional checks and balances from judicial, legislative, or electoral bodies. While some historians argue that traditions and customs acted as <em>de facto</em> limits, the theoretical framework of absolutism rejects any formal, legal limitations on the monarch's will.<br /><strong>3.2. The Meaning of "Absolute" in Velayat-e Faqih:</strong> Within Shia jurisprudence, the terms "general guardianship" (Velayat-e Ammah) and "absolute guardianship" (Velayat-e Mutlaqeh) are used interchangeably. Crucially, the word "absolute" (mutlaqeh) here is a <strong>description of the scope of authority</strong> (pertaining to public affairs), not a description of the <strong>nature of that power</strong> (being free from all constraints). It means the jurist has guardianship over <em>general</em> matters of society, not that his power is <em>unlimited</em>. This is a critical distinction often lost in translation.<br /><strong>3.3</strong><strong>. inherent Constraints on the Faqih's Authority:</strong> Contrary to absolutism, the Islamic jurist's authority is conceptually bound by multiple critical constraints:<br /><br /><strong>Public Acceptance</strong><strong>:</strong> The legitimacy of the Faqih is contingent upon public consent, often manifested through free elections.<br /><strong>Oversight and Accountability</strong><strong>:</strong> The Faqih and his appointees are subject to oversight mechanisms.<br /><strong>Constitutional Framework</strong><strong>:</strong> His authority is limited by the national covenant, typically embodied in a constitution.<br /><strong>Obligation to Consult (Shura)</strong><strong>:</strong> The Faqih is religiously obliged to avoid autocracy and must consult with experts and knowledgeable councils.<br /><strong>Adherence to Sharia</strong><strong>:</strong> Even the Prophet and Imams were bound by divine law and justice; they could not rule arbitrarily. By extension, the Faqih's authority is a subset of this and is therefore intrinsically limited by Islamic principles of justice and rationality.<br /><br /><strong>3.4. </strong><strong>Rejection of Arbitrary Power</strong><strong>:</strong> The article finds it irrational to suggest that Islamic law would grant any individual, including a Faqih, absolute and arbitrary power over people's lives and property, as this leads to social corruption and decay. Furthermore, it is illogical for a people to establish a constitutional system that includes the office of the Faqih, only for that same Faqih to be permitted to act above the very constitution that legitimizes his position.<br /> <br /><strong><em> </em></strong><strong>Conclusion</strong><br />The central conclusion is that the similarity between "Absolute Guardianship of the Jurist" and "absolute monarchy" is purely terminological, not substantive. Velayat-e Mutlaqeh does not endorse an arbitrary, despotic, or individualistic concentration of power. Instead, it defines a specific type of authority—guardianship in public affairs—that is necessarily and inherently constrained by a framework of public consent, constitutional law, mandatory consultation, and divine principles of justice. However, the article acknowledges a significant risk: the potential for an authoritarian reading of Velayat-e Faqih. If the Faqih's authority is expanded to near-divine levels, rendered immune to oversight, and demands unconditional obedience, it effectively morphs into the very absolute rule it claims to oppose. Therefore, the integrity of the concept depends entirely on its interpretation and implementation within a framework of checks and balances. A correct, sharia-compliant understanding of Velayat-e Faqih is fundamentally incompatible with the classical model of absolute monarchy.https://jls.shirazu.ac.ir/article_8216_2f5e7a7656f6ea2c3701c5307237584a.pdfShiraz UniversityJournal of Legal Studies2008-792618120260421The Right to Mother Tongue Education in Light of Theories of Justice and Hohfeld's FrameworkThe Right to Mother Tongue Education in Light of Theories of Justice and Hohfeld's Framework611642822410.22099/jls.2025.53873.5363FAShivaBazarganPh.D. in Public Law, Faculty of Law, Shahid Beheshti University, Tehran, IranRezaEslamiAssistant Professor, Human Rights, Faculty of Law, Shahid Beheshti University, Tehran, IranJournal Article20250803<strong>Introduction</strong><br />Legal systems worldwide exhibit divergent approaches to mother tongue education. Despite broad interpretations of international human rights instruments and Article 15 of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran—which declares the teaching of ethnic and local literature "free"—a comprehensive theoretical framework to elucidate the nature of this right and the consequent obligations it imposes on the state remains elusive. The central question of this research is whether mother tongue education constitutes a "claim-right," imposing positive obligations on the state, or is merely a "liberty-right," requiring only negative obligations (i.e., non-interference). This paper aims to answer this question by focusing on theories of educational justice and Wesley Hohfeld's analytical framework, thereby examining the nature of the right to mother tongue education and its impact on the type and extent of state obligations, ultimately proposing practical solutions for its guarantee within legal systems.