Shiraz University Journal of Legal Studies 2008-7926 12 2 2020 06 21 Nature and Modes of Accessory Liability in the International Criminal Courts Nature and Modes of Accessory Liability in the International Criminal Courts 131 162 5771 10.22099/jls.2020.5771 FA Mahin Sobhani Assistant Professor at University of Guilan Nadia Bagheri Student in Criminal Law and Criminology, Department of Criminal and Criminology Law, Faculty of Law and Political Science, Allameh Tabatabai University, Tehran, Iran. Journal Article 2019 07 19 <span>Statute of the international criminal tribunals for Yugoslavia and Rwanda, the Special Court for Sierra Leone and the Statute of the International Criminal Court did not refer to the “accessory”, but merely pointed out examples of assistance in the commission of international crimes such as, planning, instigation, aiding and abetting. There is an important question that if those modes of assistance in the commission of international crimes can be regarded as accessory liability to commit an international crime. Does accessory liability can give rise to less severe criminal liability and then lighter punishment? So, this paper examining various criteria to distinguish between principals and accessories concludes that despite the lack of reference to accessory liability in the statutes of international criminal courts, in practice, they confirm the existence of some modes of accessory liability by reference to the test of control of crime. In fact, those who have "control over the commission of the offence" are perpetrators. As a result, those do not have control over the commission of the crime are accessories. Each mode of Accessory Liability has distinct definitions and requirements, and there is a hierarchical relationship between them. This distinction is intended to provide a true picture of the role of perpetrators of international crimes. However, this does not necessarily lead to less severe punishments for accessories.</span> <span>Statute of the international criminal tribunals for Yugoslavia and Rwanda, the Special Court for Sierra Leone and the Statute of the International Criminal Court did not refer to the “accessory”, but merely pointed out examples of assistance in the commission of international crimes such as, planning, instigation, aiding and abetting. There is an important question that if those modes of assistance in the commission of international crimes can be regarded as accessory liability to commit an international crime. Does accessory liability can give rise to less severe criminal liability and then lighter punishment? So, this paper examining various criteria to distinguish between principals and accessories concludes that despite the lack of reference to accessory liability in the statutes of international criminal courts, in practice, they confirm the existence of some modes of accessory liability by reference to the test of control of crime. In fact, those who have "control over the commission of the offence" are perpetrators. As a result, those do not have control over the commission of the crime are accessories. Each mode of Accessory Liability has distinct definitions and requirements, and there is a hierarchical relationship between them. This distinction is intended to provide a true picture of the role of perpetrators of international crimes. However, this does not necessarily lead to less severe punishments for accessories.</span> https://jls.shirazu.ac.ir/article_5771_97dbfdf35809e22bacf763c706666124.pdf