<br /><br /><strong>Methods</strong><br />This research employs an analytical-descriptive method with an interdisciplinary approach (encompassing legal philosophy, human rights, and political science). The theoretical section utilizes conceptual analysis to investigate the philosophical and ethical foundations of mother tongue education in light of theories of justice, particularly Michael Walzer's "complex equality" and the capability approach of Amartya Sen and Martha Nussbaum. In the legal section, relying on Hohfeld's analytical framework, the nature of the right to mother tongue education (claim-right vs. liberty-right) and the resulting state obligations are analyzed. Legal data is gathered and scrutinized from international documents (e.g., the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, UNESCO's Mother Language Charter) and national documents (especially Article 15 of Iran's Constitution). Furthermore, the research background has been studied through a systematic search of academic databases and library resources.<br /> <br /><strong>Results</strong><br />The findings indicate that the right to mother tongue education has a dual nature. On one hand, as a liberty-right, it obliges the state to refrain from interference and abstain from creating obstacles to the voluntary teaching of mother tongues. However, this study demonstrates that this view is insufficient for the long-term actual guarantee of this right and could lead to the erosion and extinction of mother tongues. On the other hand, under specific conditions and based on theoretical foundations of justice, particularly Walzer's theory, mother tongue education can also be asserted as a claim-right. Walzer, by criticizing "simple equality" (equal distribution of resources) and advocating for "complex equality," emphasizes that educational justice requires recognizing identity differences, including linguistic identity. Consequently, the state becomes obligated to provide the necessary facilities and infrastructure for the realization of this right, including supplying teachers, textbooks, and classrooms in the mother tongue. Analyzing Article 15 of the Constitution, by referring to the detailed minutes of the Assembly of Experts and a dynamic interpretation, suggests the existence of such a positive obligation for the state. Furthermore, the findings show that challenges raised against this right, such as threats to national unity or implementation difficulties, can be refuted and managed with empirical evidence from multilingual countries (e.g., Canada, India) and practical solutions like educational decentralization and state regulation.<br /> <br /><strong>Conclusion</strong><br />In conclusion, it can be argued that the right to mother tongue education, within the Hohfeldian framework, has a hybrid nature, encompassing both a liberty-right (state's negative obligation) and, under just conditions, a claim-right (state's positive obligation). The full realization of this right necessitates a transition from simple equality towards Walzer's complex equality. Practically guaranteeing this right not only enhances human dignity, reduces discrimination, and strengthens cultural identity but also, by increasing the trust and participation of ethnic groups, leads to more sustainable national cohesion and cultural enrichment of society. A practical and middle-ground solution for Iran is a gradual shift towards a decentralized educational system with a state regulatory role, phased budget allocation, and utilization of local capacities to simultaneously secure citizens' rights and address practical state considerations.<strong>Introduction</strong><br />Legal systems worldwide exhibit divergent approaches to mother tongue education. Despite broad interpretations of international human rights instruments and Article 15 of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran—which declares the teaching of ethnic and local literature "free"—a comprehensive theoretical framework to elucidate the nature of this right and the consequent obligations it imposes on the state remains elusive. The central question of this research is whether mother tongue education constitutes a "claim-right," imposing positive obligations on the state, or is merely a "liberty-right," requiring only negative obligations (i.e., non-interference). This paper aims to answer this question by focusing on theories of educational justice and Wesley Hohfeld's analytical framework, thereby examining the nature of the right to mother tongue education and its impact on the type and extent of state obligations, ultimately proposing practical solutions for its guarantee within legal systems.<br /><br /><strong>Methods</strong><br />This research employs an analytical-descriptive method with an interdisciplinary approach (encompassing legal philosophy, human rights, and political science). The theoretical section utilizes conceptual analysis to investigate the philosophical and ethical foundations of mother tongue education in light of theories of justice, particularly Michael Walzer's "complex equality" and the capability approach of Amartya Sen and Martha Nussbaum. In the legal section, relying on Hohfeld's analytical framework, the nature of the right to mother tongue education (claim-right vs. liberty-right) and the resulting state obligations are analyzed. Legal data is gathered and scrutinized from international documents (e.g., the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, UNESCO's Mother Language Charter) and national documents (especially Article 15 of Iran's Constitution). Furthermore, the research background has been studied through a systematic search of academic databases and library resources.<br /> <br /><strong>Results</strong><br />The findings indicate that the right to mother tongue education has a dual nature. On one hand, as a liberty-right, it obliges the state to refrain from interference and abstain from creating obstacles to the voluntary teaching of mother tongues. However, this study demonstrates that this view is insufficient for the long-term actual guarantee of this right and could lead to the erosion and extinction of mother tongues. On the other hand, under specific conditions and based on theoretical foundations of justice, particularly Walzer's theory, mother tongue education can also be asserted as a claim-right. Walzer, by criticizing "simple equality" (equal distribution of resources) and advocating for "complex equality," emphasizes that educational justice requires recognizing identity differences, including linguistic identity. Consequently, the state becomes obligated to provide the necessary facilities and infrastructure for the realization of this right, including supplying teachers, textbooks, and classrooms in the mother tongue. Analyzing Article 15 of the Constitution, by referring to the detailed minutes of the Assembly of Experts and a dynamic interpretation, suggests the existence of such a positive obligation for the state. Furthermore, the findings show that challenges raised against this right, such as threats to national unity or implementation difficulties, can be refuted and managed with empirical evidence from multilingual countries (e.g., Canada, India) and practical solutions like educational decentralization and state regulation.<br /> <br /><strong>Conclusion</strong><br />In conclusion, it can be argued that the right to mother tongue education, within the Hohfeldian framework, has a hybrid nature, encompassing both a liberty-right (state's negative obligation) and, under just conditions, a claim-right (state's positive obligation). The full realization of this right necessitates a transition from simple equality towards Walzer's complex equality. Practically guaranteeing this right not only enhances human dignity, reduces discrimination, and strengthens cultural identity but also, by increasing the trust and participation of ethnic groups, leads to more sustainable national cohesion and cultural enrichment of society. A practical and middle-ground solution for Iran is a gradual shift towards a decentralized educational system with a state regulatory role, phased budget allocation, and utilization of local capacities to simultaneously secure citizens' rights and address practical state considerations.https://jls.shirazu.ac.ir/article_8224_ce2ef19b65eefeb53bea1e532dea233d.pdfShiraz UniversityJournal of Legal Studies2008-792618120260421A Criminological Reading of the Third Principle of the Constitution (Community-Oriented Crime Prevention Strategies)A Criminological Reading of the Third Principle of the Constitution (Community-Oriented Crime Prevention Strategies)643682834010.22099/jls.2025.53896.5364FAMohsenSharifiAssistant Professor, Department of Criminal Law and Criminology, Faculty of Law and Political Science, Shiraz University, Shiraz, IranJournal Article20250805<strong>Introduction</strong><br />Crime prevention as a criminal policy strategy is realized through the application of penal and non-penal measures. The first approach brings its objective to fruition through penal prohibitions of behaviors contrary to public order and the establishment of appropriate punishments for them. The second approach, however, with a criminological and scientific view of this phenomenon, seeks to control it through the application of non-coercive actions. Among the forms of crime prevention in the second sense is community-oriented prevention, which, outside the penal system, with a etiological and antecedent approach, seeks to eliminate or reduce criminogenic environmental factors by relying on cultural, social, and economic actions. Thus, the aforementioned prevention, based on the assumption that diverse environmental factors are effective in regulating individuals' behavioral systems, puts on its agenda mechanisms such as organizing foundations like the economy, housing, education, and physical training in order to prevent their tendency to violate social norms. <br /><br /><strong>Methods</strong><br /> In this research, using a descriptive-analytical method and utilizing library resources, answers are given to the following questions: Given the importance of social crime prevention in its community-oriented form, to what extent has this dimension of criminal policy and its accompanying strategies been reflected in the Constitution as a supra-legislative regulation and attained a supreme aspect? Various principles of the Constitution have attended to the issue of crime prevention and the means of achieving it. However, the focus of this writing is the Third Principle of this document; because, despite containing societal strategies for crime prevention, it has not been deeply addressed in other conducted research.<br /> <br /><strong>Findings</strong><br /> Investigations indicate that the importance of crime prevention as a normative approach in criminal policy has led to this matter being manifested not only within legislative and infra-legislative regulations but also at the level of a superior and guiding regulation such as the Constitution. Therefore, by attending to the types of crime prevention, including social prevention, in various principles of this upstream document, such as the Third Principle—the subject of this writing—the essential foundations for it have been created, and by providing mechanisms, a fundamental aspect has been given to it. The intrinsic and identity aspect of the aforementioned prevention attends to the content of scientific and studied solutions such as establishing a poverty-eradicating, job-creating economy, providing welfare and basic necessities of life, strengthening education, universalizing higher education, enhancing the scope of public awareness by properly utilizing the capacity of the press and mass media, strengthening the political participation of various strata, free physical training, organizing the leisure time of citizens, especially children and adolescents. The formal aspect of this doctrine attends to the realm of management and the manner of its implementation by cross-sectoral institutions such as governmental, public, and non-governmental organizations across the country. The first version of the Bill on the Prevention of the Occurrence of Crime of 2006 (1385 AH), in a relatively comprehensive definition, introduced this type of prevention as "including the set of educational, cultural, economic, and social measures and methods of the government, non-governmental institutions and organizations, and people's organizations regarding the sanitization of the social environment and physical environment for the elimination or reduction of social factors of the occurrence of crime." The Law on the Prevention of the Occurrence of Crime adopted in 2015 (1394 AH), however, with a criticizable approach, without providing a separate definition of the aforementioned prevention, has attempted to reflect all types of prevention with this incomplete statement: "Prevention of the occurrence of crime means predicting, identifying, and assessing the risk of the occurrence of crime and adopting necessary measures and actions to eliminate or reduce it." <br /> <br /><strong>Conclusion</strong><br /> Each of the clauses of the Third Principle of the Constitution, by providing non-penal mechanisms for crime prevention in the social sphere, can and should inspire the welfare state in providing the basic needs of the masses. So much so that by improving public services in light of well-considered policies based on planning, organizing, coordination, and sustainable control, it can play a significant role in the realization of educational, economic, social, and political justice, and consequently, the reduction of the grounds for corruption and ruin.<strong>Introduction</strong><br />Crime prevention as a criminal policy strategy is realized through the application of penal and non-penal measures. The first approach brings its objective to fruition through penal prohibitions of behaviors contrary to public order and the establishment of appropriate punishments for them. The second approach, however, with a criminological and scientific view of this phenomenon, seeks to control it through the application of non-coercive actions. Among the forms of crime prevention in the second sense is community-oriented prevention, which, outside the penal system, with a etiological and antecedent approach, seeks to eliminate or reduce criminogenic environmental factors by relying on cultural, social, and economic actions. Thus, the aforementioned prevention, based on the assumption that diverse environmental factors are effective in regulating individuals' behavioral systems, puts on its agenda mechanisms such as organizing foundations like the economy, housing, education, and physical training in order to prevent their tendency to violate social norms. <br /><br /><strong>Methods</strong><br /> In this research, using a descriptive-analytical method and utilizing library resources, answers are given to the following questions: Given the importance of social crime prevention in its community-oriented form, to what extent has this dimension of criminal policy and its accompanying strategies been reflected in the Constitution as a supra-legislative regulation and attained a supreme aspect? Various principles of the Constitution have attended to the issue of crime prevention and the means of achieving it. However, the focus of this writing is the Third Principle of this document; because, despite containing societal strategies for crime prevention, it has not been deeply addressed in other conducted research.<br /> <br /><strong>Findings</strong><br /> Investigations indicate that the importance of crime prevention as a normative approach in criminal policy has led to this matter being manifested not only within legislative and infra-legislative regulations but also at the level of a superior and guiding regulation such as the Constitution. Therefore, by attending to the types of crime prevention, including social prevention, in various principles of this upstream document, such as the Third Principle—the subject of this writing—the essential foundations for it have been created, and by providing mechanisms, a fundamental aspect has been given to it. The intrinsic and identity aspect of the aforementioned prevention attends to the content of scientific and studied solutions such as establishing a poverty-eradicating, job-creating economy, providing welfare and basic necessities of life, strengthening education, universalizing higher education, enhancing the scope of public awareness by properly utilizing the capacity of the press and mass media, strengthening the political participation of various strata, free physical training, organizing the leisure time of citizens, especially children and adolescents. The formal aspect of this doctrine attends to the realm of management and the manner of its implementation by cross-sectoral institutions such as governmental, public, and non-governmental organizations across the country. The first version of the Bill on the Prevention of the Occurrence of Crime of 2006 (1385 AH), in a relatively comprehensive definition, introduced this type of prevention as "including the set of educational, cultural, economic, and social measures and methods of the government, non-governmental institutions and organizations, and people's organizations regarding the sanitization of the social environment and physical environment for the elimination or reduction of social factors of the occurrence of crime." The Law on the Prevention of the Occurrence of Crime adopted in 2015 (1394 AH), however, with a criticizable approach, without providing a separate definition of the aforementioned prevention, has attempted to reflect all types of prevention with this incomplete statement: "Prevention of the occurrence of crime means predicting, identifying, and assessing the risk of the occurrence of crime and adopting necessary measures and actions to eliminate or reduce it." <br /> <br /><strong>Conclusion</strong><br /> Each of the clauses of the Third Principle of the Constitution, by providing non-penal mechanisms for crime prevention in the social sphere, can and should inspire the welfare state in providing the basic needs of the masses. So much so that by improving public services in light of well-considered policies based on planning, organizing, coordination, and sustainable control, it can play a significant role in the realization of educational, economic, social, and political justice, and consequently, the reduction of the grounds for corruption and ruin.https://jls.shirazu.ac.ir/article_8340_1461c86de3ef8eb083dbf77fcab25563.pdfShiraz UniversityJournal of Legal Studies2008-792618120260421An In-Depth Analysis of the Administrative Court's Rulings on the Ban of "Santouri" and "Rastakhiz": Legal Challenges to Iran's Cinema Licensing SystemAn In-Depth Analysis of the Administrative Court's Rulings on the Ban of "Santouri" and "Rastakhiz": Legal Challenges to Iran's Cinema Licensing System683726857210.22099/jls.2026.54332.5387FAMohamad RezaVijeh. Associate Prof, Department of Public and International Law, Faculty Of Law And Political Science, Allameh Tabataba'i University, Tehran, IranVahidAgahAssistant Prof, Department of Public and International Law, Faculty Of Law And Political Science, Allameh Tabataba'i University, Tehran, IranJournal Article20250920<strong>Introduction</strong><br />This study examines the administrative legal challenges surrounding the revocation of screening permits for two Iranian films, "Santouri" (2009) and "Rastakhiz" (2012), despite prior official approval from the Ministry of Culture. Both cases highlight systemic conflicts within Iran’s cinema regulatory framework, particularly the tension between artistic expression and state-imposed "cultural and political necessities." The analysis focuses on the role of the Administrative Justice Court as the primary judicial body addressing such disputes and explores the legal concepts of "legitimate expectation" and "vested rights" within Iranian administrative law.<br /><br /><br /><br /><br />An In-Depth Analysis of the Administrative Court's Rulings on the Ban …<br /><br /><br /><br /><br /><strong>Methods</strong><br />This research employs a case study approach, analyzing the legal texts of the Administrative Justice Court’s rulings for "Santouri" and "Rastakhiz," alongside relevant regulatory frameworks, including the 1982 Film Screening Supervision Regulations and its 1985 amendment (Article 4). The methodology includes comparative legal analysis of the two cases under different versions of the Court’s procedural laws (2005 vs. 2012 statutes). The study also considers the socio-political context of artistic censorship in Iran and its impact on judicial outcomes.<br /> <br /><strong>Findings</strong><br />The findings reveal critical flaws in Iran’s cinema law, particularly the arbitrary power granted to the Head of the Cinema Organization under Article 4 to revoke screening permits based on vague "cultural and political necessities." This provision violates core administrative law principles, including legality, procedural transparency, and the requirement for reasoned decisions.<br />The Court’s rulings diverged significantly:<br /><br />For <em>Santouri</em>, the Court rejected the challenge to the revocation but acknowledged the claim for damages, implicitly recognizing a "vested right" under the 2005 statute.<br />For <em>Rastakhiz</em>, the Court only confirmed the occurrence of a violation by the administration (under the 2012 statute) but did not award damages.<br /><br />Despite these rulings, neither film was fully restored to public screening. The study also notes the judiciary’s reluctance to fully embrace "legitimate expectation" as a legal principle, opting instead for narrower interpretations of "vested rights." The research further highlights the chilling effect of regulatory ambiguity on filmmakers, who often avoid litigation due to fears of bureaucratic retaliation and prolonged delays. Furthermore, the analysis demonstrates that the current legal interpretation fails to adequately distinguish between the 'suspension' and 'permanent revocation' of permits, leaving producers in a state of perpetual uncertainty. While the Ministry’s issuance of a production license should theoretically generate a legitimate expectation of screening, the invocation of Article 4 effectively nullifies this security. The study argues that by awarding damages in the Santouri case rather than enforcing the permit's validity, the judiciary inadvertently validated the executive branch's overreach. This approach transforms the fundamental right of free expression into a transactional liability, effectively allowing the state to pay for the suppression of artistic content and discouraging private investment due to unmitigated regulatory risks.<br /><br /><br /><br /><br />Volume 18, Issue 1, Spring 2026<br /> <br /><br /><br /><br /><br /><strong>Conclusion</strong> <br />The cases of <em>Santouri</em> and <em>Rastakhiz</em> underscore the systemic vulnerabilities in Iran’s cinema law, where broad discretionary powers enable arbitrary censorship. While the Administrative Justice Court provided partial relief by acknowledging violations and, in one case, damages, its rulings failed to fully uphold filmmakers' "legitimate expectations" or challenge the constitutionality of Article 4. The study concludes that without substantive legal reforms—including clearer criteria for permit revocation and stronger judicial protection of creative rights—administrative arbitrariness will continue to stifle artistic expression. Ultimately, the fate of these films reflects broader tensions between law, state power, and art in Iran.<br /><br /><br /><br /><br />An In-Depth Analysis of the Administrative Court's Rulings on the Ban …<br /><br /><br /><br /><br /> <strong>Introduction</strong><br />This study examines the administrative legal challenges surrounding the revocation of screening permits for two Iranian films, "Santouri" (2009) and "Rastakhiz" (2012), despite prior official approval from the Ministry of Culture. Both cases highlight systemic conflicts within Iran’s cinema regulatory framework, particularly the tension between artistic expression and state-imposed "cultural and political necessities." The analysis focuses on the role of the Administrative Justice Court as the primary judicial body addressing such disputes and explores the legal concepts of "legitimate expectation" and "vested rights" within Iranian administrative law.<br /><br /><br /><br /><br />An In-Depth Analysis of the Administrative Court's Rulings on the Ban …<br /><br /><br /><br /><br /><strong>Methods</strong><br />This research employs a case study approach, analyzing the legal texts of the Administrative Justice Court’s rulings for "Santouri" and "Rastakhiz," alongside relevant regulatory frameworks, including the 1982 Film Screening Supervision Regulations and its 1985 amendment (Article 4). The methodology includes comparative legal analysis of the two cases under different versions of the Court’s procedural laws (2005 vs. 2012 statutes). The study also considers the socio-political context of artistic censorship in Iran and its impact on judicial outcomes.<br /> <br /><strong>Findings</strong><br />The findings reveal critical flaws in Iran’s cinema law, particularly the arbitrary power granted to the Head of the Cinema Organization under Article 4 to revoke screening permits based on vague "cultural and political necessities." This provision violates core administrative law principles, including legality, procedural transparency, and the requirement for reasoned decisions.<br />The Court’s rulings diverged significantly:<br /><br />For <em>Santouri</em>, the Court rejected the challenge to the revocation but acknowledged the claim for damages, implicitly recognizing a "vested right" under the 2005 statute.<br />For <em>Rastakhiz</em>, the Court only confirmed the occurrence of a violation by the administration (under the 2012 statute) but did not award damages.<br /><br />Despite these rulings, neither film was fully restored to public screening. The study also notes the judiciary’s reluctance to fully embrace "legitimate expectation" as a legal principle, opting instead for narrower interpretations of "vested rights." The research further highlights the chilling effect of regulatory ambiguity on filmmakers, who often avoid litigation due to fears of bureaucratic retaliation and prolonged delays. Furthermore, the analysis demonstrates that the current legal interpretation fails to adequately distinguish between the 'suspension' and 'permanent revocation' of permits, leaving producers in a state of perpetual uncertainty. While the Ministry’s issuance of a production license should theoretically generate a legitimate expectation of screening, the invocation of Article 4 effectively nullifies this security. The study argues that by awarding damages in the Santouri case rather than enforcing the permit's validity, the judiciary inadvertently validated the executive branch's overreach. This approach transforms the fundamental right of free expression into a transactional liability, effectively allowing the state to pay for the suppression of artistic content and discouraging private investment due to unmitigated regulatory risks.<br /><br /><br /><br /><br />Volume 18, Issue 1, Spring 2026<br /> <br /><br /><br /><br /><br /><strong>Conclusion</strong> <br />The cases of <em>Santouri</em> and <em>Rastakhiz</em> underscore the systemic vulnerabilities in Iran’s cinema law, where broad discretionary powers enable arbitrary censorship. While the Administrative Justice Court provided partial relief by acknowledging violations and, in one case, damages, its rulings failed to fully uphold filmmakers' "legitimate expectations" or challenge the constitutionality of Article 4. The study concludes that without substantive legal reforms—including clearer criteria for permit revocation and stronger judicial protection of creative rights—administrative arbitrariness will continue to stifle artistic expression. Ultimately, the fate of these films reflects broader tensions between law, state power, and art in Iran.<br /><br /><br /><br /><br />An In-Depth Analysis of the Administrative Court's Rulings on the Ban …<br /><br /><br /><br /><br /> https://jls.shirazu.ac.ir/article_8572_2c62ab04e137ba8e3f3dbf84dd78fbba.pdfShiraz UniversityJournal of Legal Studies2008-792618120260421The Twelve-Day Iran-Israel War and Reconsidering the Criterion of Immediacy in States’ Self-Defense through the Use of Artificial IntelligenceThe Twelve-Day Iran-Israel War and Reconsidering the Criterion of Immediacy in States’ Self-Defense through the Use of Artificial Intelligence727760861510.22099/jls.2026.55451.5459FAShahnazShamsPhD student in International Law, Department of Law, Na.C, Islamic Azad University, Najafabad, IranMASOUDRAEI. Professor, Department of Law, Na.C, Islamic Azad University, Najafabad, IranAlirezaAnsari MahyariAssistant Professor, Department of Law, Na.C, Islamic Azad University, Najafabad, IranJournal Article20260106<strong>Introduction</strong><br />Developments arising from the twelve‑day war between Iran and Israel in 2025 once again highlighted the issue of the use of force and the conditions for invoking self‑defense in international law. One of the key elements in assessing the legality of self‑defense is the criterion of “immediacy,” traditionally understood as the need for a prompt response to an armed attack. However, the emergence of modern threats such as hybrid warfare, cyber operations, and data‑driven security environments has challenged the classical understanding of this requirement. In many contemporary situations, threats develop gradually through multiple indicators, making it more difficult to determine when the threshold of an armed attack has been crossed. At the same time, advances in artificial intelligence enable the rapid analysis of large volumes of intelligence and security data. Accordingly, this study aims to reconsider the concept of immediacy in contemporary international law and to examine the capacities and limitations of artificial intelligence in assessing imminent threats, using the twelve‑day war between Iran and Israel as a case study.<br /><strong> </strong><br /><strong>Methods</strong><br />This study adopts an analytical‑exploratory approach with an interdisciplinary perspective. It first examines the legal foundations of the requirement of immediacy within the framework of Article 51 of the United Nations Charter and the principles of necessity and proportionality. It then analyzes transformations in the nature of contemporary threats, particularly hybrid warfare and cyber operations. The research is based on the analysis of legal sources and scholarly literature, alongside a qualitative case study of the twelve‑day war between Iran and Israel in order to assess the role of data‑driven analysis and artificial intelligence technologies in evaluating threats and supporting decisions related to self‑defense.<br /><strong> </strong><br /><strong>Results and Discussion</strong><br />The findings indicate that the traditional understanding of immediacy as a strictly instantaneous response to an armed attack is increasingly inadequate in contemporary conflict environments. In the case of the twelve‑day war between Iran and Israel, the evaluation of potential self‑defense situations was not limited to a single overt military act but rather involved the interpretation of a complex set of intelligence indicators, security assessments, cyber activities, and patterns of hostile conduct. This suggests that determining whether the threshold of an armed attack has been reached often requires the simultaneous analysis of diverse and rapidly evolving sources of information. Artificial intelligence technologies can assist in this process by enabling the rapid processing and analysis of large volumes of military, intelligence, and security data. Through pattern recognition, predictive analytics, and large‑scale data processing, AI systems can help identify emerging threats and generate real‑time assessments that support decision‑makers in evaluating the immediacy of potential attacks. Nevertheless, the study also demonstrates that the assessment of immediacy retains both objective and subjective dimensions. The objective dimension relates to the existence of verifiable evidence indicating an imminent threat, while the subjective dimension concerns the perception and judgment of the state facing that threat at the moment of decision‑making. AI technologies can strengthen the objective dimension by providing comprehensive data analysis and improving situational awareness. However, the legality of invoking self‑defense ultimately requires normative interpretation, legal reasoning, and the evaluation of principles such as necessity and proportionality. For this reason, decisions concerning the use of force cannot be delegated entirely to algorithmic systems. Instead, artificial intelligence should function as a supportive analytical tool that enhances the informational basis of decision‑making without replacing human legal judgment. The findings further suggest that the integration of artificial intelligence into assessments of immediacy must be accompanied by appropriate legal and institutional safeguards. These safeguards include effective human oversight over AI‑assisted analytical processes, transparency regarding the algorithms and datasets used in threat analysis, mechanisms to detect and mitigate algorithmic bias, and the preservation of state accountability for decisions taken on the basis of technological assessments. Without such safeguards, excessive reliance on AI may lead to inaccurate threat evaluations and potentially encourage overly broad interpretations of the right of self‑defense.<br /> <br /><strong>Conclusion</strong><br />The study concludes that revisiting the requirement of immediacy in contemporary international law requires a careful balance between technological innovation and the normative framework governing the use of force. Artificial intelligence can enhance states’ analytical capacity to detect emerging threats and support more timely assessments of potential attacks. However, its use must remain subject to human legal judgment, transparency, and accountability in order to ensure that technological tools complement rather than undermine the fundamental principles of international law.<strong>Introduction</strong><br />Developments arising from the twelve‑day war between Iran and Israel in 2025 once again highlighted the issue of the use of force and the conditions for invoking self‑defense in international law. One of the key elements in assessing the legality of self‑defense is the criterion of “immediacy,” traditionally understood as the need for a prompt response to an armed attack. However, the emergence of modern threats such as hybrid warfare, cyber operations, and data‑driven security environments has challenged the classical understanding of this requirement. In many contemporary situations, threats develop gradually through multiple indicators, making it more difficult to determine when the threshold of an armed attack has been crossed. At the same time, advances in artificial intelligence enable the rapid analysis of large volumes of intelligence and security data. Accordingly, this study aims to reconsider the concept of immediacy in contemporary international law and to examine the capacities and limitations of artificial intelligence in assessing imminent threats, using the twelve‑day war between Iran and Israel as a case study.<br /><strong> </strong><br /><strong>Methods</strong><br />This study adopts an analytical‑exploratory approach with an interdisciplinary perspective. It first examines the legal foundations of the requirement of immediacy within the framework of Article 51 of the United Nations Charter and the principles of necessity and proportionality. It then analyzes transformations in the nature of contemporary threats, particularly hybrid warfare and cyber operations. The research is based on the analysis of legal sources and scholarly literature, alongside a qualitative case study of the twelve‑day war between Iran and Israel in order to assess the role of data‑driven analysis and artificial intelligence technologies in evaluating threats and supporting decisions related to self‑defense.<br /><strong> </strong><br /><strong>Results and Discussion</strong><br />The findings indicate that the traditional understanding of immediacy as a strictly instantaneous response to an armed attack is increasingly inadequate in contemporary conflict environments. In the case of the twelve‑day war between Iran and Israel, the evaluation of potential self‑defense situations was not limited to a single overt military act but rather involved the interpretation of a complex set of intelligence indicators, security assessments, cyber activities, and patterns of hostile conduct. This suggests that determining whether the threshold of an armed attack has been reached often requires the simultaneous analysis of diverse and rapidly evolving sources of information. Artificial intelligence technologies can assist in this process by enabling the rapid processing and analysis of large volumes of military, intelligence, and security data. Through pattern recognition, predictive analytics, and large‑scale data processing, AI systems can help identify emerging threats and generate real‑time assessments that support decision‑makers in evaluating the immediacy of potential attacks. Nevertheless, the study also demonstrates that the assessment of immediacy retains both objective and subjective dimensions. The objective dimension relates to the existence of verifiable evidence indicating an imminent threat, while the subjective dimension concerns the perception and judgment of the state facing that threat at the moment of decision‑making. AI technologies can strengthen the objective dimension by providing comprehensive data analysis and improving situational awareness. However, the legality of invoking self‑defense ultimately requires normative interpretation, legal reasoning, and the evaluation of principles such as necessity and proportionality. For this reason, decisions concerning the use of force cannot be delegated entirely to algorithmic systems. Instead, artificial intelligence should function as a supportive analytical tool that enhances the informational basis of decision‑making without replacing human legal judgment. The findings further suggest that the integration of artificial intelligence into assessments of immediacy must be accompanied by appropriate legal and institutional safeguards. These safeguards include effective human oversight over AI‑assisted analytical processes, transparency regarding the algorithms and datasets used in threat analysis, mechanisms to detect and mitigate algorithmic bias, and the preservation of state accountability for decisions taken on the basis of technological assessments. Without such safeguards, excessive reliance on AI may lead to inaccurate threat evaluations and potentially encourage overly broad interpretations of the right of self‑defense.<br /> <br /><strong>Conclusion</strong><br />The study concludes that revisiting the requirement of immediacy in contemporary international law requires a careful balance between technological innovation and the normative framework governing the use of force. Artificial intelligence can enhance states’ analytical capacity to detect emerging threats and support more timely assessments of potential attacks. However, its use must remain subject to human legal judgment, transparency, and accountability in order to ensure that technological tools complement rather than undermine the fundamental principles of international law.https://jls.shirazu.ac.ir/article_8615_b264b0e0cfcb8ac596ed8f0fafd55b60.pdf